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1ven before the term “realism” was brought into general use 
in England through the writings of G. H. Lewes, there was 
a general impression of a new kind of writing and Dickens 
was seen as one of its predecessors.1 There are certainly ele-
ments of realism in the novels of Austen and Scott, but the one excludes 
a good deal from her fiction, in particular the lower classes, with some 
exceptions, and the other tends to include some fanciful items in the 
very structure of his fiction that disallow a clear realist definition.2 I am 
thinking of the predictions of doom uttered concerning Edgar Raven-
swood in Scott’s The Bride of Lammermoor. These could have passed 
as representations of Scottish superstition at the beginning of the eigh-
teenth century if they did not function as part of the novel’s design by 
being fulfilled. Similarly, there is much in Dickens’s fiction that certainly 
appears to be realistic. John Forster records that Dickens himself valued 
realism above all else in his fiction, but does not elaborate on what that 
realism meant to Dickens. One need only cite the many urban scenes 
that vividly evoke the real presence of the city from Sketches by Boz 
on. But I would like to argue that Dickens is actually creating a kind 
of hyperreality, to borrow a term from Umberto Eco. There is always a 
touch of exaggeration of the real (and sometimes more than a touch) in 
Dickens’s novels. Donald Hawes puts it this way: “Enter a Dickens novel 
and you enter a highly charged, multitudinous world, in which realism 
and imagination are interfused as never before or since” (9). Some 
critics, such as J. P. Stern, have taken Dickens’s abundant and obvious 
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delight in the multitudinousness of the world as an indication that his works 
fall into the realist camp (1–5), but the very exuberance with which Dickens 
approaches the world transforms it into something difficult to define as real-
istic.
 Like many other Dickens scholars, I see Dickens as an heir of Romanti-
cism, with an emphasis on the importance of the imagination over simple 
reason, something in the way that imagination is valued above Facts in Hard 
Times. His inclination is to project the emotions of his characters into the 
world around them, what Meyer Abrams described in the metaphor of the 
lamp in The Mirror and the Lamp. The tradition of poets such as Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, who openly described that action of what would come to 
be known as the Pathetic Fallacy, was continued with a vengeance by such 
Victorian poets as Tennyson and Browning in poems like “Mariana” and 
“Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came.” But novelists carried on the tra-
dition as well, Dickens notable among them, and this attention to subjec-
tive states to some degree separates such writers from what was to become 
known as realism.
 My approach to realism has mainly to do with narrative method, though 
I hope I have not ignored the importance of character depiction and other 
aspects of story telling. But I do not feel obliged to discuss approaches that 
follow from the tradition of social realism, which has a tendency to confuse 
content with method. I am not here concerned with how Dickens depicted 
social institutions such as marriage, or to speculate on whether or not queer 
theory can be applied to his creation of Sally Brass in The Old Curiosity 
Shop. I prefer to work in the formalist tradition, which has recently been 
surveyed in its contemporary manifestations by Dario Villanueva in Theories 
of Literary Realism. At times I depend upon the concept of intentionality, a 
modern version of which Villanueva attributes to Husserl and phenome-
nology, but I hope that I have provided enough evidence from Dickens’s own 
writings to indicate that he was aware of his own intentions and sought to 
impose them on his readers, whether they realized this or not. For a framing 
of what realism means in literature, I am content with Lilian Furst’s presenta-
tion in All Is True: The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction.
On the contrary, realist fiction actively encourages a pretended continuity in 
the coexistence of the internal realm as an extension of the external. With a 
canny concealment of any cracks, fictional referents are presented as prolon-
gations of referents known outside the fictions. Although the two frames of 
reference overlap and share, they do not meet. The internal is adjacent and 
parallel to the external. So the text projects a new referent, constructing its 
own reality while simultaneously describing it. This internal reality draws on 
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a selection of attributes from the actual world, physically and socially, that 
function as “reality keys.” The antecedents are related to the text by a pro-
cess of fictionalization, whereby both historical and geographical data are 
annexed into the fictive realm as warranties of realism’s pretended authen-
ticity. (110)
It is just at the seam where the realist attempts to assert authority and authen-
ticity by disguising the role of the author that Dickens operates, shifting his 
weight in favor of the author, who slyly or openly establishes authority.
 One reason that Dickens has been classed with the realists, as I men-
tioned above, is his concern for social issues. At least from George Lukács, it 
has been characteristic to associate the realists with their concern for social 
improvement, such as alleviating the poverty and working conditions of 
the lower classes.3 This approach to realism assumes a direct relationship 
between text and external reality. As the passage from Furst above sug-
gests, this can never be a firm basis for realism, for realism is a mode of 
communication distinct from what it discusses, as, it may be argued, are all 
speech acts. A little later on, I shall discuss how this matter complicates Peter 
Brooks’s treatment of Dickens as a realist. Ioan Williams’s 1974 study of the 
realist novel seems to want to approach realism from a comprehensive point 
of view, as the following quotation suggests.
Finally, the texture and scope of mid-Victorian novels settle the question. 
Their solidity and firmness, their humour and breadth of interest in the 
abundance and variety of human character, and their unprecedented physi-
cal, social, and psychological detail, make the term Realist especially appro-
priate. (x–xi)
But when he finally comes to discuss Dickens, he focuses more on his treat-
ment of character than on the structure and methodology of his novels. One 
problem is that Williams defines realism in his own particular way. He sees it 
as manifesting an organic view of human experience which saw imagination 
and reason as “faculties innate in man, allied to unreflecting consciousness, 
by which he apprehended total Reality as an undivided whole and himself as 
one of its parts” (xii). Because he sees Dickens as “the first Victorian writer to 
conceive and attempt the creation of a vision of contemporary life as organi-
cally unified, and to face the technical and structural problems which were 
involved in this,” he must include Dickens among the realists (116).
 Williams associates the realist novel with the social novel, so Dickens’s 
depiction of working class life and his clear purpose of effecting social 
change also links him to realism. And yet, there is much in Williams’s argu-
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ment that hints at another way of reading Dickens and perhaps other Vic-
torian novelists as well. For example, Williams sees the realist novel as part 
of the Romantic tradition. “Nineteenth century Realist fiction in England is 
a form of Romantic art, but it differs from Romantic art itself in throwing 
emphasis on the importance of reproducing the external conditions of life 
and the material laws” (xii). With regard to Dickens himself, Williams offers 
a curious view of a general critical attitude in the 70s. “From the modern 
standpoint, Dickens seems to have escaped from the limitations of Victorian 
Realism and penetrated to a deeper level of reality” (139). He cites Dick-
ens’s interest in abnormal states of consciousness. But while he admits that 
Dickens was “original and idiosyncratic,” he also insists that he was “typical” 
(139), yet further on he admits that Dickens “was committed to melodra-
matic and sensational treatment of character, presenting internal processes 
by external factors” (141). This tension and almost contradiction returns in 
the ending of his chapter specifically on Dickens.
It is Dickens’s great achievement that dramatic or narrative separateness 
and conflict can be used in this way, to imply a dimension of life which lies 
beyond the apparent reality in which his hero-narrator addresses the reader. 
The nature of this achievement is unique, but the essential principle is com-
mon to all Realist fiction—the energy which runs through all men, though 
distorted by vice, by social circumstances, or by ignorance and weakness, 
carries meaning and moulds experience itself. (155)
If Dickens’s achievement is unique, perhaps it should not so easily be lumped 
in the category of realism. There is much that is helpful in Williams’s discus-
sion of realism, but the contradiction between content and style evident in 
his treatment of the subject needs to be faced. Hence, I have used the term 
hyperreality to describe Dickens’s self-consciously exaggerated rendering of 
the world around him. When Eco used the term in Travels in Hyperreality, 
he referred to imitations that were so grotesque that they became mockeries 
of what they were imitating. In the essay in the collection entitled “Travels 
in Hyperreality,” he takes on such notable American landmarks as Hearst’s 
Castle, Disney World, Forest Lawn, and other such institutions. My altera-
tion of the term is honorific and refers to Dickens’s ability to convey a sense 
of the everyday world while at the same time almost magically transforming 
it. I don’t mean the kind of magic associated with magical realism, but some-
thing much more insidious that is rooted in style, not content.
 A recent excellent critic runs into similar problems with content and 
method when including Dickens among the realists. In Realist Vision, 
Peter Brooks admits at the beginning of his chapter on Hard Times: “I am 
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of course not sure that it is right to talk about Dickens in the context of 
realism at all, since so much of Dickens appears as the avoidance or suppres-
sion of realism” (40). Brooks’s remark reflects the increased sophistication 
of criticism on Dickens since the 70s, and the outright resistance of some 
scholars to include Dickens among the realists. But Brooks nonetheless does 
include him. Remarkably, the text he chooses is Hard Times, a novel that, in 
defending the imagination against a Utilitarian outlook on life, makes abun-
dant use of exaggeration and nonrealist techniques, perhaps most notably 
in its blatant and highly structured pattern of metaphors. One can under-
stand Brooks’s initial doubt about classifying Dickens among the realists, 
since his perception of Hard Times is that it refuses the usual realist task of 
cataloguing the industrial workplace. In the end, he concludes of the novel 
that “it is not so much that this novel represents Coketown as that it stands 
as a counteraction against Coketown, an alternative to it. The novel versus 
the life of machinery” (52). Perhaps the main reason Brooks did include 
Hard Times in his book is that its subject matter fits so well into one vision of 
literary realism—the attempt to improve social conditions, especially among 
the working classes. As I have already suggested, my emphasis is entirely dif-
ferent. Of course Dickens was interested in social improvements, but when 
it came to his writing, he was also extremely conscious of his craft. And it is 
on this craft that my emphasis lies.
 Not quite so recent, but fully aware of the dilemma of realist classification, 
Harry E. Shaw feels it necessary to call attention to modern disparagements 
of realism; he refers to a critical tendency to see realism as a bad alternative 
to more acceptable modes of narration, and he feels obliged to offer his own 
definition, which also describes his methodology.
Nineteenth-century realist fiction can be seen as an attempt to balance pro-
cedure and substance, in the concrete modes by which it invites the reader 
to come to terms with realities, imagined and real. In my own definition of 
realism I attempt a similar balancing act, by arguing that realism insists that 
certain mental procedures are needed to make sense of those substantial 
aspects of the world it selects as significant. A dialectic between substance 
and procedure is also implicit in my claim that historicist realism involves a 
movement between positions in and above a given historical moment. (xii)
Shaw has moved away from the materialist basis of earlier critics’ approaches 
to realism, and tends toward a more psychological focus. But he is fully aware 
of the various ways in which modern criticism has defined and interpreted 
realism, and his first chapter is a handy survey of some notable positions on 
the subject.
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 J. Jeffrey Franklin goes further than Shaw in suggesting that Victorian 
realists were not interested in mirroring nature, but concerned with the true 
as distinguished from the real (25).4 He likens them to postmodern writers, 
for “they perform a revised version of society into existence by both the-
matically representing and formally enacting a reality that is similar to but 
‘truer’ than social reality” (30). Franklin emphasizes the important role of 
play, both as a subject and as a textual manner in the writers he examines. 
He touches only briefly upon Dickens, but concludes his study with an inter-
esting suggestion as far as genre studies are concerned.
Even so, perhaps it is time to expand and redefine the concept of realism to 
encompass not only Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend and Victor Hugo’s 
The Hunchback of Notre Dame, for example, but also James Joyce’s Ulysses 
and Toni Morrison’s Beloved. (204)
This solution seems to me to make realism such a diluted term that it can be 
applied to all sorts of literature. The inclusion of such an obviously Modernist 
work as Ulysses highlights the problem. I would rather employ a different 
term, and hyperreality seems a good one, to call attention to the theatricality 
of Dickens’s approach. But he is doing more than just borrowing techniques 
from the stage; he is placing himself in the position of producer and stage 
manager as well. Most critics will admit that Dickens borrowed a good deal 
from the theater and that he enjoyed a certain amount of melodrama in his 
novels. In a recent collection, John Glavin puts it this way:
Pretty much everyone agrees Dickens’s fiction is spectacular. I’m going to lit-
eralize that claim to say that in an era of Spectacular Theatre Dickens wrote a 
comparably Spectacular Fiction, where Spectacular, on both stage and page, 
meant something like realism eradicated. (Cambridge Companion 190)
 My approach to Dickens and realism involves a balancing act rather 
different from Shaw’s. I have in mind Roland Barthes’s useful distinction 
between readerly and writerly texts. In the former, the reader is granted a 
good deal of interpretive freedom, in the latter, the author seeks to main-
tain authority. I shall argue that Dickens was fully aware of these positions, 
though he might not have been able to offer critical interpretations of them. 
What Dickens tried to do from rather early in his career was to give his audi-
ence the impression that they were reading readerly texts, while, in fact, he 
was writing writerly texts.5 In the later part of his career he took to pointing 
out either overtly or through such things as plot devices or metaphorical pat-
terns, his domination of his own stories. Several of the late novels actually 
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have to be reread to be fully grasped, with Our Mutual Friend perhaps being 
the outstanding example.
 However, by way of illustration, I would like to juxtapose a passage 
from Dombey and Son in the middle of Dickens’s career, with one from his 
contemporary Mrs. Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers, a novel that fits two narrative 
descriptions, for it is, I believe a good example of realism in the more limited 
genre of the domestic novel.6 The first is a description of Carker the man-
ager’s home. Dickens has already given an objective description of the neat 
and convenient nature of the exterior and to some degree the interior of the 
bachelor’s house at the beginning of chapter 33. Then he proceeds:
And yet, amidst this opulence of comfort, there is something in the general 
air that is not well. Is it that the carpets and the cushions are too soft and 
noiseless, so that those who move or repose among them seem to act by 
stealth? Is it that the prints and pictures do not commemorate great thoughts 
or deeds, or render nature in the poetry of landscape, hall, or hut, but are 
of one voluptuous cast—mere shows of form and colour—and no more? Is 
it that the books have all their gold outside, and that the titles of the greater 
part qualify them to be companions of the prints and titles of the pictures? Is 
it that the completeness and the beauty of the place is here and there belied 
by an affectation of humility, in some unimportant and inexpensive regard, 
which is as false as the face of the too truly painted portrait hanging yonder, 
or its original at breakfast in his easy chair below it? Or is it that, with the 
daily breath of that original and master of all here, there issues forth some 
subtle portion of himself, which gives a vague expression of himself to every-
thing about him! (471–72 )
Unlike the objective narrator of realism, Dickens’s narrator emphasizes his 
presence by way of a series of rhetorical questions, which, while implicating 
the reader in the interpretation of the catalogue, nonetheless prevents him 
from taking charge of that interpretation himself. His description is not 
intended to mirror the world. The first paragraph did that to some degree. 
He is here offering an imaginatively altered “real” world by attributing moral 
values to it through such loaded words as “stealth,” “voluptuous,” and “false.” 
Moreover, this passage explicitly states the notion behind Dickens’s repeated 
method throughout his work, by suggesting that Carker’s character perme-
ates the area and objects around him, just as Dickens cloaks his narratives 
in specific moral fabrics, largely the projections of the characters’ traits, or 
of the narrator’s own moods. In many cases these projections are connected 
by repetitions of one kind or another, often of patterns of imagery. In short, 
Dickens’s narrator not only dominates the “picture” he is presenting, but also 
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weaves it into the larger structure of the narrative as a whole. In later works 
this technique becomes more subtle, but here he is letting the audience see 
the magician’s sleight of hand.
 The passage from Sylvia’s Lovers is typical of Gaskell and of realism.
Foster’s shop was the shop of Monkshaven. It was kept by two Quaker 
brothers, who were now old men; and their father had kept it before them; 
probably his father before that. People remembered it as an old-fashioned 
dwelling-house, with a sort of supplementary shop with unglazed windows 
projecting from the lower story. These openings had long been filled with 
panes of glass that at the present day would be accounted very small, but 
which seventy years ago were much admired for their size. I can best make 
you understand the appearance of the place by bidding you think of the long 
openings in a butcher’s shop, and then to fill them up in your imagination 
with panes about eight inches by six, in a heavy wooden frame. There was 
one of these windows on each side the door-place, which was kept partially 
closed through the day by a low gate about a yard high. Half the shop was 
appropriated to grocery; the other half to drapery, and a little mercery. (22)
There is no attempt to characterize the owners of the shop by its contents. 
Although the narrator intrudes herself, it is only to help the reader picture 
the limited nature of the shop’s window by a comparison with windows of 
her own day. The shop is inserted into an historical frame. Certainly at this 
point in the novel there is no need for us to know that the proprietors are 
Quakers, so this information has the superfluous feel so characteristic of 
realist description. The narrator might speculate (probably the grandfather 
of the current owners owned the shop too), but offers no moral assessments. 
We are given a scene to evaluate and the narrator does not coerce us, as 
Dickens’s narrator does, by emphasizing Carker’s preference for the volup-
tuous—something stressed throughout the text by various means, including 
the association of Carker with cats.
 The preceding comments discuss recent critical attitudes regarding lit-
erary realism in general and Dickens in particular. But Dickens has been 
something of a problem from his own day. George H. Ford pointed out some 
time ago that as early as 1852, David Masson contrasted Dickens and Thac-
keray, putting the former in the category of ideal novelists and the latter 
in that of real novelist; to Masson, Dickens was poetic, though he did not 
necessarily mean this as a high compliment (Ford 116). For George Henry 
Lewes, Dickens did not live up to the standards of realism, which Lewes 
equated with the faithful representation of everyday existence, because his 
writings were hallucinatory (Ford 149ff). Some clue to Dickens’s attitude can 
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be found in his diatribe against Mr. Barlow, the stern teacher in the children’s 
book Sandford and Merton, in “Mr. Barlow” in The Uncommercial Traveller. 
Dickens dislikes the humorless Mr. Barlow because he represents a heavily 
didactical approach to fiction. As a child, Dickens felt he was an imposi-
tion, wholly unlike the story telling that he preferred. Dickens writes: “The 
incompatibility of Mr. Barlow with all other portions of my young life but 
himself, the adamantine inadaptability of the man to my favorite fancies and 
amusements is the thing for which I hate him most. What right had he to 
bore his way into my Arabian Nights?” (339). This says it all. Dickens wanted 
some of the magic of the Arabian Nights wedded to the commonplaceness of 
the world around him, the romantic side of everyday things, as he put it him-
self. The program of realism accurately to reflect the world as it is might have 
appeared is too like the Utilitarian outlook excoriated in Hard Times (where 
the Arabian Nights is used effectively as a critical weapon) for Dickens to be 
sympathetic. 
 Dickens seems to have been misunderstood even by those who thoroughly 
enjoyed his novels. John Forster observed that what mattered to Dickens was 
that he gave a true impression of the world as it is, an attitude that can be 
confused with the realist endeavor (Ford 132). But he often commented on 
the truth as a moral truth. Hence, while he sought to render the material 
world in a factual manner, he also sought to enhance it for the improvement 
of his readers. His famous comment in the introduction to Bleak House that 
he wished to convey the romantic side of everyday life sums up this attitude.
 One useful way of looking at Dickens’s fiction was proposed some while 
ago by Edward Eigner in The Metaphysical Novel in England and America: 
Dickens, Bulwer, Hawthorne, Melville (1978). Eigner borrows the term 
“metaphysical novel” from Bulwer. In Bulwer in particular such novels were 
a “mixture of allegory and the matter-of-fact” (5). It was necessary to depict 
the material world as it was in order to subject it to a grand intellectual or 
moral design. “They had to present the experiential world view as compel-
lingly as possible before they could even generate the energy to contradict 
it with the opposite epistemic method” (181). These novels were character-
ized by premeditation; they had a scheme to which all else was subordinate. 
Thus, unlike the realist novel, character development was not important; 
characters served the overall design of the narrative. Eigner notes that “the 
metaphysical novelist does not proceed from ignorance, as the realist does, 
but from preconceived vision or truth” (64). Character development is the 
signature of nineteenth-century realist fiction; it is a main avenue for the 
pursuit of truth. But Eigner points out that “the metaphysical novelists rec-
ognized the idealized or simplified character as an injunction from German 
romantic aesthetics, but also as the heritage of the major forms of narrative 
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which had come down to them: epic, romance, and satire” (71). The narrator 
of the metaphysical novel also tended to be intrusive in a way that most real-
ists avoided. This forwardness of the narrator “offered an advantage to the 
metaphysical novelist, for if the reader could be forced to observe the cre-
ative process itself, not simply be permitted to watch the creation, he might 
become a participant in the vision rather than merely a spectator” (64–65). 
As I shall suggest in what follows, Dickens always wanted his readers to 
appreciate the craft with which he constructed his narratives, as his prefaces 
indicate.
 I shall not be discussing all of Dickens’s fiction. I shall, for example, have 
nothing to say about the historical novels Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two 
Cities. My discussions shall be concerned more with Dickens’s narrative 
method than with his subject matter or his moral objectives, both of which 
were certainly important to him.
11
escriptive detail is surely a characteristic of realist fiction, 
sometimes even to the point of offending some readers’ sen-
sibilities. There can be no doubt that Dickens was capable 
of extraordinary descriptive power, but that feature alone 
would not put him in the realist camp. In this chapter, focusing largely 
on Oliver Twist, I shall examine how, early in his career, Dickens had 
already developed a characteristic function for his descriptions.
 Modern readers of Oliver Twist (1838), though powerfully moved by 
its culminating scenes of Bill Sikes’s flight from the mob and death by 
accidental hanging from a house on Jacob’s Island, might be little inclined 
to pay much attention to the setting of these events. They may find the 
precise poetic justice the narrative enacts a little hard to swallow, but are 
not likely to raise the kind of objections that Sir Peter Laurie did when 
he claimed that there was no such place as Jacob’s Island in London, a 
place he said “ONLY existed in a work of fiction written by Mr. Charles 
Dickens”.2 Sir Peter was obviously not reading for the plot, but for an 
accurate representation of the world he believed he knew. Scholars and 
anyone who has read Dickens’s preface to the first Cheap Edition of 
Oliver Twist will recall that Dickens insisted upon the real existence of 
Jacob’s Island, an assertion that has led some scholars to deplore Dick-
ens’s attempt to transform his moral fable into a realistic depiction of 
Description1
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nineteenth-century urban life.3 For the literal-minded of Dickens’s day, the 
situation should have been simple. Draw a map and let them visit Jacob’s 
Island if it exists in reality. Less literal-minded readers might acknowledge 
that a representation of a real condition does not have to be a representation 
of a real place.4 The fact that there is no place named Jacob’s Island does not 
mean that its type does not exist, with its squalid population, narrow streets, 
decrepit houses, and mud. Dickens’s assertion that Jacob’s Island did exist, 
however, seems to be a claim on his part that his story is realistic, not merely 
fanciful. But I shall try to show that that was not his purpose. This early in 
his career, he knew what he wanted to achieve with his descriptions.
 In what follows, I examine description of real places in fictional texts, 
concentrating on the example of Jacob’s Island in Oliver Twist. Description 
has long been undervalued as a narrative device. This chapter is an attempt 
to refocus attention upon the narrative contributions description can make. 
Of course there are many types of description, from the concrete efforts at 
“realism” in Arnold Bennett’s Anna of the Five Towns to the striking imag-
inary descriptions in H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine. These descriptions 
serve different ends and can carry different ideological messages and achieve 
different esthetic purposes. Later, I shall compare the role of descriptions of 
place in Thomas Hardy and Emily Brontë with Dickens’s, especially in Oliver 
Twist, but my main intention here is to show how one form of description—
that of real places—can serve as a powerful vehicle of ideological purpose 
precisely because it occurs in a fictional text. Dickens, I argue, is successful 
in this way because he is able to make such description operate diegetically 
and also extradiegetically by imbedding this almost matter-of-fact descrip-
tion in a compelling moral fable—what today we might call a kind of hyper-
reality. In a way it is the opposite of the rhetorical device of enlivening the 
exposition of a sermon by including an amusing though instructive exem-
plum.
 In a recent study of nineteenth-century literature and culture entitled 
Novel Possibilities, Joseph W. Childers—struggling against what he sees as 
a tide of recent theoretical arguments that suggest literary works make no 
real difference, but merely engage in an intertextual discourse confined to 
the world of texts—contends that fiction not only relates to its social condi-
tion, but that it has agency and can participate in the transformation of that 
condition.5 Charles Dickens certainly believed that his writings could and 
did contribute to changes in the social conditions of his time, not least his 
descriptions of the workhouse and of the slum conditions of Jacob’s Island 
in Oliver Twist. Dickens’s response to Sir Peter Laurie’s charge that Jacob’s 
Island appeared in Dickens’s novel and was therefore imaginary was that 
Sir Peter Laurie himself had appeared in a book some years before (Dickens 
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had reason to know, since it was he who represented the alderman in his 
Christmas book The Chimes) and therefore Laurie, too, must be imaginary 
(384). This response would, of course, seem facetious to a literary critic of 
the present day, since she or he would immediately reply that we are talking 
here about representation. Of course Dickens knew that too, but he also 
believed that he could persuade his readers to actual changes in their lives 
through the power of his representations. Not only did he not believe that 
the author was dead, he believed that the true author never died.6 And he 
believed that the true author had genuine intentions to carry out and should 
control his narrative in such a way that they had their intended effect.
 What status does the description of a real place have in a fictional nar-
rative? How do we treat the register of “imaginary” characters, events, and 
locations, as opposed to the register of a “real” place? A simple response to 
the question is that the London of Oliver Twist is not a real place. It, too, 
is a representation. Never mind that Dickens names places that have real 
existence—St. Paul’s Cathedral, the Old Bailey, Newgate prison; these, too, 
are simply markers and bear no more than a trace of the actual places. Never 
mind also that Dickens is so particular about the route that Bill Sikes and 
Oliver take on their way to burgle the Maylie household or the equally par-
ticular route that Bill Sikes pursues after his murder of Nancy. These excur-
sions might have an internal significance to Dickens’s narrative, but do they 
matter in relationship to the real environs of London? Dickens himself 
seems to suggest that they do not by making the first excursion problem-
atic through the episode of the mysterious house that Oliver (incorrectly?) 
identifies, and the second through its phantasmal qualities. These interpreta-
tions of described places are complicated by the interference of the charac-
ters’ psychic states. That is not the case with the description of Jacob’s Island, 
which comes to us directly from the narrative voice.7 I do not here wish 
to reanimate the real/imaginary binary in the light of deconstructive and 
other recent theoretical approaches, but more modestly to call attention to 
peculiar creases in the fabric of interpretation when we try to distinguish 
how certain forms of description operate in fiction and what tools might be 
helpful to deal with them.8
 In Fiction and Diction, Gérard Genette concludes that “Except for the 
fictionality of their context, the speech acts of fictional characters, whether 
the fiction is dramatic or narrative, are authentic acts, fully endowed with 
the locutionary characteristics of such acts, with their ‘point’ and their illo-
cutionary force, and with their potential perlocutionary effects, intended or 
not” (33). He further concludes that there is therefore no reason why authors 
(his example is Tolstoy) cannot include maxims and descriptive utterances 
in their fictions. More explicitly, he declares that “utterances of the historical 
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or geographical type . . . are not necessarily deprived of their truth value by 
being inserted into a fictional context and subordinated to fictional ends” 
(49).
 If expressions of opinion by fictional characters are acceptable as authentic 
speech acts and “true” descriptions of place are allowable by narrators of 
novels, then in what way do they differ from a traveler’s or autobiographer’s 
expressions of opinion or “true” accounts of the places he or she has seen? 
When, for example, A. W. Kinglake in Eothen describes the exotic locations 
of the Middle East, are his descriptions more authentic than those that might 
appear in a novel, or that might appear in a travel book written by a novelist, 
as in Thackeray’s From Cornhill to Cairo? Both factual and fictive description 
is filtered through individual subjectivity, and, as Edward Said has made clear 
in Orientalism, whole cultures can develop screens for what they describe; 
hence any European might be inclined to distort the Middle Eastern object 
of his description because of his cultural preconceptions about the Orient.
 Oliver Twist does not involve the kind of exoticism that Said explores. 
Here we are talking about Londoners looking at and reporting the London 
of their own day. Nonetheless, we must still acknowledge that observers 
bring to the sights they see certain preconceptions about race, class, and 
even geographical location. A poor Irishman might see the neighborhood 
of Bermondsey in 1838 very differently from an Englishman of the middle 
or upper classes. Certain London neighborhoods were presumed by middle-
class citizens to have nefarious or unattractive characters, for example, Seven 
Dials, Snow Hill, and Whitechapel. Later in this chapter I shall suggest that 
it is precisely against such prescripting of place that fictional description can 
work in a way that it cannot in “true” reportage because fictional description 
is installed in an imaginary narrative, which has its own generative force.
 But for now let us return to the basic question: what role does the descrip-
tion of a real location play when it appears in a work of fiction?9 More spe-
cifically, how does Dickens’s description of an urban slum within a work 
of fiction operate in the imaginary not only of his own day, but in those of 
subsequent historical periods? Raymond Williams approaches this subject 
broadly in The Country and the City. To begin with, he notes that London 
was unusual as great cities of the nineteenth century went. Its “miscella-
neity and randomness,” he says, “in the end embodied a system: a negative 
system of indifference; a positive system of differentiation, in law, power and 
financial control. But the characteristic of London—capital city of a complex 
national and overseas economy and society—was that this was not, in any 
simple way, physically apparent” (154). Dickens perceived this peculiarity 
and captured it not in his actual descriptions of place, but in an innovative 
novelistic maneuver.
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Dickens’s creation of a new kind of novel—a creative achievement which had 
many false starts, many lapses, but in the end was decisive—can be directly 
related to what we must see as this double condition: the random and the 
systematic, the visible and the obscured, which is the true significance of 
the city, and especially at this period of the capital city, as a dominant social 
form.
 Dickens’s ultimate vision of London is then not to be illustrated by topog-
raphy or local instance. It lies in the form of his novels: in their kind of nar-
rative, in their method of characterisation, in their genius for typification. 
(154)
For Dickens, Williams adds, “[t]he city is shown as at once a social fact and 
a human landscape” (158). But, keen and helpful as this perception is, it does 
not resolve our issue. Williams implies that the specific description of place 
is relatively insignificant in Dickens’s representation of London and that it is 
the larger form of the novel that provides a conceptual equivalent of the city. 
I argue that the specific descriptions of real places remain highly charged 
ideological and representational nodes. Dickens could make place work 
effectively as the setting for dramatic action, thereby giving location a force 
that carried over from the diegetic or narrative world into the nonfictional, 
extradiegetic world. But his rendering of real places did not have the real-
istic novel’s ambition of transparency; rather, he wished his artfulness to be 
obvious in a manner essentially unwelcome to realism.
 To begin with, it is important to realize that Jacob’s Island did exist and 
not merely in the mind of Charles Dickens. It even appeared in contempo-
rary maps of the city. So the alderman of real London, Sir Peter Laurie, did 
not know his city as well as did the great fabler Charles Dickens. In fact, 
the very year that Sir Peter made his remarks about Jacob’s Island, Henry 
Mayhew was commissioned by the registrar general to make a report on that 
location, which was published in the Morning Chronicle on 24 September 
1849. Anne Humpherys writes: “The place had hardly changed since Dick-
ens’s famous exposé: Mayhew found the same rotting houses and the same 
filthy ditch” (16). Humpherys suggests that the whole series that became 
London Labour and London Poor grew out of this report. Drawing upon his 
own experiences and Mayhew’s researches, Charles Kingsley offered a pow-
erful picture of Jacob’s Island in Alton Locke (1850), a novel that had con-
siderable social impact. Not only, then, was Jacob’s Island a real place, but 
it became established in fictional and nonfictional texts as a representative 
place—a stereotypical urban slum.10
 When you get right down to it, Dickens’s description of Jacob’s Island is 
brief and not very particularized. After a paragraph describing the unsightly 
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approaches to the place, Dickens’s narrator arrives at Jacob’s Island, first 
describing Folly Ditch, which surrounds it, before becoming more specific.
Crazy wooden galleries common to the backs of half-a-dozen houses, with 
holes from which to look upon the slime beneath; windows, broken and 
patched: with poles thrust out, on which to dry the linen that is never there; 
rooms so small, so filthy, so confined, that the air would seem too tainted 
even for the dirt and squalor which they shelter; wooden chambers thrust-
ing themselves out above the mud, and threatening to fall into it—as some 
have done; dirt-besmeared walls and decaying foundations; every repulsive 
lineament of poverty, every loathsome indication of filth, rot, garbage; all 
these ornament the banks of Folly Ditch.
 In Jacob’s Island, the warehouses are roofless and empty; the walls are 
crumbling down; the windows are windows no more; the doors are fall-
ing into the streets; the chimneys are blackened, but they yield no smoke. 
Thirty or forty years ago, before losses and chancery suits came upon it, it 
was a thriving place; but now it is a desolate island indeed. The houses have 
no owners; they are broken open, and entered upon by those who have the 
courage; and there they live and there they die. They must have powerful 
motives for a secret residence, or be reduced to a destitute condition indeed, 
who seek a refuge in Jacob’s Island. (300)
And this is the whole of the description. It could be argued that much of the 
power of the description relies on what is not there: the linen, the smoke, the 
details of the chancery suits, and the motives for residing at Jacob’s Island. 
Also, the extension of description to social commentary strengthens the pas-
sage. Anne Humpherys compares Dickens’s text with Mayhew’s, which is 
far more detailed, including repulsive colors. She concludes that Dickens’s 
more general description gains its superior effect because of the personifica-
tion it employs and because it thereby becomes representative of all slums 
in London (192). Perhaps it is this trait that makes Dickens’s description so 
memorable. But, in fact, there is very little that could be called personifica-
tion in this famous passage. Indeed, the language, though it incorporates 
details, such as the poles thrust out for the drying of linen, the “besmeared 
walls and decaying foundations,” and the blackened chimneys that “yield 
no smoke,” is remarkably restrained. There is certainly a judgmental tone in 
the narrative voice, as the adjectives and nouns indicate—crazy, slime, filthy, 
squalor, filth, rot, garbage. Yet this description is nothing like the startlingly 
animated description of the factories at Coketown in Hard Times, where the 
extreme metaphoricity calls attention to itself, producing memorable images 
while not providing many actual details about the buildings and grounds. 
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The description of Jacob’s Island is less spectacular, closer to reportage, and 
perhaps because less theatrical, more credible.
 Besides the possible effect of personification, there is another reason that 
Dickens’s description is more forceful than the many nonfictional descrip-
tions of slum conditions—and there were many written at the time of Oliver 
Twist and later. Dickens’s description is embedded in a compelling narrative 
with striking characters who act out their deeds in the settings, both real and 
fictional, that Dickens chose to describe. The fictional narrative becomes the 
energizing vehicle that carries and lends force to the description of the real 
place that then transfers that energy to the real world by way of the reader’s 
reception of it. But why is this narrative more powerful and lasting than non-
fictional narratives containing nonfictional descriptions of similar places?
 Raymond Williams takes for granted in his estimate of Dickens’s treat-
ment of London something that has to be rediscovered by others. In 
Resisting Novels, Lennard J. Davis instructs us that “[n]ovels do not depict 
life, they depict life as it is represented by ideology” (24). The purpose of a 
highly mimetic fiction is “to help humans adapt to the fragmentation and 
isolation of the modern world” (12). The danger is that we might forget the 
ideological character of novels and accept them as natural embodiments of 
common sense. Description of place is part of a larger system of meaning. 
In novels written in the nineteenth century, landscapes, and more particu-
larly cityscapes, evoke the sense of property and hence a symbolic system 
associated with money and market values. Davis says that “Dickens made 
or remade London, particularly for his reforming purposes. He is rarely 
writing about a universal London, but writing about a London with con-
temporary problems and proposed solutions” (89). Dickens’s descriptions 
thus arise from a reforming intention and embody an appropriate ideology. 
When he describes the “real” London, he is incorporating it in a system of 
values which he promotes. His aggressively fictional narrative nonetheless 
refers back to the “real” world. Who would care about the slum dwellers in 
daily life? But we know the Bill Sikes who dies in their loathsome quarters. 
By peopling London with his imaginary characters, Dickens makes it more 
real than a journalist, obliged to confine himself to the “truth,” might do.
 It has long been appreciated that the creation of character is a device 
that seduces readers into the fictive world. Davis writes that “ideologically 
speaking . . . character gives readers faith that personality is first, understand-
able and, second, capable of rational change” (119). Catherine Gallagher, 
drawing upon a history of critical insight, notes that “[e]ighteenth-century 
readers identified with the characters in novels because of the characters’ fic-
tiveness and not in spite of it. Moreover, these readers had to be taught how 
to read fiction, and as they learned this skill (it did not come naturally), new 
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emotional dispositions were created.” Indeed, Gallagher goes on to note that 
each generation of writers felt compelled to reform the genre “by encour-
aging an affective pulsation between identification with fictional characters 
and withdrawal from them” (xvii). But if characterization is an obvious way 
to blur the distinction between the fictive and the real world, description is 
its almost invisible co-agent. Readers of fiction had to be taught how to read 
description as well as character with similar results. Being like us, characters 
are easy to judge on the basis of how they behave. Unlike us, streets, build-
ings, and rivers do not “behave” and therefore cannot be “judged” in any 
scheme of morals. But they can nonetheless embody such judgments and 
they do this best when they are embedded in imaginary narratives where 
certain moral values are asserted. Characterization, and even description of 
character, when charged with stereotypical details (as in those employing 
terms from phrenology or physiognomy) can bear a heavy ideological 
weight. So can description of place, though generally less obviously.
 Description serves many different purposes in fiction, and there is a great 
diversity in the relationship between “real” places and those represented in 
fiction. The opening of H.  G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau gives spe-
cific longitudinal and latitudinal directions for the point in the Pacific Ocean 
where the fictional island is located, but no one since the days of Gulliver’s 
Travels would suppose that this site, though existing in the real world, has 
any genuine connection with the fictional world of Wells’s novel except that 
it indicates a location remote and tropical which is consistent with Wells’s 
story.11
 Ordinarily, fictional descriptions call attention to their fictiveness and 
there are innumerable ways that they can do this. A novel set in the remote 
future assumes a setting inevitably different in many ways from any real 
place in the present. Some novels assign fictional names to places and give 
them generic descriptions. Conrad’s eastern novels, for example, only ask 
you to accept their tropicality, not their topicality. And then there is the 
remarkable example of Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities, where the cities that 
Marco Polo describes for Genghis Kahn—sometimes in words, sometimes 
in symbols—are projections of subjective states: dreams, anxieties, desires. 
Even real places can acquire a fictive quality by being focalized through the 
mood of a character, as José Manuel Lopes shows with Zola’s treatment of 
Paris in Une Page d’amour (1878).12
 All descriptions, as ingredients of novels, bear some ideological weight. 
But some are more intimately connected to moral judgment than others. 
Thomas Hardy is credited with “creating” the fictional world of Wessex, 
though readers in his day and ours have understood that his descriptions 
adhere faithfully to real locations in Dorset, Devon, Somerset, and Wiltshire. 
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Scholarly editions of his novels call attention to the fact that Melchester is 
“really” Salisbury, Casterbridge is “really” Dorchester, Christchurch is 
“really” Oxford, and so on. Academic and other tours are arranged every 
year to visit the real settings of Hardy’s novels, though most of the urban set-
tings are greatly changed, if the landscape remains generally the same. But, 
though everyone admits the existence of real places—urban and rural—that 
correspond to the places described in Hardy’s novels, are these “fictional” 
descriptions of the same order as Dickens’s description of Jacob’s Island? We 
can draw maps of Wessex and pinpoint the various places that Hardy incor-
porated in his novels. And we can correctly declare that Hardy’s descriptions 
are often extremely vivid, but what fictional purpose do these descriptions 
serve? Do Hardy’s descriptions generally make claims that extend beyond 
the novels in which they occur? I suggest that, for the most part, Hardy’s 
descriptions of place serve almost exclusively diegetic ends. They may reveal 
characters’ moods, symbolize themes, and so forth, but they rarely aim to 
escape the constraints of the narrative to operate directly upon an audience 
for other than esthetic reasons. A case might be made for Christchurch in 
Jude the Obscure as an exception, but I won’t make it.
 Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights offers another example. Much writing 
about the Brontës emphasizes the Yorkshire setting in which they grew up. 
Wuthering Heights, in particular, is said to incorporate the bleak country-
side near Haworth. The setting of Wuthering Heights certainly has thematic 
and atmospheric importance in the novel, though descriptions of terrain are 
generally unspecific. Yet so strong is the impulse to convert imaginary places 
into real ones, or at least into realizable forms, that J. Frank Goodridge took 
the trouble in his essay “The Circumambient Universe” to provide a detailed 
map of the countryside surrounding and including Wuthering Heights and 
Thrushcross Grange. This map does not resemble the countryside near 
Haworth in any detail and therefore does not relate directly to Brontë’s biog-
raphy. What is the function of the map, then, as it relates to Brontë’s novel? 
Since place in the novel is largely symbolic or representative, the spatial 
layout of the various important loci does not seem significant. The ideology 
of Brontë’s novel does not have the same designs upon its audience that Dick-
ens’s does. I do not here refer to a conscious ideology, but merely the ideology 
inhering in the text. The literal “mapping” of Wuthering Heights’ setting does 
not enhance, but detracts from the quality of the narrative because the func-
tion of place in the novel is to mirror internal states, not to call attention 
to external conditions.13 It is almost perverse to embody as real a place that 
draws its power from its imaginary character. The fictional place is truer than 
any representation of it can be. The ultimate abuse in this direction may be 
the opposite of the Jacob’s Island controversy—the stipulation of the location 
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in modern London of the original Old Curiosity Shop from Dickens’s novel of 
the same name. In this case, a claim is proffered (though not very seriously) 
that an entirely imaginary place has a real location.14
 There are notable differences in the way description of place functions in, 
say, Hardy’s Jude, Brontë’s Heights, and Dickens’s Twist. In Jude, the novel’s 
design is crucial and the descriptions of Christchurch, though they may refer 
to the actual Oxford, serve that design. Although there are implicit judg-
ments about social inequity in these passages, there is no move by the nar-
rator to traverse the gap between diegetic and extradiegetic worlds. What-
ever ideological work is done here is subtle, not targeted. Moreover, these 
descriptions are problematic in another way because they are focalized to 
a great extent through Jude’s consciousness. Jude’s picture of Christchurch 
is false and the narrator knows it. The “real” place of Oxford, then, accom-
modates the function of the fictional character. This is even more the case 
in Wuthering Heights, where descriptions of place do not evoke a real place, 
such as Haworth, but serve symbolic purposes. Brontë’s narrative seems pur-
posely to exclude and even obscure any extradiegetic connection. Descrip-
tion is hermetically sealed within the diegesis and even within the imbedded 
narrative, since Lockwood, as he narrates his own experience and what he 
has heard from Nelly Dean, does not seem to perceive the symbolic nature 
of the matter he conveys. By contrast, though Dickens’s description of the 
real named place of Jacob’s Island serves the design of the novel, the reli-
able, even authoritative, narrative voice also aims beyond the limits of the 
diegesis to the extradiegetic world in which the represented Jacob’s Island 
really exists. Crucial to this act is the authorial intention to address an audi-
ence that is capable of receiving the conscious ideological message as both 
diegetic and extradiegetic. Assumed in this narrative gesture is a conviction 
that the discourse of fiction “translates” to the real world. It is at moments 
like this that Dickens’s capacity to create a writerly and a readerly text at the 
same time becomes evident. He wishes to control the import of his text, but 
he also wants his readers to participate inventively in it. This is something 
that realist fiction avoids.
 The whole question of the effect of descriptions of real places in fiction 
is contained within the larger question of the relationship between fictional 
and nonfictional discourse. The question has received increased attention in 
the last couple of decades. John R. Searle claims: “There is no textual prop-
erty, syntactical or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction. 
What makes it a work of fiction is, so to speak, the illocutionary stance that 
the author takes toward it, and that stance is a matter of the complex illocu-
tionary intentions that the author has when he writes or otherwise composes 
it” (Expression 65–66).15 The author of fictional texts pretends to use illocu-
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tionary acts and therefore suspends the normal rules governing texts. This 
view and others involved in the debate about fictional and nonfictional texts 
are surveyed by Richard Rorty in “Is There a Problem about Fictional Dis-
course?” The whole dispute, he suggests, crystallizes in the question “what, 
if anything, turns on the difference between being ‘really there’ and being 
‘made up’? For what purpose is a convenient fiction as good as reality?” 
(110). Starting with Bertrand Russell and working forward to Searle, Don-
nellan, and others, Rorty then traces the problem back to Parmenides and 
the distinction between the discourse of science and the discourse of poetry. 
But Rorty moves away from the specific discussion of fiction to the broader 
issue of what we can tell the truth about, and concludes with a position sym-
pathetic to a physicalist semantic which he condenses in the proposition 
“whatever is referred to must be the sort of object which we have to talk 
about in order to give the Ideal Causal Explanation of our saying what we 
say” (134). In Parmenidian terms, this is a first-rate discourse (“scientific” 
discourse that deals with logic, proofs, demonstrations, etc.). This discourse 
is beneficial to second-rate discourse (“literary” discourse that deals with 
rhetoric, value judgment, aesthetic effect, etc.) because it provides a foil 
against which irony and reflexive writing can take place. Thus for Rorty, only 
first-rate discourses can convey truths.
 What Rorty seems to overlook is that what he calls scientific or first-rate 
discourses have a tendency to come into and go out of fashion. Thomas Kuhn 
has demonstrated how scientific paradigms supersede one another, calling 
up new forms of language to articulate them. Often the scientific languages 
themselves are based upon hidden or even obvious metaphors and other 
tropes. We need only glance at the anthropological assumptions of the nine-
teenth century that passed as scientific fact to appreciate how unsteadily they 
rested upon master narratives of Providence, Progress, and race or gender 
hierarchies.
 The debate about the relative standings of fictional and nonfictional texts 
remains unresolved, leaving the question of description of real places in fic-
tion texts still open, since Searle, for one, is willing to admit that “[a] work of 
fiction need not consist entirely of, and in general will not consist entirely of, 
fictional discourse” (Expression 74). He thus prepares for Genette’s remark, 
quoted earlier, that real descriptions can legitimately appear in fictional 
texts. The whole issue is complicated by the fact that nonfictional narratives 
have always felt free to employ techniques associated with fiction, including 
figurative language, prolepsis and analepsis, focalization, imagined dia-
logue, characterization, and so forth. The point is that from news reporting 
to historical representation to philosophical dispute, first-rate discourse has 
availed itself of methods characteristically associated with second-rate dis-
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course (scientific discourse, for example, is heavily dependent upon meta-
phor). Both modes of discourse share the same resources of language, both 
are circumscribed in what they can achieve by the limitations of language.
 Assertions about the death of the author and the hermetic intertextu-
ality of literature obscure the fact that a great many major literary texts con-
tinue to evoke similar patterns of response in widely different audiences. Of 
course any artifact, including a fictional narrative, may be misinterpreted. 
A person from a very different culture might well wonder what function a 
toilet stool serves in the United States. But once the context becomes clear, 
most “readers” quickly figure out the semiotics of bathrooms, street signs, 
and narrative conventions. Modern American teenagers may know nothing 
about the strict class structure of nineteenth-century England, but they soon 
grasp its general significance in narratives depicting Victorian society.
 A short while back, Wolfgang Iser reopened an old issue by examining in 
detail what he calls “the imaginary.” In effect, he proposes that underlying all 
human intellectual activity is our power to conceive, in an “as if ” manner, 
what does not yet exist. From this point of view, first-rate discourse itself 
depends upon a mental gesture akin to fiction making. What, after all, is a 
scientific hypothesis but a fabula to be elaborated as sujet? The ability to fic-
tionalize thus becomes a rudimentary and essential human trait. As Iser puts 
it, “[t]he state of being above and outside oneself is not merely a transitory 
phase but is a fundamental characteristic of humanity.” He adds that “Hans-
Georg Gadamer considers this state to be a major achievement of mankind” 
(84). This power has consequences for human identity as well. “With literary 
fictionality, the process of stepping out of and above oneself always retains 
what has been overstepped, and in this form of doubling we are present to 
ourselves as our own differential.” But though fiction seems to operate as a 
frame of reference for self-fashioning, it actually does the opposite. “Because 
it indicates that human beings cannot be present to themselves, literary fic-
tionality involves the condition of being creative right through to our dreams 
without ever allowing us to coincide with ourselves through what we create. 
What we do create is the conceivability of this basic disposition, and as this 
eludes our grasp, fictionality turns also into a judgment that human beings 
make about themselves” (86).
 Iser argues that literary fictions (unlike nonliterary fictions such as “the 
founding of institutions, societies, and world pictures”) reveal their fiction-
ality. They contain large numbers of identifiable items from the outside world, 
as well as from previous literature, that “are now marked as being fictional-
ized. Thus the incorporated ‘real’ world is, so to speak, placed in brackets to 
indicate that it is not something given but is merely to be understood as if 
it were given. .  .  . Reality, then, may be reproduced to be outstripped, as is 
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indicated by its being bracketed” (12–13). This account satisfies situations 
that involve fictional descriptions such as those in Hardy and Brontë, who, 
I would argue, aspire more toward the realist end of the fictional spectrum 
than Dickens does. But I am arguing that the example from Oliver Twist 
functions in a different manner under a different intentionality. Just as the 
political conversations in Disraeli’s Coningsby are meant to operate in the 
real world in precisely the way they do in the novel, so Dickens’s description 
of Jacob’s Island, though it serves the design of the novel, is meant to repli-
cate, not merely double, the real place, but it does so in a peculiar manner 
that has to do with the special place of description in narrative.
 In “Rhetorical Status of the Descriptive,” Phillipe Hamon relates how 
rhetoricians historically have distrusted description. He concludes that 
“description might be that place in the text where the generative power of 
language might show itself most clearly and as quite unmanageable” (25). 
Hamon also says that description is often “the place in the text where the 
‘work’ of the author is most visibly manifest” (21). Description thus becomes 
the textual site where intentionality might be most clearly isolated. It is the 
almost invisible reservoir of ideology that flows openly but muddied in dia-
logue and story.
 Iser indicates that literary fictions, because of their doubling of reality and 
their relations to other texts, are always semantically unstable. Description 
is one of the potentially most unstable narrative elements since there need 
be no limit to its proliferation. I would like to suggest that the potency of 
Dickens’s description of Jacob’s Island derives largely from the fact that this 
potentially eruptive passage, occurring when closure of the narrative (and, 
as Iser would say, the imaginative game) is imminent, does not erupt as it 
might into a torrent of details about the slum conditions of Jacob’s Island, but 
exploits its own instability through an intensifying constraint. Dickens knew 
that his middle-class audience accepted certain London neighborhoods as 
prescripted slums. They understood, at least theoretically, what constituted a 
slum. By not elaborating his description in the way Mayhew did, or a realist 
novelist might do, Dickens stimulated his audience to fill in the details. The 
reader reads the description as a setting for the activities of Bill Sikes, Charley 
Bates, and other fictional characters, but he or she also “copies” that descrip-
tion into the extradiegetic world in which she or he lives. Dickens and his 
readers fully appreciate how the description of Jacob’s Island could expand 
indefinitely in the atmosphere of the characters’ frenetic and even desperate 
actions. Both understand the power that this generates by not allowing it 
to do so. Unstable description is harnessed to narrative drive and thereby 
increases its own intensity. Fiction outstrips without overstepping reality, 
and Jacob’s Island takes its place in Western culture’s encyclopedia. Dickens’s 
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social purpose, his open ideological endeavor, seeks to influence its audi-
ence in a way that Hardy’s and Brontë’s do not. His description is a different 
rhetorical gesture arising out of a different intentionality.
 It appears that we have much work to do in the largely overlooked domain 
of description. Descriptions in fictional texts clearly include a broad range of 
functions and may constitute privileged sites for interpretation. Description 
also seems to recall into critical service tools such as intentionality, which 
have in recent years been seriously devalued. Dickens’s description of Jacob’s 
Island, appearing where it does in the narrative of Oliver Twist, accomplishes 
a special purpose, as I have tried to indicate.
 What I am arguing is that not only is there a truth value in literature 
that can affect the “real” world, but that that value may be more potent in 
its way than the same value in a nonfictional work. A work of art might not 
change the real world in the way the Declaration of Independence did, but it 
could inspire men to seek the aims stated in that document. Dickens might 
have been writing just a novel, but his intention was clearly to do more than 
merely amuse and entertain. If he had no political objective, he certainly had 
a moral one. Oliver Twist is a made-up story, but the power of its fable and 
the vividness of its characters lend force to the real world in which its events 
are supposed to take place. It is notable that Jacob’s Island did not exist in Sir 
Peter Laurie’s hard-headed, “real” London, though he was an alderman of 
that city and presumably something of an expert about it. But Jacob’s Island 
became real to a very large audience once it was represented in the fictional 
work of Charles Dickens. Ever after it was emphatically what it had been 
obscurely before—a real part of London. By including a description of a real 
place in a fictional text and exploiting readerly expectations of how both 
description and narration can work, Dickens was able to make his readers 
experience more acutely the real world of which they were a part, and it is 
testimony to the power of fiction that readers today can do so as well.
 Although I have focused on a very small part of Oliver Twist, I have 
done so mainly to show that Dickens was a special kind of writer. While 
employing many realist techniques, such as elaborate description, or exten-
sive metonymy (see chapter 4), he utilized these techniques to a different 
purpose, just as he did with devices from other genres such as fable (later 
I discuss Dickens’s use of personification, for example). Dickens’s agenda is 
different from that of realism because he wanted his art to show, not neces-
sarily on a first reading; he wanted his readers to enjoy and participate in his 
texts as though they were equal partners, only in the end to reveal his control 
and the working out of his intentions as the author of the narrative. It is this 
feature of his work, I believe, that permitted him to accept description of 
himself as The Inimitable.
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                 resent-tense narration is not very compatible with the
                            general aims of realism. It shares some traits with first-
                              person narration that make it undesirable. To begin with,
                 it is more likely to introduce an unreliable narrator. A first-
-       person narrator, even if recording past events, nonetheless intro-
duces the subjectivity of an individual character. A powerful nine-
teenth-century example is Thackeray’s Barry Lyndon. Thackeray sig-
nals Lyndon’s unreliability by revealing that he is writing from prison, 
a hint at Lyndon’s morally objectionable character. Present-tense nar-
ration could have the same “flaw” unless it is the historical present not 
identified with a specific narrator, but, in fiction, that is not usually the 
case. Realism generally aims at the provability of the chronicle, and 
therefore past-tense and third-person narration serve it best. First-
person narration serves certain formulaic genres well, as in the tradi-
tional model of the adventure story such as Scott’s Rob Roy or Steven-
son’s Treasure Island and Kidnapped. Modern detective fiction, from 
Conan Doyle to Raymond Chandler, gravitates toward first-person 
narration and sometimes present-tense narration. But present-tense 
narration has an added quality that sets it aside from most other forms 
of narration—its radical uncertainty. If one is actually writing/nar-
present tense1
C H A p t e R  2
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rating at the moment that events are taking place, no outcome can be pre-
dicted safely. It is largely this quality that makes present-tense narration 
unattractive to realist fiction, which often seeks to establish predictable 
lines of development, whether through social situations, heredity, char-
acter formation, or any other broad influence. Some modern novelists have 
been able to combine first-person narration with a deep concern about the 
human condition. I think first of Albert Camus. But then, because of their 
philosophical content and fabular construction, I would definitely not put 
Camus’ fiction in the genre of realism. Collins and Dickens experimented 
with present-tense narration while trying to preserve authorial control and 
while adhering to a providential view of human existence. This was not 
an easy purpose to achieve, but I believe both succeeded in their different 
ways.
 The present tense in fiction was not new when Charles Dickens and Wilkie 
Collins came to make use of it. Clarissa and other diary and epistolary novels 
had exploited the mode long before. Such novels gained the advantage, 
through present tense, of making the events of their narratives appear imme-
diate.2 Moreover, by restricting the narrative voice or voices to the present, 
there could be little chance for a premature revelation of what was to occur 
in the future of the narrative. Aside from these modes of present tense, the 
traditional novel did make use of present tense in third-person narratives. 
As Christine Brooke-Rose points out, however, “in nineteenth-century fic-
tion, brief passages in the historic present are used for vivid scenes before 
safe returns to the past, and the present tense is favoured for universalizing 
moral or social comments from the author” (12).3 Dickens and Collins in 
their use of the present tense anticipate experiments with tense in the twen-
tieth century, including Modernist and nouveau roman fiction. But whereas 
twentieth-century narratives exploiting present tense are chiefly concerned 
to liberate the narrative from the tyranny of the narrator, as in the fiction of 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, Dickens and Collins used the device to strengthen the 
narrative voice’s power by taking command of the future and withholding its 
secrets from the reader.
 In what follows, I shall examine how Collins and especially Dickens use 
present-tense narration in a way that violates recent thinking about “histor-
ical” narration and how, in doing so, they increase authorial control. Collins 
employs the traditional device of a present-tense text embedded in an other-
wise past-tense narrative, but Dickens is more innovative. In fact, Christian 
Paul Casparis, one of a few critics to deal extensively with present-tense nar-
ration, credits Dickens with being the first novelist “to use the Present tense 
in a structured manner on a large scale” (62). My discussion of Collins’s and 
Dickens’s use of present tense will require brief preliminary discussions of 
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the role of tense in narration and of the providential esthetic of nineteenth-
century literature.
.  .  .
In Problems in General Linguistics, Emile Benveniste drew a helpful distinc-
tion between two planes of utterance, that of history and that of discourse. 
History is delimited, in terms of tense, to three possibilities—the aorist 
(simple past), the imperfect, and the pluperfect. It excludes everything “auto-
biographical,” especially the present tense (206–7). By contrast, discourse is 
free to use all tenses except the aorist (209). Benveniste defines present tense 
as “‘the time at which one is speaking.’ This is the eternally ‘present’ moment, 
although it never relates to the same events of an ‘objective’ chronology 
because it is determined for each speaker by each of the instances of dis-
course related to it. Linguistic time is self-referential. Ultimately, human tem-
porality with all its linguistic apparatus reveals the subjectivity inherent in 
the very using of language” (227). In associating discourse with subjectivity 
and language with the possibility of subjectivity, Benveniste seems to rein-
force the separation of history, the narration of past events, and discourse, 
the more broadly conceived plane of language use. I shall argue, however, 
that it is precisely across the boundaries of history and discourse that Collins 
and Dickens achieve some remarkable effects, effects that, in our own day 
might be most closely identified with cinema.
 Aside from writers like Christian Paul Casparis, few narratologists have 
paid much attention to present-tense narration. Seymour Chatman remarks 
that “verbal narratives in English are occasionally written in the present 
tense. But story-time is still usually the past” (83). He also observes that 
cinema is the medium most clearly associated with real-time narration (84). 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan cites one type of narration that “is simultaneous 
with the action, e.g. reporting or diary entries,” and gives Butor’s La Modi-
fication as an example. Rimmon-Kenan does not pursue this narrative pos-
sibility. Most narratologists seem to take for granted the position that Philip 
J. M. Sturgess, following Gerald Prince’s treatment of the subject in Narra-
tology, summarizes thus:
To narrate is also to commit oneself to a tense of narration, with that of 
the past tense being overwhelmingly the elected mode. Unlike the present 
tense which has, so to speak, contingency and even the possibility of sudden 
closure or cancellation built into it, the past tense seems to offer a guarantee 
of narrativity since it denotes a certainty of temporal duration, extending to 
whatever (present) temporal vantage point the narrator may be understood 
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to be narrating from. Within such duration, obviously enough, events and 
situations can be understood to have occurred, people to have lived and 
perhaps died. In other words the past tense is narrativizable in a way that the 
present tense does not suggest itself to be. (23)
But it is precisely the possibility of “sudden closure or cancellation,” among 
other uncertainties, that makes present tense an attractive method for cre-
ating anxieties and exploiting uncertainty. Dorrit Cohn, picking up Gérard 
Genette’s expression “simultaneous narrating,” goes on to demonstrate how 
present-tense narration can avoid two prominent conventions of fictional 
realism, first-person fictional narration and the interior monologue, by 
“dissolving the semantic specificity that attends the historical present,” thus 
encouraging the reader “to understand the present as a temporally indeter-
minate or ‘absolute’ narrative tense, for which the most appropriate term—
highlighting its fiction-specificity—would seem to be ‘fictional present’” 
(106). She explains that whereas the fictional diary or letter may shrink the 
temporal hiatus to hours or even minutes, simultaneous narration reduces 
it to zero, “the moment of narration is the moment of experience, the nar-
rating self is the experiencing self ” (107). As we shall see, this is the distinc-
tion between Collins’s and Dickens’s use of present-tense narration, the full 
impact of which does not seem to have registered with their critics.4 Part of 
their narrative strategy was determined by what has been called the provi-
dential esthetic, which establishes a difference between their use of present-
tense narration and its use by such modern authors as John Fowles, J. M. 
Coetzee, Margaret Atwood, and others.
 There now exists a tradition of critical writing that accepts the signifi-
cance of providence as a narrative ally in literature of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century in England.5 Generally this critical view admits that an 
assumption of providential design lies behind many of the ultimately posi-
tive narrative schemes produced by British novelists. Often the providential 
design was openly acknowledged. But developments during the nineteenth 
century, including the theory of evolution propounded by Charles Darwin 
and others, problematized the notion of providential control and introduced 
an anxiety about the future that was new in kind. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
remembered the mood of that midcentury time:
[F]rom my reading and from my studies, I found that the foundations not 
only of Roman Catholicism but of the whole Christian faith, as presented to 
me in nineteenth century theology, were so weak that my mind could not 
build upon them. It is to be remembered that these were the years when 
Huxley, Tyndall, Darwin, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill were our 
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chief philosophers, and that even the man in the street felt the strong sweep-
ing current of their thought, while to the young student, eager and impres-
sionable, it was overwhelming. (26)
 In general, both Dickens and Collins employed the providential pattern 
to one degree or another in their novels, but the openness of the future also 
became for them an intriguing counterpoint to the directedness of providen-
tial designs. Because present tense is blind to the future, it was an excellent 
tool for exploiting anxiety about the outcomes of narratives.
.  .  .
Wilkie Collins’s utilization of present-tense narration to manipulate his 
audience is relatively conventional. It is his insertion of Marian Halcombe’s 
narrative in The Woman in White (1860) that is most relevant to my explo-
ration of the inventive ways in which Victorian writers play with narrative 
structure in order to exploit their readers’ fears about the future. Marian’s 
voice is remarkably strong; the reader can hardly help but like her, and, in 
fact, some have even fallen in love with her.6 However, rather than listening 
for what we hear in her voice, it will be more profitable for us to look at 
how we hear Marian’s story. It is in this facet of the narration that we see 
both Collins’s achievement with regard to narrative form and his genius for 
generating suspense. Peter Thoms points out that early detective fiction “not 
only reflects authorial exuberance in intricate plotting but also reveals an 
extensive critique of narrative patterns and the compulsions that generate 
them” (3). Collins’s manipulation of the narrative was quite purposeful, and 
it can be no accident that the revelation of Marian’s story takes place under 
the very controlled circumstances that I shall now detail.
 Before dealing specifically with Marian’s testimony, it is worthwhile to 
provide a brief review of the structure of Collins’s novel as a whole. The 
Woman in White, like The Moonstone (1868), consists of a series of first-
person narratives compiled by one character in order to guide the reader 
through the unraveling of a mystery. It is constructed as if we are reading 
individual testimony, and much has been written on the ways in which Col-
lins’s experimentation with this form resulted in a greater sense of mystery. 
Each eyewitness is allowed to reveal only his or her own firsthand experi-
ences, thus effectively eliminating any problems Collins might have had with 
a third-person narrator who, if omniscient, would have had sometimes to 
withhold information in order to maintain suspense and mystery. But the 
analysis we are working toward has to move beyond discussing simply that 
brilliant aspect of Collins’s novels. It is important to note that while we hear 
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the voices of individual characters, they do not truly speak for themselves; 
they are, in effect, edited.7 Individual testimonial texts, such as transcribed 
accounts, series of letters, diaries, and so forth, reach the reader only after 
they have passed under the pen of the editing character. In The Woman in 
White, this character is Walter Hartright, and it is only through him that we 
hear the voices of the other characters. Sometimes their stories, as in the 
case of Mrs. Catherick, are culled from letters that are addressed to Hartright 
himself. Most of the time the accounts are written as documents, as in the 
cases of Vincent Gilmore and Eliza Michelson. But these are still directed to 
Hartright, as is demonstrated by Gilmore who begins, “I write these lines 
at the request of my friend, Mr. Walter Hartright” (127). These submitted 
testimonies offer us interesting venues for investigating various aspects of 
narration, but here we are concerned with one specific aspect best explored 
in the portion of the text described as “The Story continued by MARIAN 
HALCOMBE, in Extracts from her Diary” (163).
 Diary writing enters into a mixed temporality: it is neither fully present, 
nor fully past. The diary entry generally records the immediate past, often-
times what has transpired over the course of that same day.8 As it describes 
an incident, the tense tends toward the past—we breakfasted.9 But diaries are 
also immersed in their own present: the author is writing. As entries depict 
the setting in which they are being created, they may allude to that very 
instantaneous temporality—I am sitting in the window seat in the parlor as 
I write this down—and then return to reflections upon the past, which are 
easier to sustain. The diarist may also venture into the time of the future, 
but it is generally only possible for the writer to do so in the most uncertain 
of terms—tomorrow we depart: will I ever look upon these walks and gar-
dens again? In her work on both the diary (nonfictive) and the diary novel, 
Lorna Martens determines that the diarist “cannot foresee what will happen 
or what he will think on any future date, and if he keeps his diary as a general 
record, he cannot predict what he will write about in the future. The diary is 
thus a form that eludes the author’s full control” (33). Therefore, as the dia-
rist records his or her present, there can be no true foreshadowing of what 
is to come: the writer has absolutely no idea of the way in which things will 
work themselves out or even which incidents are important. The same is not 
true for the novelist who employs a diarist in her fiction. She may still fit the 
diary into the overall narrative design.
 Herein lies the brilliance of Collins allowing Marian to speak only in 
this medium. In a diary, all kernels of information are equal in that they 
have yet to be judged with an eye to the end. Even though a reader of the 
novel might be fully aware of the author’s (Collins’s) control of the dia-
rist’s entries, he/she cannot know what the author intends to reveal any-
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more than he/she can surmise what is unknown as yet to the diarist. The 
diarist might place greater emphasis on some happenings or observations 
than on others, but then readers must determine whether or not they trust 
the character’s intuitiveness (a term which I am here differentiating from 
reliability) before they can decide if the diary’s hierarchy of information 
is accurate. So, as the Victorian reader entered into the narrative of the 
diary, he or she would have been, as we still are, forced to question Marian’s 
ability to record clues to the future. Marian herself questions this ability. 
In her self-examination of advice she has given to Hartright, she writes, 
“Except Laura, I never was more anxious about anyone than I am now 
about Walter. All that has happened since he left us has only increased my 
strong regard for him. I hope I am doing right in trying to help him to 
employment abroad—I hope, most earnestly and anxiously that it will end 
well” (177).10 Here, independent of an editorial time, Marian has access 
only to the near past and her immediate present as she attempts to analyze 
her situation and predict the outcome of her actions. Her diary provides 
a perfect medium through which the Victorian reader can be confronted 
with questions of knowledge and destiny. By examining what is important 
today, is it possible to find traces of what will be imperative in the future? 
Does Fate foreshadow? Does Providence guide?
 Of course, Collins complicates this inquiry into the future by sometimes 
suggesting that this particular Victorian quest is an anxious occupation in 
its own right. Anticipating the marriage of Laura to Sir Glyde, Marian her-
self is conflicted by her construction of the tomorrows that stretch endlessly 
before her. “I am writing of the marriage and the parting with Laura, as 
people write of a settled thing. It seems so old and so unfeeling to be looking 
at the future already in this cruelly composed way” (187). The pursuit of 
knowledge will continue as the marriage preparations unfold; and, again, the 
reader is put in a position parallel to that of the character speaking. Because 
Marian is recording her impressions as they occur to her, we are given 
mistaken and contradicting accounts of Glyde. “19th.—More discoveries 
in the inexhaustible mine of Sir Percival’s virtues” (192); “20th.—I hate Sir 
Percival!” (194). However, this ambivalence does not erode Marian’s cred-
ibility; it simply intensifies the reader’s sense of sharing the present-tense 
temporality of the speaker. After Sir and Lady Glyde return to England and 
establish themselves and their guests at Blackwater Park, Laura confides her 
anxieties to Marian: “Every fresh thing he does, seems to terrify me about 
the future” (253). If central characters fear the future, what must the reader 
feel? Through the temporal form of the diary, one lacking the consistency 
and confidence of hindsight, readers are able to experience the same appre-
hensions and uncertainties as Marian and Laura. There is no frame that can 
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establish a retrospective analysis of events, so when Marian writes, “I almost 
dread tomorrow,” so too can the reader! (259).
 Martens tells us that “the diary novel . . . emphasizes the time of writing 
rather than the time that is written about” (4). Thus, while Marian’s diary 
provides us with clues to what deviousness Fosco and Glyde are concocting, 
the emphasis is on Marian’s vulnerability. The very introduction of her diary 
into the narrative heightens its suspense since the reader cannot be sure that 
Marian herself has survived from the time of her documenting into the time 
of the compiling. Todorov tells us that “the movement [in suspense] is from 
cause to effect: we are first shown the causes . . . and our interest is sustained 
by the expectation of what will happen” (47). Collins’s suspense is not that 
of gangsters (cause) and corpses (effect), but of diary (the medium through 
which Marian speaks) and absent writer (why else would a woman hand over 
the record of her most private thoughts?). It is this twist that demonstrates 
Collins’s ingenious understanding of what might frighten his audience—he 
played on their fears of not having the means to know the end. Marian’s sec-
tion of the narrative ends with the same insinuation of absence—“NOTE. 
At this place the entry in the diary ceases to be legible. . . . On the next page 
of the Diary, another entry appears. It is in a man’s handwriting . . .” (343). 
The astute reader, by now fully able to recognize his diction, need not wait 
for Count Fosco’s signature. His intruding comments offer a sinister picture 
of the now occluded future. “I breathe my wishes for her recovery. I condole 
with her on the inevitable failure of every plan that she has formed for her 
sister’s benefit . . . Fosco” (344).
 On January 28, 1860, readers would have received the tenth installment of 
the serialization which opens with Marian’s diary. Tension would have begun 
to build at that point in time. However, it can be said that because of the 
ongoing sense of the entries, the crisis does not make itself overt until Fosco’s 
violation of the diary. This would have occurred in the 22nd installment of 
the serialization which was published on April 21, 1860. The revelation that 
Marian never left Blackwater ends the 25th installment on May 12, 1860. For 
almost five months, but most especially during this aforementioned three-
week period, the reader would have been left in doubt as to whether Marian 
spoke through her diary by choice or by necessity—that is, whether she was 
still available to speak at all. As the 25th installment ends, Marian is presum-
ably alive, although the Victorian reader would still have had to endure a 
painful anticipation before another installment verified this. In effect, the 
reader would have lived through a very convincing simulacrum of what the 
characters in the book were living through.
 In general, the narrative constitutes a history in which the compilation of 
information by Hartright causes most of the “documents” to be a past-tense 
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discussion of events from a time—the time of their creation for Hartright—
which is actually forward of the time in which the mystery would have 
reached its climax. Thus the reader is assured that the story as a whole is one 
read through a retrospective filter which was constructed only after some 
conclusion (albeit one unknown to the reader) had been reached. Collins 
knew that his Victorian readers more than anything desired a sense of clo-
sure. They were searching for the meaning this would provide for their own 
lives—a reinforcement of the concepts of both providence and destiny. How-
ever, as Lonoff points out to us, Collins also wanted to write a suspenseful 
novel that would be more popular and profitable for its manipulation of his 
readers’ anxieties. He does this most effectively through the discourse of Mar-
ian’s diary by forcing the reader into a simulation of what it would have been 
like to live out the events in the story in the present tense of their happening, 
thereby exploiting their fears that some other force, such as chance or malign 
human intent, might prevail if not in the narrative as a whole, then in the fate 
of one of its most appealing characters.11 However, as Cohn points out, no 
matter how immediate the temporal sensation of a diary might be, it cannot 
achieve the zero temporality she associates with simultaneous narration. The 
reader always knows that the diary is a document completed up to a certain 
point before the reader reads it. Despite Collins’s skill in exploiting present-
tense narration in order to enhance suspense and strengthen his narrative 
authority, his approach is nonetheless conventional. The same is not true of 
Dickens.
 Dickens makes extended use of present-tense narration in three of his 
mature novels—Bleak House, Our Mutual Friend, and The Mystery of Edwin 
Drood.12 In Bleak House the third-person narrative voice speaks in the present 
tense with a Jeremiah-like authority, which contrasts with Esther Summer-
son’s humble and subjective first-person, past-tense narration. The third-
person narrative voice’s chapters are more panoramic than dramatic. They 
pass judgment and summarize actions. They address large issues concerning 
society. Now and then they become intensely dramatic, but often still remain 
without dialogue. The best example is the presentation of the events leading 
up to and following Krook’s extinction by spontaneous combustion. In Our 
Mutual Friend there is no obvious division of narrative voices. The whole 
text is narrated in the third person. But now and then a chapter is narrated 
in the present tense. These present-tense chapters generally are concerned 
with public or quasi-public events, such as the activities of Veneering and 
his associates surrounding his decision to run for Parliament. These chap-
ters consist almost entirely of panoramic presentation. But Dickens’s use of 
the present tense in The Mystery of Edwin Drood is an advance in technique 
upon these two employments of the tense.
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 Like Collins, Dickens played upon his readers’ anxieties about an uncer-
tain future, while nonetheless endorsing a providential certainty about the 
nature of human existence, and in doing so both thrilled and entertained 
them. In Bleak House the subjective narrative of Esther Summerson is nar-
rated in traditional past tense of history, but surprisingly the third-person 
narrator records events in the present tense in a way that recalls Carlyle’s 
experiments in historical writing.13 The third-person narrator approximates 
the mode of cinema, where the camera, with all of its real-time immediacy, 
can show us surfaces in great detail, but makes few attempts to penetrate 
them. Bleak House forces history and discourse to inhabit a single text, 
leaving the reader to puzzle out the significance of the suspense and satis-
faction created by this abutment. Ironically, it is Esther’s “autobiographical” 
narrative that employs the presumably nonautobiographical and nonsubjec-
tive past-tense mode of history, and the objective, historically oriented third-
person narrator who employs the subjective mode of discourse. Our Mutual 
Friend complicates this conjunction of planes of utterance by removing the 
“simplification” of having two distinct narrators. Now the same narrative 
voice shifts from the manner of history to that of discourse, from past-tense 
omniscience to present-tense cinematic exploration of surfaces. But in The 
Mystery of Edwin Drood, the device is taken to a new level because now one 
narrative voice slides between history and discourse, but the present-tense 
chapters permit a transcending of surfaces, so that internal conditions can 
be revealed, as in cinema voice-over, symbolism, fade-ins to mental states, 
and so forth can reveal unexpressed states of mental action, such as dreams 
and desires.14 Dickens has finally established his past-tense narrative as his-
tory and his present-tense narrative as discourse, according to Benveniste’s 
distinction, but he has done so in a single narrative in which the two modes 
continually, but covertly, manifest their mutual incompatibility.15
 Another problem that surfaces when contrasting the use of present-tense 
narration in Bleak House and The Mystery of Edwin Drood is that of focaliza-
tion, the means by which the events of a narrative are perceived. There is still 
no certain agreement about how to define focalization, but for my purposes 
here I shall define it as the mediating vantage point from which events in the 
narrative are seen. Mieke Bal offers one of the broader explanations. “When 
focalization lies with one character which participates in the fabula as an 
actor, we could refer to internal focalization. We can then indicate by means 
of the term external focalization that an anonymous agent, situated outside 
the fabula is functioning as focalizer” (105).16 Many narratologists, following 
Gérard Genette, argue that the focalizer must be a figure in the fabula, not a 
nondiegetic voice.17
 In Bleak House there are essentially no focalizing characters in the 
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present-tense narration, but the ideological position of the narrating voice 
located outside the fabula is so apparent that that voice occasionally cannot 
help but blurt out his position, as in this notorious example just after Jo the 
crossing sweeper has died.
The light is come upon the dark benighted way. Dead!
 Dead, your Majesty. Dead, my lords and gentlemen. Dead, Right Rev-
erends and Wrong Reverends of every order. Dead, men and women, born 
with Heavenly compassion in your hearts. And dying thus around us every 
day. (649)18
 Something more complicated is happening in The Mystery of Edwin Drood. 
Like Bleak House, Drood begins in the present tense. The first character intro-
duced is John Jasper in an opium den. “Shaking from head to foot, the man 
whose scattered consciousness has thus fantastically pieced itself together, at 
length rises, supports his trembling frame upon his arms, and looks around. 
He is in the meanest and closest of small rooms” (1). But where is the nar-
rator? Not only is he in the present tense, but he is also either in Jasper’s 
head or else on some other spatial and temporal plane—the passage opens 
with a description of a cathedral and dissolves into fragmented references to 
a Sultan, Turkish robbers, and a royal procession complete with ten thou-
sand scimitars and white elephants! The narrator and the narrative sustain 
this strange construction of temporality until the sixth and seventh chapters, 
when the narrative shifts temporarily to past tense.19 This first present-tense 
narration’s focalization is blurred from the outset. The narrator is capable 
of knowing what the dreaming John Jasper sees. Are we to understand that 
Jasper is the focalizer here even as he dreams? I think not. His vision is medi-
ated through the narrator and I am prepared to call that focalization. But the 
focalization does not rest there. When Jasper comes to consciousness it shifts 
to him as he looks on with disgust at Princess Puffer and a drugged lascar. 
Moreover, in the last pages of the novel, focalization hovers between the nar-
rator and Datchery. Dickens, in this novel, seems to be treating focalization 
as a version of free indirect discourse, where boundaries of definition can 
also blur and dissolve quickly. The present-tense narrator of Bleak House 
was a remote surveyor of surfaces. By contrast the narrative voice of Drood 
is so intimate and invasive that it can describe the images in dreams and can 
know what the characters think. In fact, in some of these instances it appears 
as though the simultaneous narration is compromised and that the narrator 
is providing an account of events that have already transpired, most notably 
in the chapter that describes events the night before Drood’s disappearance. 
Here is an example:
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Edwin Drood passes a solitary day. Something of deeper moment than he 
had thought has gone out of his life, and in the silence of his own chamber 
he wept for it last night. Though the image of Miss Landless still hovers in 
the background of his mind, the pretty little affectionate creature, so much 
firmer and wiser than he had supposed, occupies its stronghold. (124)
A similar passage describes Jasper’s day.
John Jasper passes a more agreeable and cheerful day than either of his 
guests. Having no music-lessons to give in the holiday season, his time is 
his own, but for the Cathedral services. He is early among the shopkeep-
ers, ordering little table luxuries that his nephew likes. His nephew will not 
be with him long, he tells his provision-dealers, and so must be petted and 
made much of. (127–28)
I would argue that this is not historical present—the present-tense narration 
of events already past—but a compacted version of simultaneous narration. 
It resembles the technique Dickens used in David Copperfield where David 
provides condensed accounts of his early history in present-tense chapters 
he calls retrospects. These are historical present accounts. But the condensed 
descriptions of Drood’s and Jasper’s days are condensed within the present-
tense narration of ongoing experience, a characteristic emphasized by the 
parallel presentation (“Edwin Drood passes  . . .” “John Jasper passes . . .”).
 I am suggesting that Dickens was making some remarkable advances in 
narrative craft and that an examination of his use of present-tense narration 
is one avenue through which to disclose them. However, whereas modern 
novelists have carried such experiments a long way for new purposes, 
Dickens remained committed to authorial control. He did this to a great 
extent in Drood by dwelling upon what is not known.
 While a number of Dickens’s novels deal with mystery as a crime that 
must be solved or as the unknowable destiny that awaits each character, 
only one of his works—as its title suggests—specifically sets out to be a sus-
pense novel: The Mystery of Edwin Drood. Like his earlier work, this book 
also poses questions of how much control characters have over their own 
lives. Rosa Bud and Edwin Drood, for example, feel themselves trapped in 
an arranged betrothal that has determined the course of their futures in a 
way that they themselves might not have arranged those tomorrows. And 
John Jasper feels himself trapped in what to him is the trivial existence of a 
cathedral choir director. Present-tense narration, more specifically simulta-
neous narration, enhances this sense of entrapment at the same time that it 
increases immediacy. It emphasizes contingency. But this is a psychological 
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contingency, not the material contingency of realism. It is as though Dickens 
is consciously substituting the one for the other to emphasize the fabular/
imaginative quality over any resemblance it has to realism.
 The absence of a frame complicates and enriches Drood. As with the third-
person narrators of Bleak House and Our Mutual Friend, there is no sugges-
tion that the narrator exists within the story itself, despite his present-tense 
discourse.20 There is also no reference that would allow us to read Drood 
as a memoir, for example, a text that can plausibly use the present tense to 
re-create past incidents. Instead, the reader is caught up in the moment as 
it actually occurs and experiences the events in the same temporality as do 
the characters. Of course, the reader cannot actually ever get past the fact 
that he or she is situated elsewhere, in the study or on the couch reading 
the story instead of living the events. But it is a compliment to Dickens’s 
talent that the reader’s reality rarely interferes with the development of the 
story and that no ruptures occur in the narrative which would jolt the reader 
back to the fact that it is highly implausible that someone would have been 
able to follow along with all of the events as they actually happened. Indeed, 
the shifts back to past tense emphasize the unusualness of the present-tense 
chapters. Dickens is calling attention to their transgressive nature. Working 
ostensibly toward a “mystery” narrative, Dickens has created an even deeper 
level of suspense in his creation of a third-person narrator who is able to 
pass judgment on characters and their actions, but who is never put into 
the position of seeming to withhold information from the reader. There is 
nothing in Dickens’s text from which the reader can infer that the narrator 
holds the secret of the mystery; the reader simply accepts that he or she will 
follow the present-tense description of events until the conclusion (or, as 
should have been the case, the solution). Strikingly, the present-tense nar-
ration, with its blindness of the future, dominates the past-tense narration, 
which, because it is in the past tense and hence presumably subsequent to 
events it describes, should overwhelm the present-tense narration through 
its supposed access to the outcome of events. That it does not is apparent in 
the opaqueness of Drood’s plot. No one has been able satisfactorily to finish 
Dickens’s story. Dickens, an already astute judge of his audience’s desire for 
social justice and personal security, has tapped into what would have been 
one of his readers’ greatest fears: that life is a mystery enshrouding each indi-
vidual and that no single clue exists which can lift that mantle and reveal the 
future.
 Although the present-tense sections of Drood play upon the reader’s 
anxiety by withholding any information about what is to come, they can 
nonetheless create an atmosphere of mystery and even dread. A relatively 
innocuous example occurs when John Jasper looks in upon his sleeping 
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nephew, Edwin Drood. “His nephew lies asleep, calm and untroubled. John 
Jasper stands looking down upon him, his unlighted pipe in his hand, for 
some time, with a fixed and deep attention. Then, hushing his footsteps, he 
passes to his own room, lights his pipe, and delivers himself to the Spectres 
it invokes at midnight” (38). The apprehension experienced in reading this 
passage comes not only from previous knowledge of Jasper, but, even more 
deliberately, from the sense that nobody, not even the narrator, truly knows 
what is lurking and lying in wait and, thus, everyone who ventures into that 
next moment known as the future is vulnerable. By intimating that signs 
do exist, sometimes in the form of heavy thunderclouds and other times in 
the cast of a sunny day, Dickens is toying with his readers’ desperate desire 
to read their own personal and cultural climate. Perhaps Dickens is directly 
addressing this desire when he describes, in a third-person section of the 
novel, Mr. Grewgious’s meditation upon the heavens.
[H]is gaze wandered from the windows to the stars, as if he would have 
read in them something that was hidden from him. Many of us would, if we 
could; but none of us so much as know our letters in the stars yet—or seem 
likely to do it, in this state of existence—and few languages can be read until 
their alphabets are mastered. (160)
 Expounding upon the concepts of destiny and providence is one of the 
ways in which Dickens is able to create the sense that there is “something-
about-to-happen” without having to allude directly to the event itself. Were 
Dickens to do this, were he to allow his present-tense narrator to know 
things before they happen, Dickens would be breaking the narrator’s tem-
poral boundaries. One of the few theorists to deal with the present tense in 
narration is Gary Saul Morson. He writes of the professional requirements of 
a sportscaster that “in the temporality of his narration, there cannot be fore-
shadowing. On the contrary everything in his voice is oriented toward the 
present and the unknown future” (177, emphasis added). Christian Paul Cas-
paris calls such activities as sports announcing “current report” and relates 
this category of present-tense usage to what he calls the historical present 
by its inability to know the causal framework of the event in progress; the 
historical present narrative similarly manifests “a conscious or unconscious 
indifference to the causal linking of events” (151).
 Past-tense narration can be mute about the future. It can forego prolepsis 
and limit itself to the events as they transpire, moving as close to sheer story 
(the chronological order of events) as possible, and avoiding the maneuvers 
of plot (the rearrangements of and refinements upon story). It can, in short, 
approach the condition of historical-present narration. It is even possible 
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for present-tense narration to make use of prolepsis. That the narration is 
in the present tense does not mean that the future is not fully known to 
the narrator. An example of this possibility within Dickens’s own work is 
David Copperfield, where the present-tense retrospective chapters occur 
within David’s autobiography of which he has complete knowledge. What 
is to prevent the narrator from writing something like this? “David sits at 
the window, watching travelers pass in the street. The day will come when 
he too will be one of those travelers. But now his wondering gaze rests upon 
a parade of strangers.” This is present-tense narration resembling historical-
present narration. Such a liberty would presumably violate the conventions 
of simultaneous narration, the method, I am arguing, of Drood.
 What is striking about The Mystery of Edwin Drood is that both present- 
and past-tense chapters withhold knowledge of the future. It is the muteness 
about the future in the past-tense chapters that enhances a similar muteness 
in the present-tense chapters. The inability or refusal of Dickens’s narrator 
to claim an already complete knowledge of the story would have disturbed 
a nineteenth-century reader more perhaps than grisly hints of horrors to 
come. The opaqueness of the future, rather than specific references to forth-
coming adventures, would have unnerved the reader. It is the opposite effect 
to that created by the use of prolepsis, when a narrator anticipates an event to 
come, especially an unpleasant or even fatal event, as when a narrator says, 
“If only he had known at that moment what was to occur the very next day.” 
This disclosure of a future event can create suspense and anxiety in a reader, 
but it is a different order of suspense from the blank future of present-tense 
simultaneous narration.
 One of the ways in which Morson differentiates between “sports time” 
and a novel is his claim that a reader can always close a book, read its last 
page, or perhaps read an introduction that explains the plot. He writes, “the 
outcome has in a sense already happened  .  .  .  rather than [being] of real 
contingency in our own present” (174).21 Thus, no matter how mysterious or 
threatening the circumstances might appear, there is always the underlying 
suggestion that it is all already over, already done, and that nothing in the 
reading of the narrative can happen to change the ending of the story. Most 
readers have probably sensed an impending resolution, even when narrative 
events appear at their most tangled, simply because there is a diminishing 
number of pages separating them from where they are in the story and the 
last page of the book. When it becomes obvious that there is only one chapter 
or one page left, even the least savvy of readers can see that the finale draws 
closer and that the circumstances of the story must be resolved. Thus, by 
the sheer passing of turned pages, an adventure that began with an infinite 
number of possibilities must at last come down to only one—the end. How-
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ever, because both Collins and Dickens first published their work in serial 
form, it is arguable that for their audiences there would have been a greater 
sense of an open ending. Since it would have been easily recognized that 
both authors alluded to current events, readers would have been aware that 
the stories were being written even as they read.22 This would have under-
mined the reader’s sense that the characters’ futures were foretold—that the 
events were long over—and would have intensified the readers’ anxiety as 
to what the next installment of the characters’ lives might mean for them. 
Through the medium of serial publication, which would have reinforced the 
effects of the present-tense narration, a feeling of contingency would have 
been more firmly established in the text. Again, this would have mimicked 
the same tension that confronted readers in their anxieties over their per-
sonal lives and the future generally. Who could know what tomorrow might 
bring? 
 It is with regard to the very human desire to know the ends of our own 
stories that Kermode gives new meaning to the concept of literacy. “The 
world is our beloved codex .  .  . we do, living as reading, like to think of it 
as a place where we can travel back and forth at will, divining congruences, 
conjunctions, opposites; extracting secrets from its secrecy  .  .  .  this is the 
way we satisfy ourselves with explanations of the unfollowable world—as 
if it were a structured narrative” (145). Victorian readers would have found 
that any alterations in the conventions of the novel, such as the insertion of 
a present-tense narration that disallows a foretold future, would have been 
simply one more way in which the author could force them to acknowl-
edge their inability to read or write the future. Collins and Dickens, in their 
different ways, made sure that readers could not read their texts in the old 
familiar way—with the comfort of past-tense temporality and the reassur-
ances of an omniscient narrator. Instead, both authors insisted that their 
readers confront the characters’ situations as if they were themselves living 
in, if not the same circumstance, at least the same temporality. And by inter-
rupting the traditional history narrative with the real-time impression of dis-
course, they allowed for a further examination of the questions of providence 
and destiny—not simply as narrative constructions, but as actual forces in 
the working out of events. By withholding any hints of the future in their 
present-tense narrations, thereby increasing their audiences’ anxieties about 
it, they strengthened their own command over it, thus conferring on them-
selves the power of providential or fateful control that the present-tense itself 
seemed to deny. Just as promises of religion and philosophy could only be 
hoped for, not known for certain, so the reader of these present-tense nar-
ratives received no proleptic promises of a comfortable conclusion. But, like 
the scientists examining the physical relics of the past to construct a narra-
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tive of human existence, they had to wait until the story was told before they 
could judge if it was providence, destiny, or chance that brought them to 
where they now stood. Ironically, it was by this, the most obviously contrived 
element of the narrative, the rude coupling of the supposedly discrete planes 
of utterance of history and discourse, that Collins and Dickens were able to 
make their stories that much more real to their readers. And it is exactly this 
contrivance that sets the novel outside the category of realism. The reality 
dealt with here is not the replication of material conditions, but the sense of 
mental and emotional participation under the guidance of a master.
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ames are important in literature. Although in serious 
literature names tend to be nondirective until charac-
ters’ natures are manifested through actions, in many 
cases a name itself defines a character’s nature or hints 
at it. Realism must avoid the appearance of using symbolic, sugges-
tive, or illustrative names, since this practice calls attention to autho-
rial intention, which the realist novel seeks to mask. The realist nov-
elist cannot indulge in such play with her audience. But especially in 
comic literature, we willingly accept names that typify. We accept them 
as a writer’s shorthand, a way of conveying quickly and without com-
plication the basic “humor” of his character. But we tend also to accept 
this shorthand passively, without considering the immense power that 
such naming confers upon the writer. In this chapter, I wish to explore 
the ways in which Dickens exploits a wide range of possibilities in the 
naming of characters as a means of sequestering the force of his nar-
ratives to his own authority, a gesture at odds with the conventions of 
realism which seek to create the illusion of transparent or “natural” 
narrative. Moreover, it is my contention that Dickens purposely uses 
names to call attention to his own performance, as the force behind 
naming both within and beyond the diegesis, thus purposely opposing 
the transparency supposed in realism.1 Dickens’s contemporaries were 
naming
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aware of his skill in naming and the interest has continued through Elizabeth 
Hope Gordon’s The Naming of Characters in the Works of Charles Dickens 
(1917) to the present day.
 The power of naming shows itself in many types of fiction, sometimes in 
quite subtle ways. At one point in Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, for 
example, Marcel refers to Rachel as “Rachel when from the Lord,” a puz-
zling denomination for the general reader. J. Hillis Miller remarks that this 
is “a striking example within the novel itself of naming as a sovereign speech 
act making or remaking the one who is named” (Speech Acts 207). Miller 
emphasizes that, while Marcel’s act of naming is part of the diegesis, it is 
actually Proust, not his character, who wishes to convey the multiple signifi-
cances of the allusive name. If it were his character who wished to transmit 
this information, Proust would presumably have confirmed or explained 
Marcel’s reason for employing this name. Instead, it remains a mystery to all 
but the initiate, though it is possible that Proust felt the allusion to Jacques 
Halévy’s opera La juive (The Jewess [1835]) would be evident to his contem-
poraries.2 Whatever the case, it is possible to make a distinction between 
the author’s power to name and the significance of the act of naming within 
the diegesis, which, as Miller brilliantly demonstrates, requires an energetic 
intertextual exercise on the part of the reader.
 Miller calls naming a “sovereign speech act,” thereby himself indirectly 
alluding to the sovereignty granted to Adam and Eve over Eden, when God 
assigned them the privilege of naming the beings and objects of their world. 
Naming is widely understood to embody power in language. Few speech 
acts have more sustained effect, with the exception of such dramatic utter-
ances as “Off with his head!” and the like. Women influenced by feminist 
activism from the middle of the twentieth century acknowledged the power 
of naming by refusing to yield the surname they were born with to take that 
of a husband, despite the fact that both names came to them from men. 
Stage names, pseudonyms, and aliases also indicate a strong human impulse 
to appropriate the power of naming to oneself. What concerns me in this 
chapter, beyond a general interest in Charles Dickens’s practice of naming in 
his fiction, is the distinction hinted at, but not explored in depth in Miller’s 
comments on Proust, between the author’s and the narrator’s or character’s 
acts of naming.
 Charles Dickens was acutely aware of the power of naming both within 
his narratives, as exercised by his characters or his narrators, and on his 
own part as author. From the beginning of his career, Dickens was deeply 
involved with and interested in the act of naming.3 He began his writing 
career, as we all know, under a false name as Boz and relished such self-
naming as The Inimitable, and the Sparkler of Albion. But from the Sketches 
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onward, he was conscious of the resonances of names, most often in the 
early works for their comic qualities, a feature he shared with and borrowed 
from the numerous comic writers of his own and earlier times. Jingle aptly 
suggests the garrulousness of that character, as Winkle, Tupman, and less 
effectively Snodgrass suggest the respective characters of these humorous 
sidekicks. Pickwick itself is a comical name. Similarly, names that carry an 
allegorical quality were familiar in literary tradition and often used by some 
of Dickens’s favorite writers. Henry Fielding’s Squire Allworthy is a good 
example. Dickens’s contemporary and friend Captain Frederick Marryat was 
in the habit of naming his protagonists according to their supposed or actual 
attributes, such as Peter Simple, Jacob Faithful, Masterman Ready, and Jack 
Easy.
 Often the names Dickens selects have connotative value only, as with 
Quilp, a name that sounds both foolish and nasty. Other names suggest a 
character trait as with Miss Nipper and Mrs. MacStinger in Dombey and 
Son. Still others have associational power, as with Solomon Gills and Captain 
Cuttle, both connected to maritime activities. But some names also carry 
denotative power, as with Bradley Headstone, whose name was first tried in 
Dickens’s notes as Amos Headstone or Deadstone, before becoming Bradley 
Deadstone and finally Headstone.4 To thrust home his point, Dickens has 
Rogue Riderhood remark on the churchyard associations of the name. 
Michael Cotsell observes the resemblance of Fascination Fledgeby’s name 
to “fledgling” (150). And, of course, there are the transparent Veneerings. 
There are even those well-known instances where Dickens borrowed directly 
or alluded satirically to real names, as he did with Fagin in Oliver Twist. All 
of these acts of naming by Dickens as author are significant. However, I am 
particularly interested in those instances where characters call attention to 
the act of naming, and, in doing so signal Dickens’s own ultimate authority 
as the source of all such naming.
 Garrett Stewart offers a good example of Dickens’s complicated naming 
activity as early as The Old Curiosity Shop. Dick Swiveller achieves a kind of 
poetic apotheosis when he names the Brasses’ anonymous servant girl the 
Marchioness. As Stewart puts it, he effectively brings the girl into being, a 
beingness that will be crucial to his recovery from illness and to his achieving 
a degree of success in life. But if Dick is something of a wordmaster and takes 
to himself the privilege of naming, he is himself, through Dickens’s authority 
to name him, an example of the complex force that names can suggest. In 
Stewart’s words: 
Many have noted the importance of the name “Dick,” one syllable of his 
author’s last name, as a clue to the inherence in this comic character of at 
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least a part of the author’s own personality, one phase of his artistic tem-
perament. Further, the family pronunciation of Sam’s last name, “Veller,” 
is also contained in Dick’s own surname. And there is surely something in 
“Swiveller” that catches his directionless vitality, that willingness to take the 
prevailing wind which often makes him seem as though he is merely going 
in circles. But Dick not only swivels, he seeks; he himself wonders about his 
first name in connection with that prototypical Richard who became Lord 
Mayor of London. “Perhaps the bells might strike up ‘Turn again, Swiveller, 
Lord Mayor of London.’ Whittington’s name was Dick.” (105–6)
Stewart demonstrates the possible connections between Dickens and his 
character, the possible echoes between characters from different books, and 
the use of traditional lore to give weight to his own characters. The most 
significant attribute of this instance is its dual function: while it characterizes 
Dick, it also highlights the function of his name as a turner or swiveller. So, 
while Dick is focusing on his first name, Dickens is showing us the substance 
of his last name and hinting proleptically at Dick’s ultimate turning from his 
trivial existence to a purposeful life.5
 Stewart also points to some functions of naming in Our Mutual Friend. 
Again, it is characteristic for characters to manifest their own sense of supe-
riority by naming others. So Eugene feels free to refer to Riah as “Mr. Aaron” 
and “Patriarch,” claiming that he does so in a complimentary fashion, 
although, for the reader, his taking liberties with the Jew’s name can be seen 
as a form of appropriation (Stewart 212). More telling is Stewart’s example 
of self-naming in Jenny Wren. “Fanny Cleaver,” he writes, “has bestowed 
upon herself a liberating pseudonym, a nom de plumage whose assonant lift 
is meant to carry her fancy above the sordidness of her cares and labors . . .” 
(205). Jenny sometimes smells flowers and hears songbirds that recall her 
dream of angelic visitors, and Stewart notes that “Jenny Wren has named 
herself a songbird—developing an eye as ‘bright and watchful as the bird’s 
whose name she had taken’ (II,11)—and has grown herself a bower” (209). 
Jenny has consciously renamed herself with a view to redemption, or at 
least removal from her sordid reality. Stewart shrewdly remarks that, “Like 
Dickens himself, Jenny Wren is also a tireless coiner of names ironic and 
otherwise” for others (204). However, Stewart fails to note that it is Dickens 
who named this character Fanny Cleaver, whose ironic tongue is so sharp 
and cutting. Much as Jenny tries to wrest command of her character from 
her creator, he remains in control of her sardonic nature. His name for her—
Cleaver—still fits. Moreover, it is also Dickens who has permitted Fanny 
to choose the name Jenny Wren, which has its ironies for her, but perhaps 
others for Dickens himself.6
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 David Copperfield offers a clear and simple example of the power of 
naming in an atmosphere of coercion within its diegesis.7 When Mr. Murd-
stone wants to warn his associates to be prudent in their speech around the 
young David, he says someone is very sharp, identifying this someone as 
“Brooks of Sheffield,” an allusion to the city of Sheffield’s reputation for good 
cutlery.8 Murdstone’s humor here bears a surprising resemblance to some of 
Dickens’s own metaphorical and metonymic naming techniques. Steerforth 
names David “Daisy,” to indicate his innocence as well as his subjugation 
to Steerforth himself. In neither instance does David realize that the act of 
denomination is belittling and manipulative. Aunt Betsey renames David 
with her own name Trotwood as a mark of her command over him, just as 
Dora’s nickname for him signifies possession. Harry Stone observes that the 
new name Trotwood also signals a new phase in David’s life (“What’s in a 
Name?” 193). The same could be said of Dora’s nickname for David. David 
says that Doady is Dora’s “corruption of David,” an ambiguous statement. 
Dora is not a wise choice as a partner for a young man like David, and hence 
she does represent a “corruption” of his true course in life.9 Within the nar-
rative, therefore, it is clear that the act of naming involves an assumption of 
power over the person named (601). Oddly enough, David, who begins his 
career as an early story teller, seldom names other people in this way.
 Personal names are intriguing in David Copperfield in various ways, one 
of which is the way they intimate rather than declare authorial intention. 
It is interesting how some of the important names in the novel suggest a 
natural setting—Copperfield, Trotwood, Wickfield, Murdstone. Arguably, 
these names suggest a pastoral quality in Copperfield that is more persis-
tent than in most of Dickens’s novels. In other novels, names of this sort 
also indicate characters who ultimately figure positively in their stories, such 
as Woodcourt and Lightwood, whereas characters with names like Murd-
stone and Smallweed suggest the unappealing aspects of the natural world. 
Even David’s birthplace, Blunderstone, suggests the same outdoor atmo-
sphere, though the “blunder” in the word implies error and misfortune and 
is therefore not pleasantly combined with the hard suggestions of “stone.” 
The name is also a forecast of Clara Copperfield’s second husband, the cruel 
Mr. Murdstone, whose name Betsey Trotwood confuses when she com-
plains that David’s mother “goes and marries a Murderer—or a man with 
a name like it . . .” (253). In passages such as this, Dickens calls attention to 
his own authority in the act of naming. Harry Stone indicates that Dickens’s 
selection of the name Murdstone combines ideas of murder and hardness 
with equal emphasis and openness, but also shows how the name connects 
him with David’s real father by way of its allusion to the father’s gravestone 
(“What’s in a Name?” 194–95). Some names including w’s suggest weak-
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ness in character and include most notably Mr. Wilkins Micawber, but also 
Mr. Wickfield and both Dora Spenlow and her father, but others, especially 
those beginning with w’s imply some degree of firmness, notably Weller and 
Westlock, but also Wardle and Wegg in their ways. Perhaps the most inter-
esting is Wemmick, a character who seems to mirror the harsh traits of his 
employer, but who turns out, in his domestic character, to have a very soft 
side. But Dickens also tries out a pattern he uses effectively in Great Expec-
tations by contrasting names with the same number of letters, though with 
different connotative sounds. Thus the steady and alert Mr. Peggotty is set 
against the glum and morose Mrs. Gummidge. More significant, perhaps, 
are the names of David’s friendly companion and Steerforth’s evil servant. 
Though Micawber’s name may suggest weakness, its open vowels and soft 
consonants also imply a kindly, accommodating nature, whereas Littimer’s 
pinched vowels and pointy consonants hint at a prickly, unappealing char-
acter.10 Several characters’ names are ambiguous. Hence, Steerforth itself 
calls up heroic possibilities, but, these possibilities are, as we discover by the 
end of the novel, misapplied. Tommy Traddles’s name is both comic and bal-
anced, and it is the combination of a humorous and an industrious character 
that brings him success in life.
 What interests me in Copperfield is that it is Dickens, not his first-person 
narrator, who is in charge of this naming. The water imagery of this novel 
supports a complex pattern of danger, salvation, and death. Steerforth’s name 
evokes the image of a sea captain, but this “hero” corrupts Little Em’ly and 
carries her off in his sailing vessel, a reversal of the ideal of the rescue at 
sea. And Steerforth dies retributively in both literal and metaphorical ship-
wreck. Dickens reinforces the moral design of his novel by showing the mor-
ally compassless Steerforth coming to misfortune through the abuse of his 
considerable powers.11 By contrast, Peggotty keeps an ark that has come to 
rest not on Ararat, but the Yarmouth sands, where he shelters his extended 
family, including the appropriately named Ham, named after a son of the 
original ark owner, Noah. Ultimately, it is a ship that will carry the Micaw-
bers, Em’ly, and Martha to a new world of opportunity in Australia. Dickens, 
not his characters, links appropriate names to a water-related theme by way 
of obliging his readers to interpret his narrative in the manner he directs, not 
in some capricious reading of their own. This aim on his part might be mis-
guided, given the researches of modern critics, especially those employing 
what is known as reader-response criticism, but there is little doubt in my 
mind that this was his purpose.12
 Dickens himself took delight in naming his characters, from the sim-
plest and most theatrical to more subtle and complicated instances, but it is 
also interesting to observe the ways in which he delegates the authority for 
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naming to his third-person and first-person narrators. Esther Summerson 
and David Copperfield tend not to be big namers, whereas third-person nar-
rators name as freely as Dickens himself, if any distinction is to be made 
between author and narrator. The ironic voice of the narrator of Our Mutual 
Friend even dispenses with proper names, to call a few of the stylized charac-
ters Boots, Brewer, and, in a much slyer manner, the Veneering servant who 
is referred to as the Analytical Chemist.
 Dickens was fully aware of what one might call the sins of naming. Michael 
Ragussis has shown the discordance between a person or place’s name and 
its actual nature. In fact, he indicates that this discordance is part of a larger 
problem with language itself in Bleak House, arguing that “language is Lon-
don’s communicative/communicable disease” (263). Even Esther Summer-
son’s apparently positive name is misleading; unlike other characters who 
are robbed of histories by their names, “it is not the name itself that robs her: 
it is the absence of a name” (257). But if Dickens offered numerous indica-
tions about the perils involved with naming, he also offered as many indica-
tions of his own authority and control where naming was concerned, and 
Ragussis, without making this case, gives an appropriate instance. Hawdon, 
Esther’s unknown father, is referred to in several ways: the Captain, Nemo 
(his own alias), Our Dear Brother (the narrator’s ironic term), and Nimrod, 
Mrs. Snagsby’s misunderstanding of Nemo. But, as Ragussis demonstrates, 
this incorrect name referring to the mighty hunter of the Old Testament 
nonetheless connects Hawdon to the theme of confused language indicated 
by references to the tower of Babel and carried out in the thematic network 
of language as confusion in “Dickens’s brilliant use of ‘the great wilderness 
of London’ (xlviii, 583), that ‘immense desert of law-hand’ (xlvii, 567), as the 
Old Testament desert, but with this difference: the Law of God, the divine 
Word, has itself degenerated into babel, and the Father has become the tyr-
annous, and dead, Pharaoh” (262). Thus, while confusion might reign within 
the diegesis, and names not connect signified and signifier, Dickens makes 
certain that his story retains its tightly woven meaning and even opens up 
occasional windows for readers alert enough to draw the threads together.
 Sometimes it might appear that Dickens or his narrator has slipped up. 
Why, for example, would an author name his titular character Chuzzlewit? 
Such a name suggests an inferior, comic character—much more so than 
Pickwick, which is simply playful. Dickens did not come to the name easily, 
but considered several others, including Sweezlewag, Sweezlebach, Swee-
zleden, Chuzzletoe, and the favored Chuzzlewig. Only at the last stage did 
it become Chuzzlewit, certainly far the best of these names. But why such 
a pejorative name for the book’s hero? The full early versions of the book’s 
title provide the clue to an answer for they indicate that this is not merely 
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the story of young Martin, but forms “a complete key to The House of chuz-
zlewig” (Stone, Notes, 33). A glance at the novel’s opening paragraph reveals 
that the so-called House of Chuzzlewit is the human race, which traces its 
heritage back to Adam and Eve. Hence, the Chuzzlewit family is all of us; we 
are all confused and selfish. And lest anyone think that this is a late inter-
pretation, it is necessary only to observe that from Dickens’s earliest notes 
for the novel, he wrote his intention that for the readers of this novel “Your 
homes the scene. Yourselves the actors here” (Stone, Notes, 31).
 The power to name is enormously significant, though it also permits 
an illusion of command.13 A notable example of this last instance is Pip in 
Great Expectations, who names himself by a slip of the tongue. This novel is 
also an interesting exception to the division between the nonnaming first-
person and the naming third-person narrators of Dickens’s novels. Pip is a 
notable example of the importance of naming, if for no other reason than 
that Dickens calls such attention to this speech act at the very outset of his 
novel, when his protagonist first becomes conscious of his own being. This 
sovereign speech act, however, is reported to us in the midst of much confu-
sion on Pip’s part, which includes his misunderstanding of what is written 
about his dead parents and siblings on their cemetery markers, and then the 
perturbation prompted by Magwitch’s account of his bloodthirsty partner. 
It could be said that Pip has misnamed himself, since he has shrunk himself 
from the complete Philip Pirrip, to the diminutive Pip. From this point of 
view, one might conclude that Pip lives out his early career under a false 
name. As is frequently the case in Dickens’s later fiction, he offers a redun-
dancy of clues for the reader to grasp his full intentions, if not while reading, 
then when the reading is complete and all information is in. One such clue 
about Pip and names is in the brief episode when the young and still largely 
illiterate Pip writes a letter for Joe in which he shortens Joe’s name to JO, an 
act of abbreviation resembling the shortening of his own name and hinting 
at his misvaluing of the man Joe as well, though interestingly, Joe can rec-
ognize his name when he sees Pip’s written JO, though he is otherwise no 
reader (75). 
 Appropriately, Pip’s false name mirrors the falseness of his situation. His 
great expectations are to become a wealthy gentleman and Estella’s husband, 
though in reality he will become an overseas merchant who is single when 
the narrative ends. Pip’s misnaming of himself is thus consistent with the 
illusory life he leads through most of the narrative. By mistakenly assuming 
control of his own name, he loses command of his actual nature, accepting 
a form of secular destiny instead of forging his own fate. The verb “to forge” 
stems from the Old French forgier, derived from the Latin fabricare, to make 
or fashion. There are many modes of making, some true and some false, 
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though forge suggests arduous creation. But to forge money is to be so false 
as to constitute criminality. Whereas Joe is true to the right purpose of 
forging, Pip forges an identity which he passes off as real in the world around 
him, despite the fact that several characters see through this specious form 
of specie, from Biddy to Trabb’s boy to Dolge Orlick. The latter names Pip 
“wolf,” a displacement of Pip’s identity, but not inexplicable from the point of 
view of Orlick, to whom Pip has not been kind. There are many reasons for 
Pip’s pervading sense of guilt and association with criminality, not the least 
of which is that he is living an alias. I am myself here playing with words to 
a specific end. The Forge is one of the most important place names in Great 
Expectations, and it carries the weight of many kinds of making because it 
is here that the core mystery of the plot is worked into shape, a fact that 
Dickens signals throughout the narrative by the recurring allusions to equip-
ment associated with the Forge—a file, manacles, chains, and so forth.
 Herbert Pocket changes Pip’s name, preferring to call him Handel because 
of that musician’s well-known composition “The Harmonious Blacksmith.” 
A blacksmith is a man of physical power who can shape what is otherwise 
resistant to change through his mastery of the forge. Joe is true to the simple 
identity he did not make, but over which he takes control. Ceding domestic 
power to his wife is a sign of his real authority. Only those who hold power 
can lease it to others. No one offers to call Joe by anything but his given 
names. But by renaming Pip Handel, Herbert displaces Pip from his false 
identity without providing him with a true one, unlike the renamings of 
David Copperfield. Not he, but Dickens is calling attention to the parallel 
between Handel’s translation of the rough work of the blacksmith into art 
and Pip’s transformation from a blacksmith in fact into a role-playing gen-
tleman. It is, after all, Herbert’s father who has the task of coining this new 
gentleman. So Dickens’s allusiveness, put in the mouth of Herbert as a thing 
of little significance, is actually a clue to the correct understanding of the 
entire novel. This name game comes full circle, when, near the close of the 
novel, we learn that Joe and Biddy’s child has been named Pip. This will 
be his proper name and his proper identity to fulfill. The original Pip has 
presumably by this time achieved his true identity, which permits him to 
become the narrator of his own history; presumably he is now Philip Pirrip 
again and not that false construction known as Pip. Although, in Dickens’s 
original ending of the novel, Estella calls Pip by that name, in the published 
ending, she does not.
 Naming plays an important part throughout Great Expectations. Some 
names are neutral, as is Joe Gargery’s. Others intend a comic sound, as with 
the guests gathered at the Gargery home—Wopsle, Hubble, and especially 
Pumblechook. Other names bear varying degrees of more intense meaning. 
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Abel Magwitch links an edenic name with suggestions of sorcery and wicked 
power.14 Dolge Orlick, with its rolling vowels echoes the moroseness of its 
owner. Other names similarly play with sounds that are compatible with 
the characters they name, such as Drummle and Startop. A minor character 
is clearly skewered by being named Mrs. Coiler. But important characters 
are similarly well defined. Estella suggests a stellar inaccessibility, an apt 
name considering Dickens’s initial ending of the novel, in which Pip does 
not attain his female prize. More evident is the meaning of Miss Havisham’s 
name, for her entire life is a sham. These are necessary, but unoriginal obser-
vations. What is interesting to me is that Dickens in this novel gives Pip, a 
first-person narrator, a tendency to naming that resembles that of his third-
person narrators. Pip the narrator has not named the characters mentioned 
above, but Pip the subject of the narration does rename Pepper, his unneces-
sary servant, as the Avenger. And something fairly complex is going on with 
the narrative when this happens. Pip the narrator has used many images 
of entanglement, such as golden chains, the reappearing file, and so forth 
to indicate a pattern of entrapment in Pip’s career, but that is because he is 
narrating the account after the important events have transpired and have 
become a story that can be woven together with a clear teleological purpose. 
But Pip the subject of narration creates the minatory name for his servant 
while he is in the midst of that story, before it even is a story. Yet he fulfills 
Dickens’s need to retain control of his narrative by putting in place the allu-
sive and connotative blocks that constitute the edifice of his narrative. It is 
Dickens, too, who gives the narrating Pip his powers of metaphor.
 Dickens exploits his naming game best in this novel with Jaggers and his 
clerk, Wemmick. While at first the two seem aptly paired—both secretive 
and solitary and devoted to the business of the law—, in fact, they are even-
tually distinguished from one another. Their names make this distinction 
precisely evident. Jaggers is as jagged and rough a name as one might wish 
for with its harsh vowels and consonants. Wemmick, by contrast, is almost 
a mellifluous name with its softened consonants. More intriguing is that the 
two names align perfectly, each consisting of seven letters with contrasting 
consonants and vowels matching exactly, a precise development of examples 
I gave earlier from David Copperfield. There is no accident in this kind of 
naming. Moreover, the place names associated with both men have a sim-
ilar effect. Little Britain, though a real place, nonetheless has a spiky quality 
that makes it sound unattractive, whereas Walworth has a gentle, inviting 
tonality. These contrasting names, both of persons and of place, show what 
power Dickens could convey through his naming, for entire personalities 
and contexts are evoked in these names before any actions flesh them out. In 
some ways, they are Dickens’s clues to his readers about how to receive each 
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of his fictional personalities. We know before the secret is out that Wem-
mick is a better man than he seems. Walworth and Walworth sentiments are 
already implied in his name.
 In her study of realism, All Is True, Lilian R. Furst identifies the eighteenth 
century as the period when location and actual place became important to 
fiction. Previously places bore symbolic and allegorical significance. “Only 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries does fiction begin to 
develop environment as a matrix in which character is formed, and with 
this, the close articulation of places and people” (98). At the end of the eigh-
teenth century, the romantic enthusiasm for landscape combines with curi-
osity about practical industrial matters and details of social organization. 
“The stark symbolism of allegory combines with the digressive prolixity of 
travel writing to produce the technique of detailed and cumulative notation 
of place normally associated with realism” (98). Furst notes that since Ian 
Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, particularity of place has been considered a hall-
mark of realism. Because place names in fiction can and often do refer to real 
sites, they “can act as a bridge of continuity, along which readers may move 
from one sphere to the other without becoming conscious of the transition” 
(102). This easy flow between fiction and reality enhances the illusion of 
transparency to which realism aspires.
 Here again, Dickens, though a master at particularity, does not employ 
his details for the same strategic ends as realism. Even with place names 
he often tries to evoke an emotional response, whether positive in a place 
like Dingley Dell, or negative, with the allegorically named Dotheboys Hall 
or Pocket Breaches, the town for which Veneering becomes a Member of 
Parliament. The first is readable even by a twenty-first century American 
student; the second requires some historical information. The name sug-
gests a pocket borough—one controlled by a single individual or family, 
and hence a certainty for a favored parliamentary candidate. That such 
favor often involved cash payment is suggested by the name Dickens chose 
for the town, but even more by the names he listed in his mems, but then 
discarded—Ticklepocket and Twitchpocket.15 If his characters exert or 
try to exert control over their environment and other characters through 
assuming the power to rename, Dickens himself overtly claims a similar 
authority through the reverberating significance of the names he gives to 
persons and things.16 But Dickens also extends his own yen for naming 
places to his characters. Not many seriously realist novelists would have 
their characters offer place names such as Bleak House, Satis House, or the 
Golden Bower. But Dickens does not want to be a realist in the accepted 
sense of that term. Richard Lettis puts the matter well:
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Above all, he thought that writing should enable the reader to see the essen-
tial affirmative ‘truth’ of life—this was for him the best that writing could 
achieve. He disliked the obvious, and approved always of subtlety, but knew 
that judicious use of the commonplace, of carefully-selected detail, could 
bring reality to a story—but it must always be the kind of reality he found 
in drama: ‘wonderful reality’—the world as we know it, but ‘polished by art’ 
until it assumed values not felt in the dull settled world itself. For him reality 
was not what it was to the realists; it was neither commonplace as in Howells 
nor sordid as in so many others. (60–61)
I would add that Dickens wanted a wonderful reality not only polished by 
art, but specifically by the art of Charles Dickens.
 When Dickens names a voting town Eatanswill, he is thumbing his nose 
at what was to become the realist convention because he wants his audience 
to be conscious of the author as a performer, as master of the sovereign act of 
naming.17 When he confers that power upon his narrators and characters, he 
means to show his audience how important that power of naming is and how 
it remains ultimately the province of the author who is permitting his char-
acters to name others and even themselves. But he also calls attention to the 
sins of naming in characters like Steerforth or Murdstone, and the mistake 
of naming in Pip. By telling the stories of those who do not understand how 
sovereign the act of naming is, Dickens reinforces his own power by using 
that act correctly and to its proper end.
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           ery early in Oliver Twist, Oliver makes the fam-
                 ous blunder of begging for more food, an offense which 
                promptly brings him before the board of commissioners of the
        workhouse. When Bumble the beadle confirms that Oliver has 
asked for more after consuming the supper allotted by the dietary, “the 
man in the white waistcoat” declares: “‘That boy will be hung . . . I know 
that boy will be hung’” (11). Nobody controverts the man in the white 
waistcoat; Oliver is instantly confined and a notice is posted on the out-
side gate of the workhouse advertising his availability for apprentice-
ship to any trade. The gentleman in the white waistcoat asserts himself 
again. “‘I never was more convinced of anything in my life,’ said the 
gentleman in the white waistcoat, as he knocked at the gate and read 
the bill next morning: ‘I never was more convinced of anything in my 
life, than I am, that that boy will come to be hung’” (12). This episode 
might have ended chapter 2, but the young Dickens does not drop the 
subject; instead, the narrator emphasizes his own relationship to the 
diegesis, linking his narrative task to the claims of the gentleman in the 
white waistcoat. “As I purpose to show in the sequel whether the white-
the gentleman in the 
white waistcoat
Dickens and metonymy
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waistcoated gentleman was right or not, I should perhaps mar the interest of 
this narrative (supposing it to possess any at all), if I ventured to hint, just 
yet, whether the life of Oliver Twist had this violent termination or no” (37).
 Since the full title of Dickens’s novel is Oliver Twist, Or, The Parish Boy’s 
Progress, there is room for doubt about his ultimate fate. How much can 
be expected of a child born in a workhouse and brought up on the rates at 
the mercy of a penny-wise middle-class bureaucracy? Poverty and squalor 
are more likely to produce a criminal than a law-abiding citizen among any 
orphans who happen to survive the conditions of the workhouse. Oliver’s 
fate might be that of Bulwer’s Paul Clifford or Ainsworth’s Jack Sheppard. 
Nonetheless, the narrator’s obvious sympathy for Oliver from the outset 
makes it unlikely that he will progress to the gallows. Thus the narrator’s coy 
positioning of himself in relation to the gentleman in the white waistcoat 
seems to constitute an opposition, not a conundrum. At this point in the 
narrative, the narrator already knows the general outcome of his narrative; 
the gentleman with the white waistcoat does not. He is simply confident that 
he does. Two unnamed individuals—the narrator and the man in the white 
waistcoat—present their forms of authority before their mutual audience, 
the novel’s readers.
 It might be argued that Dickens did not know the outcome of his narrative, 
given the haste with which he was writing several different texts at the same 
time that he was beginning Twist, but I would contend that, after Pickwick, he 
usually had his overall pattern in mind, even if he did not have the details of 
plot and character defined. An example of how he tended to think appears in 
a letter to Wilkie Collins, with whom he was writing “No Thoroughfare.” He is 
concerned with the overall design first, which will culminate:
in a wintry flight and pursuit across the Alps. Let us be obliged to go over—
say the Simplon Pass—under lonely circumstances, and against warnings. 
Let us get into all the horrors and dangers of such an adventure under the 
most terrific circumstances, either escaping from, or trying to overtake (the 
latter, the better, I think) some one, on escaping from, or overtaking, whom, 
the love, prosperity, and Nemesis of the story depend. There we can get 
Ghostly interest, picturesque interest, breathless interest of time and circum-
stance, and force the design up to any powerful climax we please. (11:413)
 But back to the man in the white waistcoat who has not finished his part 
in Oliver’s drama. As chapter 3 begins, the narrator comments that, if the 
imprisoned Oliver had taken the gentleman with the white waistcoat’s “sage 
advice,” he would have hanged himself in his cell with his pocket handker-
chief, except for the fact that, handkerchiefs being luxuries, workhouse boys 
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have no access to them (12). This is an interesting proleptic moment, for 
a major part of the trade to which Fagin apprentices Oliver in London is 
the stealing of pocket handkerchiefs, potentially a hanging offense.1 So this 
apparent aside has a resonance known only to the narrator. This is a secret 
bit of metonymy—the luxury of handkerchiefs equals crime—that prepares 
for a similar metonymy involving the white waistcoat. Moreover, the con-
nection to Fagin is not accidental, for the man in the white waistcoat acts for 
Oliver much in the way the Artful Dodger does—as an agent for a poten-
tial employer. He encourages Gamfield the chimney sweep, “exactly the sort 
of master Oliver Twist wanted,” to apply for the boy and even becomes his 
advocate, introducing him to the board of commissioners (14). Mr. Limbkin, 
the head of the board, realizes what a dangerous and revolting occupa-
tion chimney sweeping is for the boys who must climb up the flues and he 
expresses some sympathy along those lines, enough to drive a hard financial 
bargain with Gamfield. However, the sale of Oliver to the vile chimney sweep 
is prevented accidentally by a magistrate who is distracted from his doze and 
notices the terror in Oliver’s face. He sends Oliver back to the workhouse 
with instructions that he be treated kindly. “That same evening,” the narrator 
notes, “the gentleman in the white waistcoat most positively and decidedly 
affirmed, not only that Oliver would be hung, but that he would be drawn 
and quartered into the bargain” (19).
 The gentleman in the white waistcoat appears to be one of those gratu-
itous items that occur in Dickens’s narratives, which do not seem to have any 
integral function, but merely extend or enhance a given situation. The man 
in the white waistcoat might be an intensifier, since he not only endorses 
the board’s treatment of Oliver, but seems to relish it with sadistic enjoy-
ment. However, I suggest that the gentleman in the white waistcoat carries 
out a much more important function in the novel and is far from incidental, 
because he illustrates what I take to be a conscious narrative technique that 
Dickens employs to distance his work from what we normally identify as 
realist fiction. Moreover, I believe that Dickens understood the rules for 
what came to be recognized as realism and that he purposely violated them 
for his own ends.
 In Hidden Rivalries: Dickens, Realism and Revaluation, Jerome Meckier 
places Dickens in the realist camp and argues that the major writers he 
examines—Dickens, Trollope, Gaskell, Eliot, Collins—were involved in a sly 
“realism war”; he declares that “the novelists themselves—professed realists 
all—read and reread one another,” and then went on to overcome the version 
of realism of their competitors, most notably Dickens (2). Dickens had to 
respond in this war by reasserting his brand of realism in a constantly new 
way. But what I am suggesting is that Dickens’s mode of evading the chal-
The Gentleman in the White Waistcoat | 57
lenges of these contemporary rivals was to go beyond realism, to incorporate 
in his writings subversions of realism’s stylistic assumptions to which they 
adhered. Many able critics, from John Romano’s Dickens and Reality on, have 
argued pointedly that Dickens’s fiction draws as much from romance, fairy 
tale, and allegory as it does from the mimetic tradition. Richard Lettis puts 
the situation well when he says that Dickens wanted a “wonderful reality” 
(see full quotation at the end of chapter 3 of this book). I have already indi-
cated that Dickens held an attitude toward fiction shared by Bulwer-Lytton, 
which Edward Eigner describes as the metaphysical novel, an approach that 
stressed overall design before plot and characterization.
 In a hostile evaluation of Dickens’s career David Musselwhite depicts a 
Dickens who begins as a truly original narrator in the role of Boz, but trans-
forms himself into a commodified author. He sees the anarchic, transparent 
world of Boz, along with some later passages, such as the description of 
Jacob’s Island in Oliver Twist and of the Fleet Prison in Pickwick as preferable 
to the mannered prose of Bleak House, as in the description of New Bleak 
House.2 The earlier work is impersonal and transparent in tone, whereas 
the later work is involved with the play of language itself, calling atten-
tion to itself. In a way, Musselwhite claims that Boz started as a realist and 
Dickens turned into a nonrealist, whatever we want to call that other entity. 
But again, my argument here is that Dickens became increasingly aware of 
how the various tropes of narration operated in what we call realism and he 
did not wish to be contained within those limits. Moreover, there are many 
moments in Boz’s Sketches where Dickens has already grasped this notion. 
J. Hillis Miller showed in “Sketches by Boz, Oliver Twist, and Cruikshank’s 
Illustrations,” that what critics and readers had so long accepted as precise 
reportage in the Sketches must be read in a different way. “The Sketches are 
not mimesis of an externally existing reality, but the interpretation of that 
reality according to highly artificial schemas inherited from the past” (32). 
And again: “The metonymic associations which Boz makes are fancies rather 
than facts, impositions on the signs he sees of stock conventions, not mir-
roring but interpretations, which is to say lies” (35). Miller indicates that 
Dickens was at least partially conscious of his own methods in the way he 
organized the Sketches for book publication. “The movement from Scene 
to Character to Tale is not the metonymic process authenticating realistic 
representation but a movement deeper and deeper into the conventional, the 
concocted, the schematic” (35).
 What happens as Dickens matures as a writer is that he does become more 
conscious of the play of language itself because he learns to use language in 
craftier ways. To recognize the double edge of metonymy, for example, pro-
vides him with a powerful tool not merely for narration, but for complexity 
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of theme. To connect patterns of metonymy over whole novels is to raise his 
narrative from simple realism to a style that prefigures the leitmotif tech-
nique of Richard Wagner in music, or Thomas Mann’s application of that 
technique to fiction, perhaps most self-consciously in Doctor Faustus. Mus-
selwhite complains that in his description of Carker’s room in Dombey and 
Son Dickens has moved away from surfaces and textures toward a concen-
tration on inner malignity and thus heavily loads its details against Carker. 
But that is the point! Plain realism could describe the room and associate 
certain objects with malign intent, let us say, but Dickens goes beyond that 
to characterize the objects as metonymic of Carker’s inner condition. It is the 
reverse of what the realist seeks to accomplish.
 I cannot here go into detail about the mimetic tradition. It is possible to 
discuss Dickens’s departure from that tradition in several ways, as I hope this 
study shows, but, for the purposes of this chapter, I would like to focus on 
one aspect of realism that seems to have received general agreement among 
critics over the years. That is the connection of metonymy with realist tech-
nique. Because metonymy is important in defining realism, I intend to show 
that Dickens used this trope in a manner contrary to its customary use in 
realist writing. Roman Jakobson formulated this identification of metonymy 
with realism when he opposed it to metaphor, which he allied to poetry. He 
wrote:
The primacy of the metaphoric process in the literary schools of romanti-
cism and symbolism has been repeatedly acknowledged, but it is still insuf-
ficiently realized that it is the predominance of metonymy which underlies 
and actually predetermines the so-called ‘realistic’ trend, which belongs to 
an intermediary stage between the decline of romanticism and the rise of 
symbolism and is opposed to both. Following the path of contiguous rela-
tionships, the realistic author metonymically digresses from the plot to the 
atmosphere and from the characters to the setting in space and time. He is 
fond of synechdochic details. (77–78)3
Virginia Woolf in her own way had already established the linkage of 
metonymy and realism in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” with the pur-
pose of showing its limitations. She divides up the writers of her day into 
Edwardians and Georgians, the former representing the realism of the past, 
the latter the modernism of the future. Bennett is one of the former, whose 
tools, Woolf says, no longer work for the present generation. The chief of 
these tools was elaborate description, so that character could be determined 
by what the human being was associated with among inanimate things. She 
concludes:
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That is what I mean by saying that the Edwardian tools are the wrong ones 
for us to use. They have laid an enormous stress upon the fabric of things. 
They have given us a house in the hope that we may be able to deduce the 
human beings who live there. To give them their due, they have made that 
house much better worth living in. But if you hold that novels are in the first 
place about people, and only in the second about the houses they live in, that 
is the wrong way to set about it. (332)
Recently, Harry Shaw has examined the history of this relationship in some 
detail. He accepts Jakobson’s ordering of metonymy with realism, but extends 
the idea along his own lines.
To the extent, then, that we imagine ourselves back into a situation in which 
we can take seriously the claims of figural realism to capture the real, we 
find ourselves conceiving of the connections it makes as metonymical in 
nature. After Dante, figural realism appears to be founded in a species of 
metaphor—as does much of the literature we most prize. But that is because 
our culture’s sense of the real has itself shifted. I draw from this the follow-
ing moral, which extends Jakobson’s contention that metonymy is the trope 
characteristic of nineteenth-century prose fiction: the defining trope of all 
realisms is metonymy—but it is metonymy as defined in the light of the 
ontology to which a given realism appeals.
 If we return to our model of realism, then, I am suggesting that the 
mechanism that connects different levels in modern realism is a historicist 
metonymy. This metonymy assumes as many inflections as there are realist 
novelists. (103–4)
Without offering any particulars, Shaw excludes Dickens from his study, as 
I see it, correctly.
 There are many ways in which realism does not and cannot conform to 
its own largely unwritten rules. Bruce Robbins has shown, for example, that 
British realism scarcely represents an entire part of the population. There are 
few significant representatives of “the people” in this literature, and, ironi-
cally, when “the people” are represented, it is servants, dependents within 
the households and thus extensions of their masters, who stand in for the 
lower classes. Robbins claims that servants are not even depicted as genuine 
representatives of their historical context, but fulfill roles that existed in the 
earliest sources of Western literature, such as Greek drama. Servants thus 
serve an almost symbolic role in representing the rebellious, resistant, and 
otherwise challenging forces arrayed against the master class. For the most 
part, Robbins argues, realist novelists did not try to offer a genuine picture 
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of the lower classes, but fell back upon a trusty convention. In a more recent 
study, Katherine Kearns argues that realism surreptitiously and uncon-
sciously evokes those elements of experience that it seeks to repress. She has 
several different formulations of this idea, but here is one. “Realism’s doubled 
intuitions for the social and the ineffable ensure both that the sublime will 
make itself attractive and that its attractions will be appropriately chastised; 
one ends up with authorial gestures that simultaneously acknowledge and 
repudiate the seductions of the sublime” (114). Many other studies indicate 
various qualifications of realism’s claims to true mimesis.
 In a similar fashion, critics writing specifically on Dickens have examined 
ways in which his narratives must be seen as standing to one side of the 
realist tradition. A recent example is Juliet John’s Dickens’s Villains: Melo-
drama, Character, Popular Culture, which argues that the flatness of Dickens’s 
characters is intentional. Dickens is not aiming primarily at the examination 
of internal states of mind, but wishes to show that his characters are part of 
a larger community. Interiority is thus hostile to the communal drive of his 
narratives, and is therefore associated primarily with villains and their like, a 
practice inherited from the stage, especially in its melodramatic modes.
 My claim here, then, is not that I am making an original observation when 
I say that Dickens should not be placed within the mainstream realist tradi-
tion, if such a thing really exists, but that he appropriated devices associated 
with realism and used them to ends that operate against the realist program. 
Again, I do not mean to say that he defined himself against realism, but that 
by hindsight we can recognize that he was resisting a mode of representation 
which came to dominance in fiction during his lifetime, fueled largely by the 
popularity of Sir Walter Scott’s fiction, though Scott himself was not a realist. 
Throughout this book I examine different ways in which Dickens sets him-
self against or outside of realist practice, but here I shall concentrate on the 
one feature of metonymy, and that returns us to the issue of the gentleman 
in the white waistcoat in Oliver Twist.
 I have chosen the gentleman in the white waistcoat as my example because 
he is so rudimentary and he appears so early in Dickens’s career. Dickens 
used metonymic devices brilliantly in his earliest writings. “Reflections in 
Monmouth Street” is an example, where, beginning with the old clothes 
exhibited in a ragshop, the narrator constructs from their appearance the 
lives of their former owners.4 The clothes bear the traces of a former life. Of 
course, this is the reverse of how metonymy usually works, where an article 
of clothing might indicate a person’s function. A prominent example is the 
scene in Hardy’s Far from the Madding Crowd where Gabriel Oak goes to the 
market to find work as a farm agent only to encounter employers seeking 
shepherds instead. Oak identifies himself as a potential agent by wearing 
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middle-class clothing, but changes to his shepherd’s smock, hoping to find a 
place as a shepherd through this new identifying attire, only ironically to be 
passed over by an employer who is looking for an agent. Clothes mark the 
man.
 The gentleman in the white waistcoat is interesting because he remains 
nameless and is identified chiefly by this one article of clothing and by his 
vicious sentiments. This is all the more striking since Dickens had declared 
in Sketches by Boz that viewing the exterior of a person was a surer guarantee 
of comprehending his character than written description can provide, thus 
to offer almost no description at all must be seen not as a disclaimer (as it is 
in the Sketches, where Boz amusingly goes on to provide the description he 
says is unnecessary), but as a conscious strategy (Sketches 158–59). The gen-
tleman in Oliver is thus entirely surface to us. We get no physical description 
of him as we do of Gamfield in detail to indicate his viciousness. We have 
just that white waistcoat as a token of his identity. Does the whiteness of the 
waistcoat signify anything, let us say, like the whiteness of Moby Dick, where 
Melville’s narrator himself opens whiteness to multiple interpretations? Let 
us begin with the social significance of the waistcoat.
 Dickens knew about waistcoats and, in his early manhood favored elabo-
rate examples. C. Willett Cunnington and Phillis Cunnington in their Hand-
book of English Costume in the Nineteenth Century note that in the 1820s 
and 1830s the waistcoat had become quite dramatic, with dandies wearing 
all colors of the rainbow. They remark that the waistcoat “had become the 
most striking male garment; a gentleman’s inventory of 1828 revealed 36 
white waistcoats costing £54” (104). One might assume that, though this 
gentleman had white waistcoats, they were not necessarily plain, since many 
waistcoats described as white were of elegant fabrics, such as silk or satin. In 
the early part of the century a white satin embroidered waistcoat with gold 
thread was a standard article of Court dress. The Exquisites of the 1830s wore 
white waistcoats with elaborate costumes. Here are two examples quoted by 
the Cunningtons from magazines of the time.
“In a light brown coat, white waistcoat, nankin pantaloons buttoned at the 
ankle with two gold buttons, yellow stockings with large violet clocks, shoes 
with buckles of polished cut steel.”
“.  .  .  with green coat, broad velvet collar, white waistcoat, pantaloons of 
glazed white ticking tight to the knees.” (107)
Anne Buck points out that waistcoats, where “[m]ost of the colour and orna-
ment of men’s dress was concentrated,” often “showed the fabrics and colours 
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and woven and printed designs fashionable in the materials of women’s 
dress” (188). Many of the waistcoats that survive from the nineteenth cen-
tury were wedding waistcoats often “in white or cream figured silk, or white 
silk embroidered” (188).
 It seems, then, that white waistcoats were quite a common feature of men’s 
dress both for formal occasions, such as weddings and Court appearances, 
and for ordinary use. Apparently a great deal depended upon the materials 
out of which these waistcoats were fashioned and the cut of their design. 
But Dickens tells us nothing more about the man in the white waistcoat’s 
waistcoat except that it is white. The whole man thus depends upon this 
overwhelmingly identifying physical object and his dialogue, or nearly so. 
But I shall return to that in a minute. First I want to indicate that this trait in 
Dickens’s method of characterization stayed with him throughout his career 
and took on interesting variations. I shall mention just a couple of instances 
here because my space is limited. In Little Dorrit, Merdle is intimidated by 
his butler, who is a grave and sober man, far more refined than his master. 
It is in Merdle’s interest to demonstrate to society all the trappings of wealth 
and high social status.
The chief butler was the next magnificent institution of the day. He was the 
stateliest man in company. He did nothing, but he looked on as few other 
men could have done. He was Mr. Merdle’s last gift to Society. Mr. Merdle 
didn’t want him, and was put out of countenance when the great creature 
looked at him; but inappeasable Society would have him—and had got him. 
(243–44)
To this point, what we apparently have is some sharp social satire. Merdle’s 
inferiority to his own servant makes a mockery of his supposed power. The 
butler should metonymically serve as a manifestation of the household to 
accomplish realist ends. And he does, except that in this case he does so 
ironically. So it would appear that this brief passage fulfills a realist purpose, 
though any reader should be wary of so quickly accepting it in that way, 
since it occurs in a chapter where the guests at Merdle’s home are named 
as Treasury, Bar, and Bishop and fulfill typical, not individual, functions. 
Later we encounter Merdle wandering through his great house with “no 
apparent object but escape from the presence of the chief butler” (386). And 
a few lines later we are introduced to his habit of “clasping his wrists as if he 
were taking himself into custody” (386). Soon the “chief butler” becomes the 
“Chief Butler” and is described as “the Avenging Spirit of this great man’s 
life” (540).
 Something similar happens in Great Expectations when Pip, feeling the 
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need to confirm his status as a gentleman, hires an unneeded servant whose 
name is Pepper. In what might be mistaken as the typical metonymic device 
of associating character and social rank with clothing, Pip begins, “I had 
got so fast of late, that I had even started a boy in boots,” signifying that 
the boy’s status as a servant is indicated by his livery, which Pip goes on to 
describe—“and had clothed him with a blue coat, canary waistcoat, white 
cravat, creamy breeches, and the boots already mentioned” (210). The boy, 
however, is as much a nuisance as a help and to indicate this Pip employs a 
language already strongly thematic throughout the novel. He says that he is 
“in bondage and slavery” after he has “made this monster” (210). Since Pip 
later alludes to the Frankenstein creature, it is possible to link this reference 
to the later motif of the creature’s avenging pursuit of Victor Frankenstein. 
Hence, what begins with a “realist” ploy quickly evolves into a symbolic func-
tion. Seeing Pepper as an “avenging phantom,” he renames him the Avenger, 
and before long this function, which is a product of Pip’s imagination and 
has nothing to do with the boy’s own nature or conduct, becomes the major 
and metonymic way of referring to him. But he is no longer metonymically 
connected to the social world; he is now a part of Pip’s internal realm which 
is peopled with images of convicts, chains of gold, punishment, revenge, 
and so forth. I need not catalog the well-known web of such references that 
make this novel such densely rich reading. The metonym in this very simple 
instance consciously transfers Pepper out of the range of servant-and-master 
social relations and into a symbolic range of references operating against the 
realist agenda. Metonym blends with metaphor and even suggests allegorical 
dimensions.
 Late in his career, Dickens is able to turn this kind of trope into a brand of 
shorthand that blurs the difference between metaphor/simile and metonym. 
For convenience sake, I will use an example that almost reprises the instance 
of the butler above. At the Veneerings’ house in Our Mutual Friend, we again 
have generic figures Boots and Brewer and an ominous servant, this time a 
retainer who “goes round, like a gloomy Analytical Chemist; always seeming 
to say, after ‘Chablis, sir?’—‘You wouldn’t if you knew what it’s made of ’” 
(10). By his next appearance and thereafter the simile disappears. Moreover, 
the gloom identified with him is transferred to those he serves, thus we see 
Eugene Wrayburn “gloomily resorting to the champagne chalice whenever 
proferred by the Analytical Chemist” (11). In his next appearance, he has 
become simply “the Analytical” (250). And this shift emphasizes a feature of 
the character that proves significant and fits him into the tenor of the novel 
as a whole.5 This apparently insignificant individual is capable of analyzing 
the situation around him accurately. In this novel crammed with secrets and 
mysteries, only a few individuals have this power of penetration and yet it is 
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precisely this penetration that the narrator offers, especially in relationship 
to seeing past the surface of the Veneerings. Just as he knows better than 
others what the constituents of the chablis are, the Analytical is equally acute 
about other domestic features. When Mrs. Veneering reports that Baby was 
uneasy in her sleep on the night of the election that will give Mr. Veneering 
a seat in Parliament, “The Analytical chemist, who is gloomily looking on, 
has diabolical impulses to suggest ‘Wind’ and throw up his situation; but 
represses them” (253–54). In his last appearance, the Analytical Chemist 
feels he could give Veneering an apt answer to the question: How do people 
live beyond their means? In his brief moments on stage he has become more 
and more judgmental, so it is not surprising that he departs the text as “the 
Analytical, perusing a scrap of paper lying on the salver, with the air of a 
literary Censor  .  .  .” (627). It might be said that Dickens here discloses his 
affiliation with this subversive character.
 What is significant for the purposes of this essay is that Dickens calls atten-
tion to his nonrealist joke on metonymy. A household servant is unlikely to 
have a metonymic connection with the science of chemistry. By converting a 
servant to an Analytical Chemist, Dickens aligns the servant with “scientific” 
analysis, something carried out methodically elsewhere in the novel by the 
police and others. The servant is a tiny image of the potential disclosure of 
untrue conditions that mirrors the effort of the novel as a whole. At his last 
appearance the Analytical Chemist has returned to simile, only now it is as 
the Analytical Chemist, not as a household retainer, that he is likened to a 
“literary Censor.” This simile marks him as a literary artifact, thus marking 
him a product of fancy rather than fact, and indicating that he has never 
been a participant in a “real” domain, but a figure highjacked out of allegory. 
He becomes a sign pointing to a particular function of the narrative and thus 
resembles the allegorical figure on the ceiling of Tulkinghorn’s room with his 
ominous pointing hand. This technique can operate in the reverse direction 
as well, as a simple example from A Christmas Carol shows.
 Near the opening of the story, the narrator asserts that “Old Marley was 
as dead as a door-nail” and then boldly calls our attention to the figurative 
expression. “Mind! I don’t mean to say that I know, of my own knowledge, 
what there is particularly dead about a door-nail. I might have been inclined, 
myself, to regard a coffin-nail as the deadest piece of ironmongery in the 
trade” (7). This bit of self-conscious playfulness about the narrator’s own 
language might have ended right here, but it is actually preparation for a far 
more important episode. When Scrooge arrives at his house that evening, he 
finds on his door, “not a knocker, but Marley’s face” (15). The ironmongery 
simile that proved Marley dead now becomes an ironmongery that shows 
him not entirely dead at all. From being a dead character, Marley has become 
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a real presence to Scrooge. More ironmongery follows. The bells in the house 
begin to chime on their own, introducing the appearance of Marley’s ghost 
wearing a chain made “of cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and 
heavy purses wrought in steel” (17). Marley explains his bizarre ornament.
“I wear the chain I forged in life,” replied the Ghost. “I made it link by link, 
and yard by yard; I girded it on of my own free will, and of my own free will 
I wore it. Is its pattern strange to you?” (19)
Marley’s chosen attitude toward life has constituted this punishment in the 
hereafter, and Scrooge has been forging his own similar chain. By now the 
simple simile of ironmongery has become a forbidding symbolism. The met-
onymic items of Marley’s business have been transmuted into a nearly alle-
gorical object—an iron chain.
 What is happening in Oliver Twist is simpler, but depends upon the same 
irony that operates in the other examples I have cited. It is important that 
the narrator almost always refers to the man as the gentleman in the white 
waistcoat (his first reference is the exception). There is no doubt about his 
status, but the repetition of this word, always linked to the white waistcoat 
reinforces his social place as one that is privileged. To some degree, then, the 
gentleman in the white waistcoat is a counter for a whole class. It would be 
possible to provide a sociological analysis, indicating that only a gentleman 
comfortably well off could afford such a fashionable item which would 
require expensive laundering and so forth. White gloves similarly indicated 
station through the implication that they would have to be changed during 
the day and many of them laundered over time. Thus articles of clothing 
encode a certain social attitude and even ideology. But that kind of analysis 
is not my purpose here. I am concerned here with Dickens’s style rather than 
his politics. The man in the white waistcoat is not most importantly a repre-
sentative of his class, but a peculiarly malign specimen. His prejudices com-
pletely overwhelm him. Oliver comes before the workhouse board, which 
consists of “eight or ten fat gentlemen . . . sitting around a table” (8). He is 
asked his name and hesitates to answer, being intimidated by so many gen-
tlemen. The gentleman in a white waistcoat intervenes with an outburst that 
Oliver “was a fool. Which was a capital way of raising his spirits, and putting 
him quite at his ease” (9). There is a great deal of obvious irony in this scene 
at the expense of the gentlemen. For example, this famous passage: “The 
members of this board were very sage, deep, philosophical men; and when 
they came to turn their attention to the workhouse, they found out at once, 
what ordinary folks would never have discovered—the poor people liked it!” 
(9–10). But the gentleman in the white waistcoat is not merely stupid in this 
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manner; he has a determined animus against the poor. He does not merely 
assume the worst about the poor, but wishes them ill. The head of the board 
instructs Oliver, but the gentleman in the white waistcoat adds his own view 
immediately after.
“Well! You have come here to be educated, and taught a useful trade,” said 
the red-faced gentleman in the high chair.
 “So you’ll begin to pick oakum to-morrow morning at six o’clock,” added 
the surly one in the white waistcoat. (9)
This unexplained, gratuitous nastiness sums up the gentleman in the white 
waistcoat and raises him almost to the level of symbolic representation. In 
some ways we are faced with the mystery of whiteness similar to that in 
Moby-Dick.
 Near the beginning of this chapter, I noted the narrative irony of the nar-
rator’s comment on the handkerchief that Oliver could not have hanged 
himself with because handkerchiefs were a luxury in the workhouse, and I 
suggested that this reference is the narrator’s proleptic joke, because hand-
kerchiefs will play an important role in Oliver’s subsequent career. One 
prominent connection has to do with hanging, so that the gentleman in the 
white waistcoat is actually the first to voice a motif that proliferates through 
the text in a manner that becomes typical of Dickens’s style, of which I have 
tried to give a few brief examples from other novels above. Since Dickens 
was writing under great pressure while composing Oliver Twist, it cannot 
be assumed that he planned out that intricate pattern of handkerchief refer-
ences, but it can be assumed that his imagination instinctively worked in this 
way. In later writings, it is clear that he consciously employs the technique.
 Earlier I quoted from Katherine Kearns’s Nineteenth-Century Literary 
Realism: Through the Looking-Glass. One chapter in this book is entitled “A 
Tropology of Realism in Hard Times.” It is a very intriguing and valuable 
reading of Dickens’s novel. At one point Kearns summarizes her perception 
of Dickens’s dilemma—how Hard Times presents double messages at every 
level of its discourses, reflecting Dickens’s anxiety about and his resistance to 
the realistic mode.
His apprehension of some alternative and unnameable energy brings his 
metonymies to challenge their own directional, propagandistic contiguities; 
people, their characters formed in some secret place, seem as much to cre-
ate or to alter their surroundings as to be created or altered by them. (188)
Kearns is acute in noting the ways in which metonymy works in this novel. 
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She sees that “the language that reveals character through metonymy in 
Hard Times must communicate Coketown’s essential nature as a fabricated 
construct, its strangeness only masked by the conventional linearities of 
its architecture  .  .  .” (190). And she demonstrates that Bounderby’s char-
acter, though dependent upon metonymies, refutes itself with its past, thus 
resisting the realistic program of the novel, for he is not what he is; his char-
acter has nothing to do with his past and thus is not explicable in terms 
of his own current realism. I couldn’t agree more, but Kearns seems to feel 
that Dickens brings about this disjunction inadvertently, that he is uncon-
sciously subverting his own attempt at realism.6  It seems to me more sensible 
to regard Dickens as intentionally bringing about exactly these deconstruc-
tions. After all, he is attacking the Utilitarian materiality represented by the 
Gradgrinds and Bounderbys and he means to demonstrate its falseness. It 
is spectacularly evident that Bounderby, the enemy of fancy, is himself the 
most fanciful storyteller in the novel, having fabricated his entire early his-
tory. My argument is that Dickens employed metonymy in his fiction pre-
cisely to call attention to that part of experience that is not limited to mate-
riality. He made his inclinations clear in his famous preface to Bleak House 
when he wrote: “In Bleak House, I have purposely dwelt upon the romantic 
side of familiar things” (xiv).
 In Hard Times, Dickens aggressively calls attention to the difference 
between the metonymic and the metaphoric, the “realistic” and the “fanciful,” 
in his style. At the very opening of the story Mr. Gradgrind is described as 
having a “square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows for its base, 
while his eyes found commodious cellarage in two dark caves, overshad-
owed by the wall” (1). The square wall connects Gradgrind metonymically 
with the business/industry, no-nonsense aspect of Coketown. But the eyes in 
their cave associate him metaphorically with a different pattern in the novel 
that has to do with redemptive danger and with the capacity to imagine 
beyond the factual and the material. Kearns has called attention to the way 
in which the square wall pattern proliferates as the narrative proceeds.
Thus Gradgrind’s “own metallurgical Louisa” is most literally a metonymic 
chip off the old block who lives in Stone Lodge, having been struck off the 
parent with a piece of the thing that names her; the implied syntagmatic 
progression goes nicely from the obdurate industrialism embodied in Coke-
town’s red-brick buildings to Stone Lodge to the wall- and warehouse-like 
Mr. Gradgrind to his flinty offspring. (187–88)
That is the metonymic development of the square wall, but the metaphoric 
development of the dark caves is equally complex and pervasive, though per-
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haps even subtler. It finds expression in the “ditch” that Bounderby claims to 
have been born in as well as in the “dark pit of shame and ruin at the bottom” 
of the mighty staircase Mrs. Sparsit imagines Louisa descending, and in the 
uncovered shaft into which Stephen Blackpool falls. The ditch is the product 
of Bounderby’s imagination, not a reality; the pit is the product of Mrs. Spar-
sit’s imagination, and never becomes real; the shaft, though real enough, is 
the medium through which Stephen Blackpool, by the power of his posi-
tive imagination, conceives the central truth of the novel. While lying in the 
mineshaft he can see a star in the sky. “‘I thowt it were the star as guided 
to Our Saviour’s home. I awmust think it be the very star!’” The narrator 
endorses Stephen’s perception. “The star had shown him where to find the 
God of the poor; and through humility, and sorrow, and forgiveness, he had 
gone to his Redeemer’s rest” (274).
 This tendency to take a small detail from early in the narrative and elab-
orate it in an increasing network of allusions and similarities is typical of 
Dickens’s narrative method and is related to the examples I have given in 
the narrator’s mention of a handkerchief early in Oliver Twist, the butler in 
Little Dorrit, and Pepper in Great Expectations. Dickens does not disguise his 
purpose and his method from any careful reader. Even as McChoakumchild 
(and the name gives away the narrator’s moral alignment) is calling for the 
schoolchildren to be filled with facts, the narrator obstinately contains his 
efforts within the realm of fancy.
He went to work in this preparatory lesson, not unlike Morgiana in the Forty 
Thieves: looking into all the vessels ranged before him, one after another, 
to see what they contained. Say, good McChoakumchild. When from thy 
boiling store, thou shalt fill each jar brimfull by-and-by, dost thou think that 
thou wilt always kill outright the robber Fancy lurking within—or some-
times only maim him and distort him! (8)
This is throwing down the gauntlet, as the shift to preacherly diction directly 
suggests. But if the narrator confines his Utilitarian characters within the 
circle of well-known fable, he does so in order to counteract a similar action 
perpetrated by these characters themselves. Here is what we learn of the 
young Gradgrinds, brought up through their father’s fact-based training.
The first object with which they had an association or of which they had 
a remembrance, was a large black-board with a dry Ogre chalking ghastly 
white figures on it.
 Not that they knew, by name or nature, anything about an Ogre. Fact 
forbid! I only use the word to express a monster in a lecturing castle, with 
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Heaven knows how many heads manipulated into one, taking childhood 
captive, and dragging it into gloomy statistical dens by the hair. (19)
This reads like a parody of the Giant Despair in Pilgrim’s Progress—one of the 
all-time great fictions illustrating the positive power of fancy—who captures 
and confines Christian and Hopeful in a dungeon because they have strayed 
out of the true way. Here, however, the children are innocent captives and 
the den into which they are drawn bears a family resemblance to the caves of 
Gradgrind’s eyes and the other ditches, pits, shafts, and so forth that emerge 
as the narrative proceeds, culminating in Stephen’s release from his chasm 
into the freedom of death. In the contest between metonymy and metaphor, 
metaphor wins, but metonymy has also been drafted to the work of symbolic 
architecture which subverts and transcends what we call realism. J. Hillis 
Miller points out the way in which metonymy in Dickens crosses the line 
from its realistic function. He writes: “The metonymic reciprocity between a 
person and his surroundings, his clothes, furniture, house, and so on, is the 
basis for the metaphorical substitutions so frequent in Dickens’s fiction. For 
Dickens, metonymy is the foundation and support of metaphor” (13).7 In 
Hard Times the work of subversion is planned, open, and direct, whereas in 
Oliver Twist, for example, it seems largely instinctive. Nonetheless, as early 
as Twist, Dickens was willing to deliver a sly clue to his purposes. After the 
opening chapters, the gentleman in the white waistcoat disappears from the 
narrative. But in chapter 51, as the story is drawing to a close, Dickens makes 
what seems to be an entirely gratuitous move when he has Mr. Bumble remark 
to Oliver, “‘Master Oliver, my dear, you remember the blessed gentleman in 
the white waistcoat? Ah! He went to heaven last week, in a oak coffin with 
plated handles, Oliver’” (345). Bumble by this time has been totally discred-
ited, and so his statement here can be read as just the opposite of what he 
says. The gentleman was scarcely “blessed” and is not likely to have gone 
to heaven, given his uncharitable temperament. The oak coffin with plated 
handles constitutes more of the trappings of gentility, of a piece with the 
white waistcoat. This is the narrator (and Dickens, we can assume) dealing a 
little bit of poetic justice, just before the more commanding instances of the 
deaths of Fagin and Sikes. Nonetheless, it is Dickens revealing a sample of 
his handiwork.
 In the realist tradition, metonymic connections help to identify characters 
with social place, occupation, and mental or emotional ability. The details 
might be articles of clothing, tools, and so forth, but these articles are sub-
ordinate to the purpose of making sharper the nature of the human figure. 
For realism, metonymy reinforces materiality. By contrast, in Oliver Twist, 
Dickens uses a repetitive metonymy to obliterate any specific human identity 
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and makes his gentleman in the white waistcoat instead the embodiment 
of a malign spirit, dispersing the materiality of the individual man into a 
class atmospheric. Realism is not supposed to take this leap, though, in fact, 
a number of supposed realists could not resist such moves at one time or 
another. But Dickens makes this a regular practice in his writing and seems 
to be doing so in resistance to the growing impulse in the writing of his 
time to favor elaborate examinations of internal states partly through met-
onymic connections, preferring instead to represent a world with symbolic 
overtones, no matter how deeply he was capable of giving the impression of 
rooting it in a palpable reality.
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eorge Ford wrote that at the height of Dickens’s 
career, there was a general growing appreciation of 
the esthetics of fiction along with a growing demand 
for realism in the novel, which created a tendency for 
critics to misvalue the developments in Dickens’s own writing (128). 
Though Dickens employed many nonrealist techniques, one feature 
of his writing that might have been off-putting for a critic demanding 
greater realism was his frequent use of personification. What figura-
tive device is less conducive to realism than personification, so deeply 
connected to unrealistic genres such as allegory and fable? Although 
Dickens was fully aware of his fanciful use of personification in his fic-
tion, he also used the device frequently in his personal discourse.
 This tendency surfaces early in Dickens’s career, sometimes with 
amusing irony. Referring to an essay for Bentley’s Miscellany, Dickens 
wrote to Theodore Martin, “The Dying Student is also at the Printer’s. 
I will look him up, and entomb him in the February number” (Letters 
I, 479). The personification of a piece of writing is not remarkably orig-
inal, but to transform publication into entombment is. Rodney Stenning 
Edgecombe has examined personification in Dickens, but his approach 
is to discuss abstractions made concrete, such as Mendicity. He also 
makes an interesting observation about how alert Dickens was to the 
Dickens and personification
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whole idea of personification, by pointing out that Dickens converts an 
idle personification—the allegory of the pointing Roman on Tulkinghorn’s 
ceiling in Bleak House—to a functional one (232–33).
 In this chapter, however, I emphasize the animating quality of personi-
fication and am not interested in locutions such as “blind justice,” which 
offer embodiments of abstractions, or “Heep was the personification of 
guile,” which offers an individual as an abstract model. Instead, I shall dem-
onstrate that Dickens combines personification and deanimation as com-
panion devices to emphasize the way in which human existence may be per-
ceived as hyperreal, hence constituting an implied resistance to the realist 
movement, for which personification was not an acceptable tool. That his 
tendency to this form of personification was part of Dickens’s worldview is 
evident in some of his public statements. In an address at a banquet in his 
honor at Hartford on February 7, 1842, he stated his belief that nothing is 
high because it is in a high place, and that nothing is low because it is in a 
low one, and then added:
This is a lesson taught us in the great book of nature. This is the lesson which 
may be read, alike in the bright track of the stars, and in the dusty course 
of the poorest thing that drags its tiny length upon the ground. This is the 
lesson ever uppermost in the thoughts of that inspired man, who tells us 
that there are
 Tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
 Sermons in stones, and good in everything. (Speeches 24)
For Dickens, all of existence, both animate and inanimate, contained a kind of 
spirit that the human imagination could release. Dorothy Van Ghent notably 
called attention to this practice in “The Dickens World: A View from Todg-
ers’s,” stating that “[t]he course of things demonically possessed is to imitate 
the human, while the course of human possession is to imitate the inhuman” 
(213). She stresses, as I do, not only the animation of the inanimate, but the 
deanimating of the living. She offers many examples, of which the following 
is one instance. “Those who have engaged, as Grandfather Smallweed has, in 
the manipulation of their fellows as if they were things, themselves develop 
thing-attributes, like Podsnap, the capitalist, who has hair-brushes on his 
head instead of hair . . .” (214). Raymond Williams also notes that “the char-
acteristics of houses and of people are consciously exchanged” in Dickens’s 
fiction, providing “a way of seeing the city as a destructive animal” (159). 
Harvey Peter Sucksmith states that animism and a sense of force permeating 
things is typical of introverted vision, which he argues is part of Dickens’s 
makeup (345). This may be so, but my claim here is that Dickens consciously 
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employed the device of personification or animation to create a literature 
that feels free to exceed the limits of realism and to stimulate a similar kind 
of animating activity in his readers.1
 An early and simple instance of my sense of personification occurs in 
The Pickwick Papers. I choose this particular example because it combines 
humans, other living creatures, and inanimate things all contained in one 
modal presentation.
The morning which broke upon Mr. Pickwick’s sight, at eight o’clock, was not 
at all calculated to elevate his spirits, or to lessen the depression which the 
unlooked-for result of his embassy inspired. The sky was dark and gloomy, 
the air was damp and raw, the streets were wet and sloppy. The smoke hung 
sluggishly above the chimney-tops as if it lacked the courage to rise, and the 
rain came slowly and doggedly down, as if it had not even the spirit to pour. 
A game-cock in the stable-yard, deprived of every spark of his accustomed 
animation, balanced himself dismally on one leg in a corner; a donkey, mop-
ing with drooping head under the narrow roof of an outhouse, appeared 
from his meditative and miserable countenance to be contemplating suicide. 
In the street, umbrellas were the only things to be seen, and the clicking of 
pattens and splashing of rain-drops, were the only sounds to be heard. (713)
In this passage, which opens chapter 51, Dickens starts us out with his cen-
tral character, noting his depressed mood. He then proceeds to an ordinary 
description of the weather, but soon modulates into a projection of human 
agency onto smoke and rain, though this agency appropriately mirrors Mr. 
Pickwick’s gloomy mood. Having thus animated smoke and rain, he turns to 
animals, attributing to them similar bad human moods, with the alarming 
prospect of the donkey considering suicide. Having taken us to this extreme 
point, Dickens returns to straightforward description, with the forceful 
detail of the clicking pattens. While seeming to be a description of the day, 
the passage is actually an improvisation on Mr. Pickwick’s subjective state. 
This extending of a human mood to the nonhuman world is a technique that 
Dickens used throughout his career, often in his descriptions of buildings, 
whose windows are blind eyes, and who must sometimes, as in Little Dorrit, 
lean on crutches to support themselves. The technique, even with the mod-
erating “as ifs,” is one that calls attention to the way in which humans con-
struct the world around them according to their moods, a perception that 
Dickens inherited from the Romantic writers who had called attention to the 
positive, restorative aspects of this human tendency, but also to its negative 
qualities. Drawing upon John Ruskin, the New Critics referred to this ten-
dency as the Pathetic Fallacy. It would be frowned upon in realistic writing.
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 I believe that Dickens was well aware of what he was doing and was able 
to amuse himself with the idea. An extreme example of such play, also from 
Pickwick, occurs not as a mere figure of speech, but as a core part of plot. In 
chapter 14, a bagman tells the story of Tom Smart, who stops at a country 
inn and takes a fancy to the widow who owns it, though she is already appar-
ently being courted by “a tall man—a very tall man—in a brown coat and 
bright basket buttons, and black whiskers, and wavy black hair  .  .  .” (181). 
Tom thinks how nice it would be to marry the widow and become owner of 
the inn while he is having five tumblers of hot punch before retiring to bed. 
In his room, Tom is particularly struck by “a strange, grim-looking high-
backed chair” with “legs carefully tied up in red cloth, as if it had got the 
gout in its toes” (183). This description already hints at personification, for 
the chair has traces of character in the opening adjectives, and the reference 
to its possible gout intensifies the tendency. Later, Tom awakes from a dream 
and immediately focuses on the chair again. He tries to go back to sleep, 
but can only see chairs dancing before his eyes, so he opens them. And now 
something peculiar indeed occurs.
Tom gazed at the chair; and, suddenly as he looked at it, a most extraordinary 
change seemed to come over it. The carving of the back gradually assumed 
the lineaments and expression of an old shrivelled human face; the damask 
cushion became an antique, flapped waistcoat; the round knobs grew into a 
couple of feet, encased in red cloth slippers; and the old chair looked like a 
very ugly old man, of the previous century, with his arms akimbo. (183–84)
Here is personification with a vengeance! What’s more, Tom actually 
engages in conversation with the chair, which comes around to the subject 
of the landlady, the chair remarking on her attractions. “Here the old fellow 
screwed up his eyes, cocked up one of his wasted little legs, and looked 
altogether so unpleasantly amorous that Tom was quite disgusted with the 
levity of his behaviour . . .” (185). The chair recounts his youthful romantic 
adventures, noting that women were always fond of him, but soon gets to 
the point of his conversation. He wants Tom to marry the widow because 
the tall man is an adventurer, who would sell all the furniture and abscond, 
leaving the old chair himself to waste away in some broker’s shop, whereas he 
knows that Tom would never leave the inn while there was anything left to 
drink there. To aid Tom, therefore, the chair tells him of a letter that reveals 
Jinkins, the tall man, to be already married. The next morning, Tom cannot 
draw the chair into conversation, but does find the letter, and with it informs 
the widow of the true situation and eventually marries her himself. At the 
end of the story there is discussion among its immediate audience whether 
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it was believed to be true, and the bagman says Tom himself declared it was.
 The personification in this tale is literally acted out, though the discussion 
about its verity calls its truthfulness into question for Dickens’s reader. Gar-
rett Stewart some time ago called attention not only to Dickens’s inclination 
to personification, but also to his self-consciousness about it. Stewart writes 
of Tom’s story:
In the sober light of day, “it must have been a remarkably ingenious and 
lively imagination, that could have discovered any resemblance between it 
and an old man.” Dickens himself, of course, has just such an imagination, 
and the whole tale seems to have unrolled from a simple instance of his 
typical descriptive trick—the animation of lifeless objects. (Dickens and 
the Trials 41)
Stewart gives an instance of Dickens’s self-consciousness about the ani-
mating power of his mind by citing a passage from “The Parlour Orator” 
(“Characters,” Sketches 5). Praise for the narrator’s oratorical abilities follows 
his speech, after which the company disbands, leaving him alone with his 
mind. What takes place is an unusual revelation:
“If we had followed the established precedent in all such instances, we should 
have fallen into a fit of musing, without delay . . . and we should have gone 
dreaming on, until the pewter pot on the table, or the little beer-chiller on 
the fire, had started into life, and addressed to us a long story of days gone 
by. But, by some means or other, we were not in a romantic humour; and 
although we tried very hard to invest the furniture with vitality, it remained 
perfectly unmoved, obstinate, and sullen.” (17)
Stewart notes that Dickens has failed in this effort because of the false rhet-
oric of another speaker; such false rhetoric is an enemy of romantic fancy.
 In Versions of Pygmalion, J. Hillis Miller argues that all story telling is an 
act of prosopopoeia, “the ascription to entities that are not really alive first 
of a name, then of a face, and finally, in a return to language, of a voice” (5). 
The author and narrator create living characters out of nothing living, just as 
Pygmalion creates his statue of a woman, which takes on real life as Galatea. 
Miller argues that characters thus created take on a life of their own and 
thus escape the dominion of both author and narrator, for the reader also 
performs an act of prosopopoeia by giving life to mere markings on a page. 
Dickens seems to have intuited, in Tom Smart’s case, the insight that Miller 
has worked out logically. He, as author, has created a narrator who brings 
Tom Smart to life, who in turn brings the chair to life. But Dickens also 
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implies in this episode his own interest in retaining control of his begotten 
Galateas, for just as Tom makes use of the chair to achieve the fulfillment 
of his own desires, so the bagman achieves his purpose in conveying an 
amazing tale, which leaves him still in a position of narrative power. Though 
his audience are left doubting whether they have Pygmalion’s power to make 
these characters real or to discount them as frauds, this abeyance, in turn, 
leaves Dickens, not the reader, in control of the interpolated tale and its con-
text in the larger narrative.
 And yet the bagman has told his tale with realistic detail and engaging 
humor that makes it a success as a story, with the one exception of the talking 
chair, which should place it outside the realm of realism. Personification is 
a literary device that does not sit well with realistic literature. Metaphors 
and similes can be recognized as tropes common to ordinary language, and 
often seen as necessary to clear communication, but personification serves 
no such utilitarian end, operating largely for its own effects.2 In the bagman’s 
tale the talking chair makes the truthfulness of the tale impossible as a real-
istic narrative. Thus, at the outset of his career, Dickens very clearly notes 
the antagonism between personification and realistic narrative, and chooses 
sides. He is not deeply interested in realism, despite the acclaim he received, 
and continues to receive, for the detailed realism of his writing. Rather, like 
Jack Bamber, who narrates a tale himself later in Pickwick, Dickens wishes to 
depict “‘the romance of life, sir, the romance of life!’” (279).
 In midcareer, Dickens made another memorable use of personification in 
a narrative that was clearly not intended to be realistic. I refer to A Christmas 
Carol. Scrooge returns to his chambers on Christmas Eve. “They were a 
gloomy suite of rooms, in a lowering pile of building up a yard, where it 
had so little business to be, that one could scarcely help fancying it must 
have run there when it was a young house, playing at hide-and-seek with 
other houses, and forgotten the way out again” (14). This personification is 
qualified by the fact that it is merely fancied, but it has particular point, since 
just before this description, we have been told that Bob Crachitt has hurried 
home to play at blindman’s buff. The old house is long past play now, as is 
Scrooge, but in the overall atmosphere of the story, the house’s fate seems to 
foretell the mood that would fall upon the Crachitts if Tiny Tim died. And 
the theme of death is immediately raised by a more startling personification, 
for Scrooge comes to his door and undergoes a shock.
And then let any man explain to me, if he can, how it happened that Scrooge, 
having his key in the lock of the door, saw in the knocker, without its under-
going any intermediate process of change—not a knocker, but Marley’s face. 
(15)
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This might not be considered true personification, because the knocker does 
not have an identity of its own. Nonetheless, an inanimate object takes on 
human qualities—very specific human qualities. There is a further irony in 
this apparition, since it was customary in Victorian times to muffle door 
knockers when there was illness or death in a house; instead, Marley per-
versely appears alive again as a knocker. This irony highlights the conflict 
between personification and realism. Scrooge does not want to believe in 
the visions he experiences, and tells Marley’s ghost when it appears: “‘There’s 
more of gravy than of grave about you, whatever you are!’” (18). He does 
not wish to believe in what is not realistic, yet he is forced to endure an 
experience that is well beyond the range of the real. Before he encountered 
the knocker, Scrooge was described as lacking any fancy, but, for Dickens, 
fancy—the capacity to use one’s imagination—was essential to a satisfactory 
life.3 Personification is a striking manifestation of a fanciful mind, and thus 
an endorsement for Dickens’s preferred mode of narrating.
 The episode with Marley and the knocker is adumbrated in the sketch 
“Our Next-Door Neighbour,” in Sketches by Boz, which opens with the nar-
rator’s theory of door knockers. He asserts “that between the man and his 
knocker, there will inevitably be a greater or less degree of resemblance and 
sympathy” (40). A large round lion-faced knocker is invariably owned by a 
convivial fellow, but a small attorney or bill-broker will patronize a knocker 
lion with a “countenance expressive of savage stupidity”—it is “a great favou-
rite with the selfish and brutal” (40). Little spare priggish men prefer “a 
little pert Egyptian knocker, with a long thin face, a pinched-up nose, and a 
very sharp chin” (40). This amusing identification of human character with 
door knockers is not personification, but it demonstrates Dickens’s ready 
penchant for aligning the animate and the inanimate. It also makes explicit 
the function of passages like the one from Pickwick with which I began this 
chapter. Just as Pickwick’s mood is extended to the animate and inanimate 
things around him, so men extend their characters to their doorknockers.
 Various critics have called attention to certain tensions in Dickens’s fic-
tion that I believe are relevant here. Susan Horton notes the mechanical 
use of repetition in Dickens’s fiction, while also indicating that Dickens 
greatly disliked what appeared mechanical (100ff). She draws the conclu-
sion that: “Since sameness or stasis is the beginning of the death of feeling, 
the Victorians love its opposite: violent contrasts” (107). And Dickens sat-
isfies that love by constantly shifting modes of presentation. John Kucich 
makes a related observation. “In effect, by absorbing machine-like language 
into his own narration, Dickens out-machines the machine, performing 
with the very impersonal linguistic energy he can at the same time con-
demn in his characters” (214).4 For me, the tension between the repetitions 
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either rhetorical or diegetic is of a piece with Dickens’s dramatic vision of 
a world both perilous and safe, comprehensible and mysterious, good and 
evil. Susan Horton puts it differently, but tending in the same direction. She 
says that Dickens diverts the reader with an unending parade of miscel-
laneous human beings, but they remind us of exactly those things we most 
need to escape from (65). The consequence of this “struggle” in Dickens’s 
fiction is ordinarily a happy ending, with even the ghosts that haunt char-
acters helping them to a better comprehension of their place in the world. 
Hence Marley’s face animating the knocker is prelude to an experience that 
will open a metaphorical doorway into an improved future for Scrooge. I 
believe that personification, the animation of inanimate objects, is related 
to this overall narrative drive.
 On the borderline with actual personification is another form of identi-
fication with the inanimate closely related to the house owner and his door 
knocker. This is the interest in objects for their own sake. A very simple 
example of this approach also appears early in Sketches by Boz in “Shops 
and Their Tenants,” where the narrator follows with personal interest, his 
“old friend,” a certain building holding various shops in succession in its 
progress through decline to degradation. It is almost like following the moral 
decline of a fellow human, although the building is seen more as a victim 
than an agent of that decline. More intimate yet is the connection so acutely 
examined by J. Hillis Miller between clothing and its former owners in the 
sketch “Meditations in Monmouth Street,” mentioned in a previous chapter, 
where the narrator imagines the kinds of people who wore the various items 
of clothing and even creates brief stories of their lives (Miller, Sketches 1ff). 
The articles of clothing themselves do not take on life, but recall what is met-
onymically associated with them. They are Galateas now once more returned 
to stone. 
 “Meditations in Monmouth Street” is a tour de force of creative reportage 
and meant to be perceived as such, but Dickens uses a similar technique in 
his fiction, sometimes to very complicated effect. Dickens was as much given 
to deanimating the human as he was to animating the nonhuman, a version 
of the contrast between mechanism and dynamism mentioned above. There 
are intriguing examples of this method in Dombey and Son. Dombey is a man 
unconcerned with the imagination and devoted to material things, espe-
cially those involved with commerce, especially money, so it is not surprising 
that when his son is born he anticipates passing on his wealth and his name 
to him. His daughter, Florence, however, he regards, because she is a girl, as 
“merely a piece of base coin . . .” (3). Dickens can, here and elsewhere in the 
novel, slyly reveal the mindsets of his characters through such deanimations 
(just as he can with their animations). But the narrator himself is already at 
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work to prepare the reader for outcomes of the plot through his own anima-
tions, particularly in his description of Dombey himself on the first page of 
the novel. “On the brow of Dombey, Time and his brother Care had set some 
marks, as on a tree that was to come down in good time—remorseless twins 
they are for striding through their human forests, notching as they go . .  .” 
(1). Not only has Dombey been transformed into a tree, as though he were 
a figure out of Ovid’s Metamorphosis, but the abstractions Time and Care 
have assumed human characters as though they were in an allegory such 
as Pilgrim’s Progress. But even more significant is the proleptic hint that the 
upright tree is destined for a fall—something that is delayed until Dombey’s 
ruin near the end of the novel. Elsewhere, Dombey is described as wooden 
or as a piece of statuary. At a dinner dreadful to others, “Mr. Dombey alone 
remained unmoved. He might have been hung up for sale at a Russian fair 
as a specimen of a frozen gentleman” (57). He may retain his human form, 
but the great merchant has been transformed into an inanimate being now 
an object for a commercial venture, not its organizer. Earlier in the novel 
Dombey is likened to money itself; he “was one of those close-shaved close-
cut moneyed gentlemen who are glossy and crisp like new bank-notes, and 
who seem to be artificially braced and tightened as by the stimulating action 
of golden shower-baths” (17). Dombey’s stiffness is associated not only with 
his concern for wealth, but also with his pride and egotism. Also greatly 
given to egotism is another unappealing character Major Bagstock, who is 
also “wooden-featured” (83).
 If negative characters have their animation compromised by various 
tropes, a livelier figure in the novel is the nonhuman wooden midshipman, 
“which thrust itself out above the pavement, right leg foremost, with a sua-
vity the least endurable,” who represents the true domestic sanctuary of 
Sol Gill’s shop (32). Hence, while humans are turned into wood, wood has 
conferred upon it pert but attractive qualities that suggest the kind of long-
lasting fidelity and integrity manifested by both Sol and Captain Cuttle. 
This is clearly not accidental writing, but coding with a vengeance. At the 
same time, the wooden midshipman can mimic the traits of humans. Both 
Dombey and Bagstock are depicted as relatively heartless men, and the 
wooden midshipman can behave as they do.
The Wooden Midshipman at the Instrument-maker’s door, like the hard-
hearted little midshipman he was, remained supremely indifferent to Wal-
ter’s going away, even when the very last day of his sojourn in the back 
parlour was on the decline. With his quadrant at his round black knob of 
an eye, and his figure in its old attitude of indomitable alacrity, the midship-
man displayed his elfin small clothes to the best advantage, and, absorbed in 
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scientific pursuits, had no sympathy with worldly concerns. (258)
Of course, a wooden midshipman may be forgiven for remaining heartless, 
since he truly is made of wood, but he stands out as an indictment against 
the unfeeling men in the novel who have pulsing hearts, but do not heed 
them. Dickens thus uses animation in a way prohibited to realism, for it 
works toward the intensifying of his novel’s scheme, and emphasizes its fan-
ciful over its factual elements.
 More striking yet in the way of deanimating humans and animating the 
nonliving is Hard Times, the opening of which offers a sophisticated example 
of dehumanization and personification engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle. 
Thomas Gradgrind has been speaking about the necessity for facts.
The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s square wall of a forehead, which 
had his eyebrows for its base, while his eyes found commodious cellarage 
in two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The emphasis was helped by 
the speaker’s mouth, which was wide, thin, and hard set. The emphasis was 
helped by the speaker’s voice, which was inflexible, dry, and dictatorial. The 
emphasis was helped by the speaker’s hair, which bristled on the skirts of his 
bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, all 
covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had scarcely 
warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside. The speaker’s obstinate 
carriage, square coat, square legs, square shoulders—nay, his very neckcloth, 
trained to take him by the throat with an unaccommodating grasp, like a 
stubborn fact, as it was—all helped the emphasis. (7)
Here is an apt way to open a novel whose theme is the conflict of Fact 
(or Realism) and Fancy. The spokesman for fact has his human qualities 
obscured. His forehead is a wall overshadowing a cellarage. His sparse hair is 
a line of trees to protect the bald surface of his head, which itself is knobbed 
with projections like those on the crust of a plum pie. All of these images 
dehumanize Gradgrind, but they are energetically at war with one another 
as well, for the softness of the crust of the pie seems to belie the stoniness of 
the forehead. However, this is just one sly way of indicating that the rigidity 
of belief in facts has a similar fault. The facts stored in the warehouse of 
Gradgrind’s mind are pushing through the pulpy surface of his head. The 
mind is better served by containing some airier ballast of fancy. And facts 
themselves seem to know this better than the philosophers who promote 
their hegemony, for, in the personification of the neckcloth, they take the 
living man by the throat as though to strangle him and deprive him of life—
the ultimate dehumanization.
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 The narrator anticipates the negative characters themselves by appropri-
ating their inhuman perspective and applying it to them just before he dis-
closes what their outlook is. The three fact-worshipping men in this scene 
“swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then and there 
arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them 
until they were full to the brim” (7–8). These men feel that walls decorated 
with horses or carpets with flowers are unacceptable because they violate the 
principle of realism. It is clear from the outset of Hard Times, that Dickens 
will himself engage in a battle against such realism by using the tools of fairy 
tale, exotic narratives, and other resources of fancy, as he makes clear with 
his apostrophe to Mr. M’Choakumchild, himself, like other schoolmasters, 
“lately turned at the same time, in the same factory, on the same principles, 
like so many pianoforte legs” (12). 
He went to work, in this preparatory lesson, not unlike Morgiana in the Forty 
Thieves: looking into all the vessels ranged before him, one after another, to 
see what they contained. Say, good M’Choakumchild. When from thy boil-
ing store thou shalt fill each jar brimful by-and-by, dost thou think that thou 
wilt always kill outright the robber Fancy lurking within—or sometimes 
only maim him and distort him? (12)
Here Dickens turns the tables on the fact men. While they perceived the 
children merely as vessels, Dickens now appropriates those vessels and puts 
the living if maimed spirit of Fancy back into them, using as his medium 
The Arabian Nights, a text the adults would abominate as nothing but Fancy.
 If disagreeable humans are thus deanimated, the unappealing city of 
Coketown is contrarily given life. Its walls are “red and black like the painted 
face of a savage,” and from its tall chimneys come “interminable serpents of 
smoke,” while the pistons of the steam engine work up and down “like the 
head of an elephant in a state of melancholy madness” (22). If these unliving 
things are brought to life, it is not a promising life, but a foreign and threat-
ening place, suggestive of an Indian tropical forest. The negative effect of 
Coketown and its owners (the fact men) is made manifest at the end of the 
novel when Tom Gradgrind appears with a painted face to help effect his 
escape from the law in a foreign country where he dies of a fever. This could 
be the West Indies, India, or any other part of the British empire, but the 
early ominous description of Coketown forecasts and hovers over young 
Tom’s fate.
 Two instances of the inanimate world taking on human powers in a mina-
tory way occur in Bleak House. One is the third-person narrator’s warning 
that the slum Tom-All-Alone will have its revenge on those who have occa-
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sioned its neglect. The other is the clock that speaks out, telling the doomed 
Tulkinghorn “Don’t go home.” Both instances clearly violate the spirit of 
realism and do so self-consciously. Dickens wants his readers to think of the 
natural and the man-made world as having a meaning that is discoverable 
by the imagination, not merely by reason and the interpretation of facts. 
Virgil Grillo remarks that “Dickens’ novels offer us a world where character 
and object merge; where symbolic identifications are more than comments 
on human personality; character and symbol merge in an almost totemic 
system” (211). Metonymy, such a valuable tool for the realists, here becomes 
not merely identification of a character with some object, but a merging with 
it, an assumption of its nonhuman traits.5 But the opposite is also true, as 
human traits are transferred to objects. Mildred Newcome argues that Dick-
ens’s mode of experience can be visualized as a figured tapestry or pictorial 
scroll interpreting life, containing allegorical people, emblematic places, and 
so forth (2ff). She contends that internal and external realities blend in the 
interpretation of experience. For her, Dickens knows that he is reweaving 
parts or all of the total allegory of the pilgrimage of life (189). I agree that 
Dickens’s narratives share certain qualities with allegory, though they never 
become precisely that. Nonetheless, his bestowing on humans traits associ-
ated with inanimate life and his personification of the inanimate, resemble 
that feature of allegory that makes humans and objects manifestations of 
moral traits. In The Pilgrim’s Progress, which Dickens knew and loved, a 
wicket is not merely a wicket, but a gateway into a new life. A broom is not 
merely a broom, but an instrument of human imagination.
 I want to end and summarize with a few brief examples from The Uncom-
mercial Traveller that illustrate Dickens’s tendency to exchange human and 
nonhuman traits in a way that works against a simple realist practice. I 
choose The Uncommercial Traveller as a source because these essays, like the 
Sketches by Boz can easily be taken as realistic reportage, though I believe 
there is a hint at the romantic side of everyday things in the “Uncommercial” 
part of the title. The title of the essay “Shy Neighborhoods” already suggests 
a transfer of human qualities to nonhuman space. It turns out largely to be 
a study of animals. The narrator calls attention to the bad company birds 
keep and makes similar comments on donkeys and dogs. Cats, he observes, 
tend toward barbarism in shy neighborhoods. But what interests me most in 
this essay is the narrator’s observation that there are certain dogs who keep 
people. This reversal of the “natural” order is conspicuous. Dickens self-con-
sciously shocks his readers out of the normal expectation that animals will 
be “kept” by humans. It is a conscious part of Dickens’s literary arsenal.
 In “The City of the Absent” the Uncommercial Traveller meditates on all 
of the empty locations, such as banks, that people do not go to on Sunday 
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as though they were acquaintances neglected, while in “Arcadian London,” 
which also deals with a London emptied of many of its citizens in August, 
the narrator muses on the grim dentist’s room that is now doing penance. 
These places are treated as humanlike not because they metonymically sug-
gest their human counterparts; they are humanized precisely because no 
humans are there to compete with them. It is the absence of humans that 
calls up in the narrator’s imagination the possible humanity of nonhuman 
entities.
 Finally, in “Aboard Ship,” generally a very straightforward account of the 
narrator’s experiences on a ship crossing the Atlantic from New York to Liv-
erpool, one passage sharply calls attention to itself and shifts the moral reg-
ister of the whole piece. Early in the essay the narrator recalls odd church 
services that once were practiced aboard ship. A little later he argues that, 
despite temperance opponents, there is no harm in the distribution of grog 
to sailors. These references to issues that fall within the realm of morality 
take on a different cast when the narrator describes the constant noise of the 
screw propeller as like the voice of conscience, always there. Soon after, as 
though prompted by a bad conscience himself, he ponders the many dan-
gers of sea travel. Turning the inanimate propeller into a moral guide is pre-
cisely the kind of trick Dickens often uses to defamiliarize his material for 
his readers and make them take notice. What is a little taking of grog in the 
large scale of moral behavior when your life itself might be in the balance? If 
our conscience must always be working, let it work on serious matters.
 Some time ago, J. Hillis Miller wrote a brilliant study of Sketches by Boz. I 
have already referred to his treatment of “Meditations in Monmouth Street.” 
Elsewhere I differ with Miller concerning Dickens’s use of metonymy, but I 
agree with the following passage.
If a movement from things to people to stories is the habitual structural 
principle of the Sketches, the law which validates this movement is the 
assumption of a necessary similarity between a man, his environment, and 
the life he is forced to lead within that environment. (14)
What I have argued in this chapter is that Dickens was fully aware of his own 
perception of the relationship of persons to places and things, and one way 
for him to make his readers aware of this relationship as well was to exchange 
human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate traits within his narratives. 
So humans lose some of their humanity and become wooden like trees, or 
dark and forbidding like caves, while chairs and buildings take on the ability 
to speak or to become ill and infirm. Some of the most interesting instances 
of this practice are points of amalgamation, such as the wooden advertising 
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sign in the form of a midshipman—where the wood has a human form and 
is credited with human behavioral traits—or Marley’s face that appears as a 
door knocker. In these instances, the genuinely human and the genuinely 
nonhuman merge, with the balance toward the latter in the midshipman and 
toward the former with Marley. But in both instances, and as a regular aspect 
of his writing, Dickens was trying to demonstrate his narrative control over 
his readers by exceeding the self-imposed limits of literary realism, and 
employing techniques related to emotions deeply embedded in the human 
imagination. He did not want to be a mere realist, master though he was of 
many of its techniques. He wanted rather to be something closer to a magus.
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ur Mutual Friend has not pleased many otherwise satis-
fied readers of Dickens’s fiction. For his contemporaries 
and such acute assessors of fiction as Henry James, the 
novel seemed to lack structure, among other faults.1 More 
recently, critics have discovered ways in which Dickens can be seen 
experimenting in this novel, especially with a tightness of structure 
that, to a large extent, keeps itself hidden.2 What I wish to argue here is 
that Dickens was in full command of his narrative, so much so that he 
wanted both to assist his readers in interpreting it correctly and to retain 
control of the mode of that interpretation, impulses that go against 
the ambitions of realism. Dickens was a man devoted to orderliness 
and careful exertion to a determined end. These inclinations, it seems 
to me, are extended to his fiction as well, more so as he grows older. I 
also wish to argue that in establishing an incredibly elaborate structure 
for his novel, he was extending his quarrel with what has come to be 
known as realism. Calling attention to its own language and using highly 
formal structure were taboos of realism.3 Dickens glories in his com-
mand of language, especially metaphor, and creates a formal structure 
that intentionally challenges plausibility. In Our Mutual Friend, Dickens 
employs his characteristic technique of offering a surplus of informa-
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tion in order to guarantee the transmission of meaning, what in information 
theory was early dubbed “redundancy.”4 In his early fiction, Dickens was 
rather obvious about this overload of data—the backing up of one pattern of 
references by another related pattern. But by the time he wrote Our Mutual 
Friend, his technique, though still perceivable, was subtler, hence my choice 
of this novel to study redundancy because it weaves imagery, allusion, and 
narrative detail into a mode of transmission that calls attention to itself and 
by doing so restricts what the information it transmits can mean. Insofar 
as it does this, it is directly opposed to the practices of realist fiction. In his 
early fiction, Dickens was serializing narratives of which he did not know the 
conclusions and his use of imagery was thus not as controlled as it became 
later. For this reason, the early novels are in some ways closer to realist tech-
nique than the later, though with a powerful admixture of fairy-tale quali-
ties. There are many more examples of the gratuitous details that consti-
tute Roland Barthes’s “reality effect,” undigested material that emphasizes 
the unexpectedness of everyday reality. In the later, well-planned novels, 
Dickens permitted very little that did not contribute to his design; the super-
fluity of information both in narrated detail and in the supporting imagery 
and allusiveness, despite immediate appearances, acts against this “reality 
effect,” by narrowing the meaning of the narrative as a whole and confining 
it as strictly as possible to Dickens’s own intended meaning. Like his own 
characters Jenny Wren and Mr. Venus, he wants to make use of every scrap. 
Even the serial mode of publication came to serve these ends as the segments 
became more tightly related to one another, as book and chapter titles often 
indicate; see, for example, the allusive book titles of Our Mutual Friend itself. 
Yet if the technique in the late fiction was subtler, so were Dickens’s signals to 
his readership on how to read his texts. The opening of the novel is Dickens’s 
primer on the reading of signs, aptly titled “On the Look-out.”
 The first chapter opens with a description of Gaffer and Lizzie Hexam 
in a boat on the Thames and begins with a series of exclusions. Gaffer has 
“no net, no hook, or line, and he could not be a fisherman”; other items not 
present are listed and the trades of waterman and lighterman are eliminated 
as possible occupations. In fact, “there is no clue to what [Gaffer] looked for, 
but he looked for something, with a most intent and searching gaze.”5 The 
passage alerts us to the fact that we too will need “clues” to solve the mystery 
of this boat and its occupants, who are obviously “doing something they 
often did, and were seeking what they often sought” (1). The scene is filled 
with the need to interpret. Lizzie must read Gaffer’s face to direct the boat 
she is rowing, just as Gaffer reads the water for signs of what he is seeking. 
But while Gaffer’s gaze is utilitarian, Lizzie’s is affected by emotion and fancy. 
A slant of light upon “a rotten stain [at the bottom of the boat] which bore 
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some resemblance to the outline of a muffled human form, coloured it as 
though with diluted blood. This caught the girl’s eye, and she shivered” (2). 
This is one of the narrator’s many clues to his readers in this short opening 
chapter; it emphasizes Lizzie’s figural imagination. But another clue is the 
narrator’s own figure. Gaffer is likened to “a roused bird of prey” (3), an 
image confirmed by Rogue Riderhood, who says to Gaffer, “‘you’re like the 
wulturs, pardner, and scent ’em out’” (4). Though the mystery of what Gaffer 
scents out and what Lizzie cannot bear to sit close to is undisclosed, a trans-
parent clue appears at the very close of the chapter, when we learn that a 
neophyte might fancy “that the ripples passing over it [what Gaffer has in 
tow] were dreadfully like faint changes of expression on a sightless face; but 
Gaffer was no neophyte and had no fancies” (5).
 In this first chapter, then, the narrator gives us a lesson in reading signs 
and establishes the basis for some of the central themes of the narrative—
preying and scavenging, the transformative powers of water, and the contrast 
of fancy with pragmatic thought, all of these interwoven with one another 
from the start. Another theme is begun, but left unpursued in the descrip-
tion of Gaffer’s boat being “[a]llied to the bottom of the river rather than 
the surface, by reason of the slime and ooze with which it was covered . . .” 
(1). But if the narrator has given us a lesson in reading signs, he has not 
openly solved the mystery of the chapter. Who are Gaffer, Lizzie, and Rogue? 
What is their business? What does Gaffer have in tow? If we have learned our 
lesson and read the clues, we should know.
 Chapter 2 abandons the river for a very different setting where the subject 
and theme of dust is prominent in the tale of old John Harmon, a narra-
tive that interests the company gathered at the Veneerings’ home. In telling 
the story of the Harmons, Mortimer Lightwood remarks that old Harmon’s 
daughter “intimated that she was secretly engaged to that popular character 
whom the novelists and versifiers call Another,” and a bit later declares that 
“[w]e must now return, as the novelists say, and as we all wish they wouldn’t, 
to the man from Somewhere” (14). As central story teller in chapter 2, Light-
wood alludes directly and critically, even condescendingly, to conventions 
of fiction; appropriately, his own narrative is incomplete and ends abruptly 
until a message suddenly delivered to him provides closure to the story of 
the man from Somewhere. His listeners speculate, one notion being that 
there was a codicil in the dust, but all the auditors are wrong. Lightwood 
exclaims, “[t]he story is completer and rather more exciting than I supposed. 
Man’s drowned!” (17).6
 Chapters 1 and 2 could not be much more different from one another—
the one set in the ooze and damp of the river with ghastly circumstances 
developing, the other set among the well-to-do and cultivated classes 
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enjoying a stagy dinner, with the luxury of speculating on the life stories of 
strangers concerned with dust and money. Chapter 1 is narrated by an alert 
narrator; chapter 2 is about narration. But dust and water come together at 
the end of chapter 2 in the supposed drowning death of John Harmon, Jr. 
When dust and water mingle, the result is mud and ooze, and as the nar-
rative progresses we discover how significant mud is in the meaning of the 
story, if we have learned to read the clues the way Dickens has taught us to 
do. But for us to read these clues correctly, we must have a surplus of them. 
Our Mutual Friend offers an ideal example of how Dickens utilizes redun-
dancy not merely to reinforce narrative meaning, but to assert his control 
of how that meaning will be received, and also to indicate the limitations of 
the realist program. Patterns of imagery, recurrent motifs, and repetitions of 
themes are common in many types of fiction, but Dickens subsumes all of 
these and the narrative design of the novel itself to a mode of transmission 
that makes each of these devices reinforce the others, thereby more severely 
circumscribing the meaning of the information it conveys even as it becomes 
denser. Redundancy can be seen as a mode of interpretation something like 
the concept of the implied author, where an idealized governing force of 
the narrative is posited for much of the narrative’s design. Redundancy can 
be seen as such a governing force imbedded in the novel’s language itself, 
but requiring both by its intricacy and its self-advertizing a specific mode 
of information reception. In some ways, it is a mode of meaning that is the 
opposite of Bakhtin’s heteroglossia.
 Redundancy means different things in different contexts, though ordi-
narily it suggests superfluousness. The Victorians, for example, discussed the 
problem of redundant women, a large surplus of single women for whom 
there were insufficient mates. Different fields of research today use the con-
cept of redundancy in a rigorous manner. In linguistics and semiotics it 
has to do with that which is supposedly unnecessary though helpful for the 
communication of information (though often such redundancy is difficult to 
determine). W. C. Watt notes that “the kinds of information that are ‘redun-
dant’ (superfluous, predictable) vary greatly depending on what task is at 
hand”; his example is the recognition of letters of the alphabet (16).
Suppose some performative differences, in so far as they depend on utilizing 
different portions of one’s overall knowledge of the letters, might be reflected 
directly in the letters’ analysis in a particularly simple way: information used 
in some tasks but not in others could be included in the letters’ analysis, at 
some level, as “redundant.” (17)
What is redundant depends upon what task is required; for example, recog-
nizing, uttering, or writing a letter of the alphabet. 
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 Although such concepts of redundancy are obviously related to that 
which I am using here, my derivation is more directly from information 
theory.7 Here is Jeremy Campbell’s explanation.
In nearly all forms of communication, more messages are sent than are 
strictly necessary to convey the information intended by the sender. Such 
additional messages diminish the unexpectedness, the surprise effect, of the 
information itself, making it more predictable. This extra ration of predict-
ability is called redundancy, and it is one of the most important concepts 
in information theory. Redundancy is essentially a constraint. It limits the 
value of W in the entropy equation S = k log W, reducing the number of 
ways in which the various parts of a system can be arranged. (68)8
Language is an example where redundancy is contained within rules. In 
order to communicate in language there must be shared conventions such 
as grammar, spelling, and so forth. Attempts to compress language, deleting 
what appears to be redundant, destroy the built-in safeguards against error 
found in all languages. Redundancy in this sense facilitates the communi-
cation of messages. Campbell continues, “[t]here is yet another aspect of 
redundancy which is of great interest. This is the role it plays in enabling 
systems, both biological organisms and artificial intelligence machines, to 
become complex.  .  .  .  The more complex the system the more likely it is 
that one of its parts will malfunction. Redundancy is a means of keeping the 
system running in the presence of malfunction” (73). Campbell concludes 
that “while redundancy constrains, it also may lead to great complexity 
within the constraints” (74).
 Redundancy might apply in any number of situations. Campbell cites 
Susumu Ohno, a geneticist who speculated that evolution provided “‘useless 
information’ in the DNA of organisms. This came in the form of repetition, 
which is the simplest form of redundancy . . .” (149). But this “useless infor-
mation” can prove to be very useful indeed, as Jennifer Ackerman indicates 
in her account of heredity.
But lately scientists have taken a closer look at the wilderness of junk DNA 
and found that certain stretches are fecund voids, like Leonardo’s darks, full 
of sequences that may be ungenelike but are nevertheless vital to life, exert-
ing exquisite control over the genes embedded in them. (24)
Any code, any message, could contain within it a useless or a useful redun-
dancy, but the implications of biology, linguistics, information theory, and 
other areas of study suggest that wherever redundancy exists, it contributes 
to the delivery of a message.9 Lily E. Kay provides an interesting account 
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of how the concept of redundancy crossed the borders from linguistics to 
genetics and back again by way of a conference of the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences in Boston, August, 1962 (304ff).10 The codes of genetics 
and linguistics might be different, but the concept of redundancy as a prin-
ciple of communication need not be.
 I am not suggesting that Dickens understood this notion, but simply that 
he intuitively comprehended the way in which a message can be delivered 
by a combination of constraint and increasing complexity through narrative 
language. Bleak House provides a midcareer sample. That novel is famous for 
the repetitions of its opening paragraphs, tolling the words ‘mud’ and ‘fog’ 
over and over. But that is an obvious example of repetition, a transparent 
descriptive redundancy. A less prominent pattern also begins with the first 
chapter and continues throughout the novel until it swells to major signifi-
cance in the death of Lady Dedlock. Chapter 1 ends with this memorable 
sentence: “If all the injustice [Chancery] has committed, and all the misery 
it has caused, could only be locked up with it, and the whole burnt away in a 
great funeral pyre,—why so much the better for other parties than the par-
ties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce” (7). And so much the better for all of English 
society, the passage and the chapter suggest. The end of a chapter is a good 
place to locate an important theme, and Dickens does that here by intro-
ducing the funeral/burial motif. But it is not only the world of Chancery that 
would be better off in its grave. The world of fashion represented in chapter 
2 by the Dedlock household at Chesney Wold seems already to have passed 
the boundary between the quick and the dead at least metaphorically, but 
literally as well. Chesney Wold seems inclined in that direction. The little 
church in the park is moldy, “and there is a general smell and taste of the 
ancient Dedlocks in their graves” (9). When Esther first visits the locale, 
she notices that the church “smelt as earthy as the grave” (249). It is at this 
moment that Esther first sees Lady Dedlock, who will later learn that Esther 
is her own daughter returned from the grave. Tom Lloyd has commented on 
some of the connections between Lady Dedlock and Esther, including the 
irony that the mother must “bury” her newly discovered daughter in secrecy 
again, but also that the handkerchief that Esther uses to cover Jenny’s dead 
baby in a respectful funeral rite, is later taken by Lady Dedlock in her ulti-
mately fatal flight.11 So the handkerchief becomes a signifier in the funerary 
connection between Esther and Lady Dedlock. Jo, too, makes a connection 
between Esther and the woman who wanted him to show her the “berryin’ 
ground” (430). These, and many other similar references, create by their rep-
etition a redundant network alluding to funerals and burials, including the 
elaborate inquest sequence following the death of Nemo, that peaks in the 
scene in which Esther discovers her mother dead at the gates of the loath-
The Riches of Redundancy | 91
some burying ground where her one-time lover and the father of Esther 
is buried. By the end of the novel, we realize that these redundancies have 
pointed the way to the conclusion, with Lady Dedlock in her grave.
It is known for certain that the handsome Lady Dedlock lies in the mauso-
leum in the park, where the trees arch darkly overhead, and the owl is heard 
at night making the woods ring; but whence she was brought home, to be 
laid among the echoes of that solitary place, or how she died, is all mystery. 
Some of her old friends, principally to be found among the peachy-cheeked 
charmers with the skeleton throats, did once occasionally say, as they toyed 
in a ghastly manner with large fans—like charmers reduced to flirting with 
grim Death, after losing all their other beaux—did once occasionally say, 
when the World assembled together, that they wondered the ashes of the 
Dedlocks, entombed in the mausoleum, never rose against the profanation 
of her company. But the dead-and-gone Dedlocks take it very calmly, and 
have never been known to object. (872)
This scene of the nearly dead judging the dead is reinforced by the implica-
tion that the entire Dedlock way of life is passing away, supplanted implic-
itly by the inhabitants of new Bleak House, a place of joy and healing. Sir 
Leicester is the manifestation of this impending change.
Closed in by night with broad screens, and illumined only in that part, the 
light of the drawing-room seems gradually contracting and dwindling until 
it shall be no more. A little more, in truth, and it will be all extinguished for 
Sir Leicester; and the damp door in the mausoleum which shuts so tight, and 
looks so obdurate, will have opened and received him. (874)
The anonymous narrator concludes that “passion and pride  .  .  . have died 
away from the place in Lincolnshire  .  .  .” (876).12 And so the penultimate 
chapter ends, but in the final chapter, narrated by Esther, the turf has not yet 
been planted on Richard Carstone’s grave when his son is born, symbolizing 
a new era of new hopes when even Esther’s lost looks can come to life again.
 This brief taste of Dickens’s method of providing a superfluity of informa-
tion on a theme he wishes to convey is one manifestation of what is more 
densely enacted in Our Mutual Friend. Literal and metaphorical funerary 
and burial activity abound in Bleak House, but the mesh of references to 
water, dust, and mud is far more complex in Our Mutual Friend. We have 
already seen how the themes of water, dust, surface, and depth are devel-
oped in the first two chapters of this novel, but we have scarcely, as it were, 
touched the surface. The whole second chapter depends upon the concept 
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of the Veneerings as representative of superficiality, as their name suggests. 
But set against this reprehensible surfaceness is the desire to penetrate sur-
faces, and we get a glimpse of this immediately at the beginning of chapter 
3, when Mortimer interrogates Charley Hexam, who has written and deliv-
ered the note about John Harmon’s death. This interrogation takes place in 
the Veneering library with its “bran-new books, in bran-new bindings . . .” 
(18). Young Charley “glanced at the backs of the books, with an awakened 
curiosity that went below the binding,” notes the narrator, then adds, “[n]o 
one who can read, ever looks at a book, even unopened on a shelf, like one 
who cannot,” a telling connection of the surface/depth theme with that of 
interpreting signs and that of narration.
 Charley takes Mortimer to Gaffer, who is vain about not being able to 
read, yet being “scholar enough” to identify all of the posters on the walls 
of his room, which refer to corpses he has recovered (22). This mesh of 
themes is drawn together more forcefully, though the reader does not know 
it at this point, when the man from Somewhere shows up at Gaffer’s door 
seeking directions to the corpse, which he thinks he might be able to iden-
tify. Before chapter 3 ends, we meet another interpreter of signs in Lizzie 
Hexam, who can read the flames in the fireplace. Unlike Gaffer’s ability to 
note the meaning of outside signs through his memory of what they stand 
for, Lizzie projects her own depths unto the unmeaning “signs” of the flames. 
Hence, all three Hexams are readers, but they span a very wide range of that 
activity; Lizzie’s “reading” comes closest of the three to the related practice of 
narrating.
 Having stated his themes and interwoven them in the opening three 
chapters, the narrator is now able to begin the more leisurely development 
of his story, and so the next two chapters introduce new key players in the 
novel, first the Wilfers and then Wegg and the Boffins. But gradually one or 
another theme is reintroduced. Boffin hires Wegg to read to him, though 
what is being read now becomes relatively inconsequential. However, what 
is important is that, whether or not he is a good reader, Wegg is an untrust-
worthy narrator. He has made up his account of the family in the corner 
house near which he has his stand. He is only one breeder of fictions, though, 
as the novel demonstrates. Chapter 10, for example, shows how Twemlow 
recognizes that “the Veneering guests become infected with the Veneering 
fiction,” without realizing that he is infected too (115).
 The first few chapters of Our Mutual Friend put Dickens’s machinery in 
place. These are the cocoons of the redundancy to be spun out later. But 
having got this material before the reader, he relaxes into the “realistic” 
body of narrative. Still, the themes of the opening appear in trace amounts 
throughout, often linked to one of the other motives. Dickens was intent on 
The Riches of Redundancy | 93
keeping control of his own narrative and so, along with guiding his readers’ 
interpretations, he includes examples of the misinterpretation of signs. Mr. 
Podsnap thinks that he knows what all signs mean, though the narrator 
checks his confidence abruptly when the foreign gentleman misunderstands 
Podsnap’s boasting of the signs of prosperity in London, taking him to be 
referring to the horse dung so common on the London streets. This pas-
sage may seem gratuitous except that dung in the streets may reasonably be 
connected to the activities of a prosperous city. No business and wealth, no 
horses and their waste. But dung is also collected by scavengers and depos-
ited in mounds that can also produce wealth, as they did for John Harmon, 
Sr. If Podsnap is thus negatively connected to the elder Harmon, he is also 
connected to the younger Harmon, for it is Podsnap who bids Veneering, 
“who has prospered exceedingly on the Harmon Murder,” to retell the story. 
As Mr. Veneering plunges into the case, his wife dives into the same waters 
for a wealthy Ship-Broker as audience and brings him up, “safe and sound, 
by the hair” (134). This is a gruesomely comic reversal of what has suppos-
edly happened to John Harmon, who is supposed not to have been brought 
up safe and sound.
 This multipurpose imagery, what Garrett Stewart in a discussion of Oliver 
Twist calls “metaphoric overkill,” (The Cambridge Companion 157) appears 
far too often for me to cite all cases in Our Mutual Friend. But Robert Alter 
admirably shows how what appears to be an isolated description of a foggy 
London reveals itself as thematically embedded, for the city drowning in 
fog with St. Paul’s Cathedral the last to go, “carries forward the images of 
death by drowning” (136). Clearly Dickens’s frequent and prominent refer-
ences back to his initial themes are meant to keep the reader in training, but 
also to demonstrate his own command of the narrative. We are told of the 
“depths and shallows of Podsnappery” (255) and of the “winds and waves” 
of Fledgeby’s stormy childhood (268). Betty Higden says she will be able to 
avoid the workhouse if there is “water enough to cover us” in England (327). 
Bradley Headstone’s thoughts are “tributary” to one purpose (551). In the 
passage about Headstone, Dickens even provides a proleptic glimpse of the 
scene where Headstone will attack Wrayburn, so that, in rereading, his audi-
ence would recognize a sign missed in the initial reading.
 These references to water are timid by comparison with more forceful 
passages in which water is connected with passionate, selfish, and even 
savage qualities. This connection is first made overtly at the very end of 
Book One in the chapter entitled “A Dismal Swamp,” in which we learn of 
all of those who are trying to get money out of Boffin, who are described 
as “the Alligators of the Dismal Swamp, and are always lying by to drag the 
Golden Dustman under” (213). The chapter ends with a reference to Wegg 
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as a “fish of the shark tribe in the Bower waters” who also resembles “some 
extinct bird,” plotting to get his portion out of Boffin (213). This associa-
tion is intensified when Boffin visits Venus’s shop and has to hide behind a 
stuffed alligator upon Wegg’s unexpected appearance to discuss the nefar-
ious “friendly move” with Venus. The narrator remarks that Wegg’s wicked 
behavior is nothing new. “The yard or two of smile on the part of the alli-
gator might have been invested with the meaning, ‘All about this was quite 
familiar knowledge down in the depths of the slime, ages ago’” (383). Wegg 
is connected to the slime in another way, for he resembles Gaffer as a bird of 
prey. He “fluttered over his prey,” Boffin, even when he was powerless, but 
now, when he believes he has Boffin in his power, he prepares to “drop down 
upon” him (579, 584ff.).
 Wegg’s craving for Boffin’s wealth is a hollow desire for gratification. A 
fiercer desire discloses itself in Bradley Headstone. He has advanced him-
self from humble origins of which he is both sullenly proud and ashamed. 
He employs a constant self-suppression in order to get on with his career 
as a schoolmaster. “Yet there was enough of what was animal, and of what 
was fiery (though smouldering), still visible in him, to suggest that if young 
Bradley Headstone, when a pauper lad, had chanced to be told off for the sea, 
he would not have been the last man in a ship’s crew” (218). John Harmon 
recognizes something suppressed in Headstone. “The Secretary thought, as 
he glanced at the schoolmaster’s face, that he had opened a channel here 
indeed, and that it was an unexpectedly dark and deep and stormy one, and 
difficult to sound” (388). But if Harmon cannot sound it, Headstone himself 
can, as he demonstrates to Lizzie, when he reveals his passion for her.
“No man knows till the time comes what depths are within him. To some 
men it never comes; let them rest and be thankful! To me, you brought it; on 
me, you forced it; and the bottom of this raging sea,” striking himself upon 
the breast, “has been heaved up ever since.” (396)
The narrator can take a larger view of Headstone’s individual case, and he 
does so in the same scene where he refers to Headstone’s origins. “But even 
among school-buildings, school-teachers, and school-pupils, all according 
to pattern and all engendered in the light of the latest Gospel according 
to Monotony, the older pattern into which so many fortunes have been 
shaped for good and evil, comes out” (218). The narrator is referring to 
Miss Peecher, who has an unrequited passion for Headstone, but the passage 
applies equally to Headstone. The “older pattern” is what the alligator knows 
was commonplace in the slime ages ago. The slime and mire and mud are 
what humanity sinks to at its worst; it is what those who aspire to the best 
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wish to rise out of. But there may be parodic versions of that ascent. Just as 
Headstone has risen above his origins, Charley Hexam wants to raise himself 
in the world and tells Lizzie “that after I have climbed up out of the mire, you 
shall not pull me down” (401, 403). Later, suspecting Headstone of criminal 
behavior, he disassociates himself from his former schoolmaster, saying “he 
will not be dragged down by others” (712–13). The playful “hunting” scenes 
that Wrayburn puts Headstone through on an almost nightly basis, making 
him “like an ill-timed wild animal,” becomes a real hunting down of Wray-
burn by Headstone (546). Ooze, slime, mud, and mire are the primordial 
savage conditions out of which the human race has presumably crept.
 If the river bottom and the oozy river itself scavenged by birds of prey rep-
resent human vileness, it is a world supposedly best avoided and forgotten. 
And so, John Harmon, who has descended briefly into it, decides that John 
Harmon shall not come back to life; instead he buries “John Harmon many 
additional fathoms deep” (378). Like Headstone, Harmon as Rokesmith is 
determined to keep himself down, but in his case self-repression involves a 
consideration for others rather than a need for self-discipline.
 All of the water references return near the end of the book as Wrayburn, 
having pursued Lizzie up the river, is attacked by Headstone then rescued 
by Lizzie.13 Whereas Gaffer pulled the dead from the water to plunder them, 
Lizzie pulls Wrayburn from the water to save his life. All that she learned 
about her father’s trade now serves to reverse it. The narrator cannot help 
reminding us of our reading lesson in the first chapter of the book, and notes 
that “An untrained sight would never have seen by the moonlight what she 
saw at the length of a few strokes astern” (700). It is still necessary to interpret 
signs correctly, to act rightly, just as Riderhood must decipher the meaning 
of Headstone’s clothing (to implicate him in the murder) and then teach a 
lesson of his own in Headstone’s own classroom. Rogue asks Headstone’s 
students to name the waters on the earth, which they dutifully accomplish, 
but when he asks them what is caught in seas, rivers, lakes, and ponds, he has 
to correct the answers fish and weeds, and state that “It’s suits o’ clothes,” for 
he has fished up the clothes that Headstone wore during the attack on Wray-
burn (795). He is not now fishing up corpses, but empty suits of clothes, yet 
the parallel with the opening scenes of the novel is clear. In fact, Headstone 
is as good as a dead man already, as the erasure of his name from the black-
board portends, and he and Riderhood will soon end up together “lying 
under the ooze and scum” of the lock, back in the primordially savage world 
of which one was an obvious, the other a covert denizen (802).
 As Wrayburn lies half-dead he fades in and out of consciousness, and 
the narrator remarks, “This frequent rising of a drowning man from the 
deep, to sink again, was dreadful to the beholders” (740). It is “the wreck 
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of him that lay cast ashore there now  .  .  .” (753). Having visited the river-
side only through Lightwood’s legal interest there, Wrayburn is attracted to 
Lizzie, who represents the positive element that can arise from the apparent 
unattractiveness of that world. It is she more than Charley who rises out of 
the mire and who lifts Wrayburn with her. And if he is a wrecked ship at 
this stage, he will survive to lead a better life married to Lizzie, who is, as 
Twemlow insists against the Voice of Society, a lady. If Lizzie is thus redemp-
tive for Wrayburn, Harmon is similarly redemptive for Bella. Bella dreams 
of a rich husband coming to her in a ship and of setting off into the world 
as a wealthy woman (318ff), but later, after she has married Rokesmith, she 
says to her father that there was no John in all of the ships she had earlier 
imagined (670). In fact, there was. For John Harmon had returned in a ship 
from abroad specifically to investigate the circumstances that would have 
bound him to Bella as she was, not as she has become. Moreover, the result 
of their marriage is that a baby is on a ship coming to them, a baby that is 
safely brought home (688, 755), as John almost was not. The whole theme 
of water constitutes an extensive redundancy, but what seems superfluous 
is actually an elaborate network uniting various characters’ histories, and 
various other themes. Water references, whether factual or metaphorical tell 
the complicated story of journeys on a perilous medium where some sink to 
the vile bottom and others land safely.
 Lest we miss the larger meaning of the water motif, the narrator occa-
sionally steps in to make it explicit. When Betty Higden is in flight from the 
workhouse she follows the Thames.
In those pleasant little towns on Thames, you may hear the fall of the water 
over the weirs, or even, in still weather, the rustle of the rushes; and from 
the bridge you may see the young river, dimpled like a young child, playfully 
gliding away among the trees, unpolluted by the defilements that lie in wait 
for it on its course, and as yet out of hearing of the deep summons of the sea. 
It were too much to pretend that Betty Higden made out such thoughts; no; 
but she heard the tender river whispering to many like herself, ‘Come to me, 
come to me! When the cruel shame and terror you have so long fled from, 
most beset you, come to me! I am the Relieving Officer appointed by eternal 
ordinance to do my work; I am not held in estimation according as I shirk it. 
My breast is softer than the pauper-nurse’s; death in my arms is peacefuller 
than among the pauper-wards. Come to me!’ (504–5)
Here is the opposite setting to the Dismal Swamp and the ancient slime. It is 
human innocence and human destiny. Betty Higden will soon die, but not 
in the river. Nor will Wrayburn die in the river. But the train carrying Mr. 
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Milvey to marry Wrayburn and Lizzie seems to suggest otherwise and cer-
tainly puts the water theme in a larger perspective as it roars across the river:
spurning the watery turnings and doublings with ineffable contempt, and 
going straight to its end, as Father Time goes to his. To whom it is no matter 
what living waters run high or low, reflect the heavenly lights and dark-
nesses, produce their little growth of weeds and flowers, turn here, turn 
there, are noisy or still, are troubled or at rest, for their course has one sure 
termination, though their sources and devices are many. (751)
A few lines later we are “near the solemn river, stealing away by night, as 
all things steal away, by night and by day, so quietly yielding to the attrac-
tion of the loadstone rock of Eternity . . .” (751). This reference too suggests 
the imminent death of Wrayburn and is overtly so connected by the narra-
tive, but the death to come is Headstone’s instead. However, no matter how 
immediately applicable, these passages reveal the cosmic moral background 
against which Dickens plays out his water music.14 These passages also con-
stitute instructions for the proper deciphering of the redundant information 
concerning water, but also indicate that water references are interlocked with 
other images, themes, and narrative gestures.
 If there is water, there is also dust. Dust is most obviously connected to 
the accumulation of wealth by unsavory means. But the dust mounds in the 
story also represent the past as either opportunity or burden for the living. 
The Boffins benefit from old Harmon’s will and acquire the mounds along 
with the estate. John Harmon rejects the imposition of the past upon him 
and frees himself from its dusty entrapment.15 But the mounds themselves 
and dust in general also suggest mystery, and occlusion. When Lightwood 
makes the off-hand remark to Boffin that “everything wears to rags,” Boffin 
replies “there’s some things that I never found among the dust” (91). Boffin is 
called the Golden Dustman because for him the dust has meant great wealth, 
but he can put it in perspective and has come to the Temple “as a spot where 
lawyer’s dust is contracted for  .  .  .” (91). What is not found in the dust is 
unselfishness and love.16 And just as the motif of recovery is associated with 
water, that of unburying and recovering is also associated with the dust, 
most particularly in the plotting of Wegg and Venus. That the accumulation 
of dust signifies a pernicious activity becomes evident when the narrator 
uses metaphors to castigate the authorities who have made the poor laws 
what they are.
My lords and gentlemen and honourable boards, when you in the course of 
your dust-shovelling and cinder-raking have piled up a mountain of preten-
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tious failure, you must off with your honourable coats for the removal of 
it, and fall to the work with the power of all the queen’s horses and all the 
queen’s men, or it will come rushing down and bury us alive. (503)
Those concluding words cannot help but remind us, as does Lightwood’s 
remark that everything wears to rags, of the most famous quotation about 
dust—“dust thou art.” Lest we forget that dimension, the narrator occasion-
ally reminds us of it; thus, near the beginning of chapter 15, we find a para-
graph beginning: “A grey dusty withered evening in London city has not a 
hopeful aspect. The closed warehouses and offices have an air of death about 
them, and the national dread of colour has an air of mourning” (393). The 
removal of the dust mounds, from this perspective, is a removal of all that is 
allied with the unattractiveness of death and the influence of the dead upon 
the living, including the will of a dead parent, but also of social conventions 
upon individuals.
 The ooze, scum, mud, and slime associated with the corpses in the 
Thames, but also with Gaffer’s own death and those of Headstone and Rider-
hood, call attention to the serious theme of mixing water and dust, or hidden 
forces and the unsavory accumulation of “wealth.” Gaffer is driven by greed 
in his marginally legal trade; John Harmon Sr. is miserly in his assembling 
of the mounds. When these two metaphorical patterns come together, they 
suggest the ancient slime in which the predatory alligators and birds of 
prey live. But there is a lighter side to this pattern as well. It takes its cli-
mactic form with Silas Wegg, who has sought to acquire wealth through 
blackmailing Boffin about ownership of the dust mounds. John Harmon 
denounces Wegg as a “mudworm” at the moment of his unmasking (788). 
Like the other predators, this one too has failed. His fate is not as dramatic as 
Gaffer’s, Headstone’s, or Riderhood’s, but it is related. Sloppy picks Wegg up 
and carries him into the street where he pitches him into a “scavenger’s cart” 
where he makes “a prodigious splash” (790). It might not be the pit of a lock 
on the Thames, but it is ooze of a very disagreeable nature. Scavengers in 
the streets carried on a more reputable trade related to Gaffer’s occupation. 
What were called dust carts collected animal and sometimes human waste 
as well. Wegg’s removal from the narrative is prepared for long before when 
Jenny Wren tells her prodigal father, “‘I’d give the dustman five shillings to 
carry you off in the dust cart’” (532), and in the foreign gentleman’s misun-
derstanding about the “signs” on the London streets. The resolution to the 
problem of mud is hinted at in the scene of John and Bella’s wedding, which 
takes place at Greenwich Church. Their air of happiness as they move off to 
the ceremony “wafted up from the earth and drew up after them a gruff and 
glum old pensioner” with two wooden legs and no object in life but tobacco. 
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“Stranded was Gruff and Glum in a harbour of everlasting mud, when all 
in an instant Bella floated him, and away he went” (664).17 It is love and 
the prospect of domestic contentment that frees us from the selfishness and 
hopelessness of mud and slime.
 I have argued thus far that Dickens has his narrator provide us with an 
excess of information about water in particular but also dust and mud to 
convey the central meaning of his complex narrative. I want now to argue 
that he employs this redundancy in order to maintain his own control of 
the narrative and to make as certain as possible that his text will not be mis-
read.18 We have already seen how Lightwood becomes a self-conscious nar-
rator in the second chapter of the novel when he tells the story of the man 
from Somewhere. In chapter 16 of Book Two Lady Tippins recalls that it was 
during a dinner at the Veneerings that Lightwood first told the story of the 
man from Somewhere. Mortimer, again calling attention to the artificiality 
of narration, responds: “‘Yes, Lady Tippins. . . . as they say on the stage, Even 
so!’” (411). We now learn that there is a sequel to that story, though Light-
wood is reluctant to tell it until Wrayburn impatiently urges him to do so, 
declaring it insignificant and quoting a children’s “narrative” to illustrate his 
point.
“I’ll tell you a story
Of Jack a Manory,
And now my story’s begun;
I’ll tell you another
Of Jack and his brother,
And now my story is done.” (412)
Wrayburn’s poem suggests the inconsequentiality and lack of serious content 
in narratives, but Dickens’s purpose here as elsewhere is to refute that claim. 
In fact, the sequel Lightwood has to tell is monumentally important to the 
narrative of Our Mutual Friend, for it involves an account of Riderhood’s 
charges against Gaffer and his subsequent retraction of them, and climaxes 
with the information that Lizzie has vanished.
 Lightwood can successfully minimize the importance of narrative in 
his first appearance as narrator; it is less easy to do so when his narrative 
involves his close friend Wrayburn, who is deeply concerned about Lizzie’s 
disappearance, which sets him into action with very serious consequences. 
Lightwood’s progress as a narrator suggests that any story might be far more 
important than we suppose. Who, as the party at the Veneerings entertained 
themselves with the story of a stranger, knew how intimately that story 
would intertwine with their own? But if the stories of strangers may prove 
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surprisingly significant, false stories can be equally powerful. Riderhood’s 
lying narrative about Gaffer must be expunged. The very subject of reading 
and interpretation must be examined. It can be elementary. Betty Higden 
explains that “‘Sloppy is a beautiful reader of a newspaper. He do the Police 
in different voices’” (198). Reading, if it is only the conveying of information 
from the newspaper, requires some degree of interpretation. It is still the 
reception and translation of signs.
 Of course, the central figures, when it comes to the theme of reading in 
this novel are Boffin and Wegg, the latter, as we have seen, concentrating 
almost parodically several of the serious themes of the novel. Boffin declares 
to Rokesmith, “I ain’t a scholar in much, Rokesmith, but I’m a pretty fair 
scholar in dust,” echoing Gaffer’s boast that he is scholar enough to “read” 
the posters on his wall (185). In short, both men can “read” the signs of 
their trades. But Boffin is something more. Like Charley Hexam, he seeks to 
acquire the information stored in books and hires Wegg to assist him in this 
venture; Wegg himself, though literate, is not the scholar he pretends to be. 
Boffin wants to enjoy the fruits of literature, but soon finds himself in “severe 
literary difficulties” (178). The first mention of his “literary” difficulties actu-
ally pertains to his inability to keep his records straight. It is for this that 
he hires Rokesmith as secretary, though he realizes that employing Roke-
smith will evoke jealousy in “‘a literary man—with a wooden leg . . .’” (182). 
But there is another sense in which Boffin has literary difficulties. “What 
to believe, in the course of his reading, was Mr. Boffin’s chief literary dif-
ficulty indeed . . .” (176). The written records he has listened to may provide 
historical truth, or simply be made-up tales. Without sufficient verification 
from many sources—another kind of redundancy—it is impossible to tell if 
a historical narrative is “true.” But Boffin soon manifests yet another con-
nection with literature. He shifts his reading from history to biography, and 
specifically the biographies of misers.19 Seeming to accept these narratives as 
true accounts, he seeks out as many as he can in an attempt to validate the 
lifestyles of these men through a superfluous collection of information. We 
later learn that this is simply a ruse, but the ruse involves the transmitting of 
false signs for Wegg and Venus (and also Bella) to read—a kind of negative 
redundancy embedded in the larger narrative as a whole. Meanwhile, as he is 
sending these false signals, a “kind of illegibility” masks his own face (472). 
The once transparently readable Boffin has become a problem of interpreta-
tion. He is, in fact, creating a false narrative as potent as Riderhood’s, though 
ultimately with a benign motive. For all that, it is still a lie. When is a lying 
narrative justified? When it leads to a happy ending? All fiction is, by defi-
nition, lying narrative, and Dickens made his living by it, so he had every 
reason to defend his own practice. 
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 Boffin is not the only individual who is a text. In his passionate scene of 
declaration to and refusal by Lizzie, Headstone identifies “the text” that most 
deeply concerns him as “Mr. Eugene Wrayburn” (399). It is Wrayburn him-
self who delivers the riff on reading, by which the narrator makes this signifi-
cant theme directly apparent. Wrayburn has just commented on Lightwood’s 
“reading” of his weak character.
(Bye-the-bye, that very word, Reading, in its critical use, always charms me. 
An actress’s Reading of a chambermaid, a dancer’s Reading of a hornpipe, a 
singer’s Reading of a song, a marine painter’s Reading of the sea, the kettle-
drum’s Reading of an instrumental passage, are phrases ever youthful and 
delightful.) (542)
If we hadn’t figured it out before, this passage should help us to realize that 
reading is interpretation—the conversion of signs into expression, or the 
conversion of one set of signs into another, to be read in their turn by an 
audience of one sort or another. But what constitutes the appropriate mate-
rial for an appropriate audience is often in doubt. In chapter 1 of Book Two 
entitled “Of an Educational Character,” the narrator deplores the inappro-
priate narratives used in the first school Charley Hexam attends. Young 
women old in vices read the highly moralistic Adventures of Little Margery, 
and young dredgers and hulking mudlarks read the experiences of Thomas 
Twopence. The members of this audience require far other texts than these. 
The narrator opens the chapter with a significant statement about what con-
stitutes education.
The school at which young Charley Hexam had first learned from a book—
the streets being, for pupils of his degree, the great preparatory Establish-
ment in which very much that is never unlearned is learned without and 
before book—was a miserable loft in an unsavoury yard. (214)
You don’t have to go to school to become a scholar of death posters or of 
dust. But you do have to “read” the signs around you and decode them accu-
rately if you intend to survive.20 This, of course, is the message of the novel’s 
opening chapter.
 Sometimes, however, it is necessary to read our own story before we 
try to interpret those of others. Hence, central to the narrative as a whole 
is a scene often regarded as clumsy by critics of this novel, in which John 
Harmon must tell himself his own story. Having left Pleasant Riderhood’s 
shop, Harmon finds himself walking in circles in the unfamiliar neighbor-
hood and complains to himself: “‘This is like what I have read in narratives 
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of escape from prison,’ he said, ‘where the little track of the fugitives in the 
night always seems to take the shape of the great round world on which 
they wander; as if it were a secret law’” (364). Soon, however, Harmon 
sets about his own narration, which is about an escape not from prison 
but from death by drowning. This act of narrating to himself, might seem 
redundant, since one would suppose no one knows more about oneself 
than oneself. But such an assumption can be mistaken, as Bella’s case dem-
onstrates. Harmon must reexamine his experience and read the signs anew 
from a changed perspective, something the narrator is constantly urging 
upon his readers. Thus Harmon’s narration is a model within the larger 
narrative of how to process data so that it becomes information containing 
meaning upon which to act.21 And act he does. At the end of this chapter 
Harmon declares his devotion for Bella and she rejects it, determining 
him to keep John Harmon down and let him remain dead. But, though 
readers are not privy to the fact, Harmon/Rokesmith has set a “secret law” 
in motion which will change the story of Bella’s life. She has disliked being 
written into a role through the will of old John Harmon, but has focused 
on marriage for wealth as the object of her existence. Her fantasies about 
ships bringing in a rich husband and carrying out Bella married to one are 
her projection of her life story. But these projections are wrong and she 
marries the “poor” Rokesmith instead. After the revelation of Rokesmith’s 
true identity, Mrs. Boffin concludes: “‘and here you are, and the horses is 
in, and the story is done, and God bless you, my beauty, and God bless us 
all’” (774). But Bella is not content with this narrative and asks, “‘But is the 
story done?’” and goes on to declare that she does not believe in Boffin’s 
miserliness, but that he took on such a role to force her into recognizing 
her better self, an account closer to the truth (774).
 Harmon has told himself his life story and thereby empowered himself to 
rewrite Bella’s so that they both conclude with a happy ending. Boffin’s role 
playing was intended to misinform Wegg and thereby lead him to overreach 
himself, but it has had the additional benefit of teaching Bella her true self. 
She has been rescued by Harmon in a far subtler way than Lizzie rescues 
Wrayburn, but there is an interesting connection between the two cases. At 
one point Jenny interrogates Lizzie about her feelings for Wrayburn, and, 
in her familiar manner, she finds her own love story in “the hollow down 
by the flare” in the fireplace (348). Like Harmon, she tells herself her own 
story, but as she tells it, it is a hopeless projection into the future, for this love 
story involves a lady not a waterman’s daughter as the devoted companion 
to Wrayburn. Still, Lizzie, unknown to herself, has read the signs aright. She 
will end not only as Mrs. Wrayburn, but as Twemlow asserts, a lady as well.22
 To a great extent Our Mutual Friend is about being able to tell ourselves 
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our own life stories by correctly interpreting the signs. The novel is filled with 
characters who tell false tales for selfish ends—Wegg is a notable example, 
but the Lammles and Fledgeby are instances as well. Lightwood, Wrayburn, 
and Twemlow see no life stories for themselves, each being dominated, 
as John Harmon refuses to be, by a patriarchal directive. A realistic novel 
would be content to produce its narrative and perhaps allow the mirroring 
and contrasting of character types—a mode of redundancy too. But Dickens 
has embedded his redundancy not only in characterization and plotting, but 
in his very style, so that literal descriptions and figurative passages blend to 
convey an ever-increasing stream of data building to an inescapable message, 
though that message can only be read when all the signs the narrator has sent 
have been received. It seems to me that Dickens, though he could not use 
the language of information theory, intuitively understood the nature of his 
endeavor and how it differed from what was coming to be defined as realism. 
Part of his reason for resisting the conventions of realism, was his desire to 
retain control of his own narrative. As George Levine and others have sug-
gested, to be true to itself realism had to have the appearance of not being 
tightly structured, since real life itself was perceived, in the realist worldview, 
not to be so structured (11). But Dickens, while he embraced the detailed 
recording of the material world in the manner of the realists, was not com-
fortable with the mode of realism. He wanted a world more intense than 
real life and yet potentially more under control, hence his famous remark to 
Wilkie Collins that a novelist resembles providence.23 Dickens’s late fiction 
can be likened to the late operas of Richard Wagner. Other musicians had 
used musical motifs to reinforce a “meaning” in their music, but Wagner so 
developed the concept of the musical motif that it became a language in its 
own right, and his operas were correctly “readable” only by those who had 
mastered the recurrent, varying, and interlocking motifs into a highly over-
determined design. Wagner’s operas benefit from the concept of redundancy 
in music as Our Mutual Friend does, I believe, in fiction.
 That Dickens knew full well how his use of redundancy with its prolif-
eration of signs worked, his Postscript to the novel indicates. Some readers 
and commentators, he says, suppose that he was trying to conceal the fact 
that Rokesmith was Harmon, whereas that is what he was encouraging 
his readers to discover; it is, he writes, “in the interests of art, to hint to an 
audience that an artist (of whatever denomination) may perhaps be trusted 
to know what he is about in his vocation, if they will concede him a little 
patience. . . . To keep for a long time unsuspected, yet always working itself 
out, another purpose originating in that leading incident, and turning it to 
a pleasant and useful account at last, was the most interesting and the most 
difficult part of my design” (821). This difficulty is increased because one 
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cannot expect that serial readers “will, until they have it before them com-
plete, perceive the relations of its finer threads to the whole pattern which is 
always before the eyes of the story-weaver at his loom” (821). What I have 
tried to do in this chapter is to look at Dickens’s often-examined narrative 
from a somewhat novel perspective in order that those finer threads might 
be more clearly discerned.
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s Darío Villanueva has pointed out, realism can be 
viewed in many ways. It may be a worldview, an object 
of theoretical reflection, or a kind of art. At least since 
Plato, art forms have been seen as attempts at mimesis, 
the representation of actual existence. The trouble is that first we have 
to decide what reality is and then attempt to represent it. For Plato, the 
real was not necessarily the visible. The same was true for most medieval 
Europeans, where the spiritual was real and physical phenomena were 
transient. In Browning’s “Fra Lippo Lippi,” the painter has mastered 
what we would call realism; he has held the mirror up to nature. But his 
superiors in the church disapprove, suggesting that a focus on physical 
details distracts one from the real purpose of art, which is to evoke the 
spiritual. Giotto is recommended to him as a model. So determining 
what is real is not as easy as it may seem.
 Also, there is a difference between representing what is real and 
what is true. Again, for many people in many places and times physical 
appearances are an illusion and only the ideal is true. So, even in nine-
teenth-century England an author might feel she was writing the truth, 
though not depicting the world around her in realistic terms. We must 
also distinguish sincere writing from realistic writing. Any writer might 
be sincere, true, and realistic at the same time, but these various qualities 
may occur separately and be rendered by different manners.
 The realism I refer to in this study is limited to the literary and artistic 
approach that emerged in the West in the latter half of the nineteenth 
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century. Villanueva makes the distinction between genetic realism, which 
assumes an external reality that can be objectively captured, and formal 
realism, which is more concerned with the relationship of the author and 
his text. For literary critics and creative writers today, both forms of realism 
involve creating the illusion of reality. But with nineteenth-century realism, 
writers and artists sought to pass that illusion off as a correct reflection of 
the way things are. My argument here is that Dickens did not accept that 
program. If one likes, one could say that he preferred the true to the real. He 
wanted to emphasize the human capacity to imagine. He wanted to heighten 
human experience through fancy.
 In this short study I have tried to show that Dickens behaved like a mae-
stro. He was the one in control; he directed the way his readers’ imagina-
tions should go. He wanted his art to show ultimately, if not immediately. In 
his early writing he was willing to expose his tricks directly, but he became 
more and more crafty in both senses of the word as he matured, until in 
his late works he purposely masked clues to a correct reading of his narra-
tives. What I have done is to offer some evidence for his consciousness of 
this program by exploring his use of such nonrealist devices as personifi-
cation, first-person narration, and typical or symbolic naming, but also by 
studying the way he uses realist techniques such as description, metonymy, 
and redundancy in a way that subverts or directly opposes the realist use 
of these techniques. Dickens’s descriptions, metonymies, and redundancies 
reinforce his command over the reader, whereas the realist seeks to give the 
reader a sense that she is controlling her reading. If Dickens could tell Wilkie 
Collins that the writer in some ways imitated providence, in his own writing 
he often sought to become that providential power that creates the design, 
makes his subjects follow it, and discloses its form when it has been fulfilled. 
What is interesting to me is the incredibly skillful methods he employed to 
do this, and I hope I have illuminated some of them here.
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Introduction
 1. Not everyone saw Dickens as a realist in the years before the term became com-
monplace. In an 1851 review, David Masson put Thackeray in the real school and 
Dickens in the ideal (Hawes, 137).
 2. Jane Millgate places Scott in the Romantic tradition, but in a way that aligns him 
with Dickens’s outlook. She writes that “in the movement from verse romance to prose 
fiction as embodied in the completed Waverley of 1814, Scott shifts from an initial 
romanticism of a very eighteenth-century kind to that much more nineteenth-century 
variety which perceives the imagination not as the enemy of knowledge and wisdom 
but as their very source” (57).
 3. Lukács connects Dickens to realism through his criticism of capitalism in 
Dombey and Son (212).
 4. In the 70s, Maurice Larkin linked realism with a greater concern for material 
reality as shaper of man, with an emphasis on such concepts as determinism, heredity, 
and environment (2ff). Such an approach suggests a different notion of realism (it does 
set out to mirror nature) than Franklin’s.
 5. Barthes discusses these traits of writing in S/Z (4).
 6. I am certainly not alone in seeing Gaskell and Dickens in opposition in the matter 
of literary realism. Here is a passage from Laurence Lerner’s introduction to Wives and 
Daughters. “Like all realists, Elizabeth Gaskell believed that environment forms char-
acter. No novelist would meticulously create the social medium in which his characters 
move and have their being if he did not believe it mattered. The romantic is more likely 
to see personality as formed, mysteriously, from within; nothing makes it clearer that 
Dickens was not, at the deepest level, a realist, than the metaphysical exemption from 
social influence that he gives to his really good and his really evil characters” (26).
n o t e s
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Chapter 1
 1. I wish to thank James Phelan and Audrey Jaffe for their advice that helped me to 
clarify the argument of this essay and also audiences at Wayne State University and the 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, for their helpful questions and comments.
 2. This quotation is taken from Dickens’s preface to the Cheap Edition of Oliver 
Twist [1850], reprinted in the Clarendon Press edition 383. 
 3. He reasserted its existence in the preface to the Charles Dickens Edition of the 
novel in 1867.
 4. But this dispute overlooks a more intriguing point that Umberto Eco explores 
in “The Strange Case of the Rue Servandoni.” This essay in Six Walks in the Fictional 
Woods asks, in Eco’s own words: “What happens when in a fictional text the author 
posits, as an element of the actual world (which is the background of the fictional one) 
something that does not obtain in the actual world?” (100). More specifically, he is 
concerned with what happens when Alexander Dumas locates a clearly fictional place 
in a real historical setting—a certain street, for example, in seventeenth-century Paris. 
What difference does this make to the act of reading on the one hand, and what differ-
ence to the “real world” on the other? Though Eco touches briefly on the latter point, 
his real concern is with “the format of the model reader’s Encyclopedia,” his or her body 
of information available for interpreting The Three Musketeers (109).
 5. Childers may be undervaluing the political project of deconstruction and over-
simplifying the dismissal of written texts out of the realm of direct influence on the 
social realm, but he is not alone in his reaction. In a related approach, Gerald Dawson 
argues in Soldier Heroes that identity itself follows a similar pattern of agency. “As imag-
ined forms, masculinities are at once ‘made up’ by creative cultural activity and yet 
materialize in the social world as structured forms with real effects upon both men and 
women” (22). Many commentators on deconstruction and postmodernism emphasize 
the movement away from the “real” toward the claustrophobia of the text. Christopher 
Norris offers this description of the trajectory from Foucault to Lyotard, Baudrillard, 
and the “apostles of postmodernity.”
As reality dissolved into the structures of discursive or textual representa-
tion, so the subject (after Lacan: the “subject-presumed-to-know”) became 
just a locus of multiple shifting and transient subject-positions, or a spec-
ular reflex of the epistemic will-to-truth whose ubiquitous workings Fou-
cault set out to expose. And from here it was no great distance to that stance 
of out-and-out cognitive scepticism—joined to an ultra-relativist position 
on issues of ethico-political judgment—which forms such a prominent 
(and depressing) feature of the current postmodernist cultural scene. (30)
Some time ago Terry Eagleton described the shift from structuralism to post-structur-
alism as “a shift from seeing the poem or novel as a closed entity, equipped with definite 
meanings which it is the critic’s task to decipher, to seeing it as irreducibly plural, an 
endless play of signifiers which can never be finally nailed down to a single centre, 
essence or meaning” (138). Jonathan Culler’s description of this same shift has a slightly 
different emphasis, but still stresses the increasing movement away from an acceptance 
of the text as referent to a “real” world and toward an emphasis upon the action of the 
text in and upon itself.
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In simplest terms, structuralists take linguistics as a model and attempt to 
develop “grammars”—systematic inventories of elements and their possi-
bilities of combination—that would account for the form and meaning of 
literary works; post-structuralists investigate the way in which this project 
is subverted by the workings of the texts themselves. Structuralists are con-
vinced that systematic knowledge is possible; post-structuralists claim to 
know only the impossibility of this knowledge. (22)
 6. Whether we see Dickens in the realist tradition or in some intermediary mode 
between romance and realism, it is pretty clear that he shared certain aims with novelists 
of his time. As Michael Irwin writes in his study of description in nineteenth-century 
fiction, “[t]he typical Victorian novel requires you to look for significance in terms of a 
slowly emerging pattern of relationships between an immense variety of elements, some 
important, some trivial, some the product of the intellect, some of imaginative instinct. 
It says more because it contains more. The author may fall short of his conscious pur-
pose, but he may also exceed it. In showing how he looks at the world about him he is 
likely to betray limitations and prejudices—who would not? But he also projects a view 
of life” (157). In projecting that view of life, most Victorian writers sought to affect the 
views of their readers as well.
 7. F. S. Schwarzbach writes of the detailed journey made by Oliver and the Artful 
Dodger into London.
The details of their route are scrupulously accurate—every street and 
turning is carefully and exactly named. And yet the effect is not, as one 
might expect, an enhanced sense of realism. The seeming precision is only 
on the surface: by naming the streets, and giving us no other detail about 
or description of them, the passage shatters their particularity and renders 
them virtually interchangeable. Reading the paragraph is like entering 
a maze, which is precisely what Oliver has done. This is the labyrinth of 
London. (46)
 8. I would like to endorse Ruth Ronen’s purpose of correcting the almost canonical 
theoretical perception of description as non-narrative. Along the way, she notes that 
description may serve many different narrative purposes. She describes description as 
“the territory of maximal reference and minimal significance” and notes that “the refer-
entiality of descriptions, which is in itself a discursive convention, makes them gener-
ally devoid of meaning unless organized on a higher level” (282). With Dickens that 
organization took place consciously at the ideological level.
 9. Carole Fabricant’s Swift’s Landscapes examines in detail Swift’s idiosyncratic rep-
resentation of real places, but does not pursue to any degree the philosophical or lin-
guistic implications of his approach.
 10. Richard Maxwell quotes a description of Jacob’s Island from the South London 
Chronicle of 1 April 1890, indicating that the location’s reputation persisted. Maxwell 
himself comments: “The willful mixing of rumor and fact is typical of Jacob’s Island, 
a freak socially marginal to the great city yet strongly insistent, pulling the wanderer 
toward it” (90). In a footnote, Maxwell points out that Jacob’s Island became identified 
with Dickens over the years. A celebration of the repeal of the Corn Laws was held 
in 1846 “on that highly interesting Spot, described by Charles Dickens.” A newspaper 
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clipping of 1920 remarks that “the only visitors [Jacob’s Island] receives from the outer 
world are the Dickensians. . . .” And a 1934 Daily Mirror article announced the demo-
lition of Bill Sikes’s house on Jacob’s Island (Maxwell 341). Writing in the nineteen-
forties, E. Beresford Chancellor was confident about Sikes’s house: “The actual house 
visited by Sikes has been identified as being at the back of 18 Eckell Street in Metcalf 
Yard, now used as stables” (123). He offers no evidence for the identification. Not only 
is Jacob’s Island identified with Dickens, but the expression “Dickensian,” when applied 
to descriptions of certain kinds of poverty, tends to render them picturesque.
 11. Wells’s directions place Moreau’s island in the region of the Galapagos Islands. 
Since Wells’s novel deals with the attempt to speed up Darwinian speciation by surgical 
means, his directions for the island’s location might have a sly, ironic point to make, 
something quite characteristic of the early Wells.
 12. Lopes’s Foregrounded Description in Prose Fiction makes a case for description’s 
potential for major narrative functions, instead of consigning it to an inevitable back-
ground or subordinate role, as rhetorical tradition generally has done.
 13. I can appreciate the pleasure derived from constructing a spatial design of the 
locations contained in a novel or in viewing such a design, but this is surely a pleasure 
separate from that of reading the text itself.
 14. Another variation on the Old Curiosity Shop syndrome occurred when the 
Bookman ran a special number on Mrs. Humphry Ward and included photographs 
of real homes that presumably were the originals for the estates described in Ward’s 
novels. This attempt to “authenticate” Ward’s fictions offers little that is helpful in the 
way of appreciating her achievement as a novelist, though it may reveal a great deal 
about how readers conflate authors and their texts, often with less interest in the text 
than in the author’s relationship to a presumed reality. The information about Ward and 
the Bookman I have derived from a paper by Beth Sutton Ramspeck entitled “A Photo’s 
Worth a Dozen Novels? Mary Ward in Turn-of-the-Century Gaze” at the Midwest Vic-
torian Studies Association conference at Indiana University, April 27, 1996.
 15. In Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Searle explores in detail the 
underlying assumptions that support his view of intentionality.
Chapter 2
 1. This chapter originated as a short essay by Susan Beckwith. I became a co-author 
and made extensive contributions to the original essay. Subsequently, I revised a good 
deal for inclusion in this book.
 2. Lorna Martens’s The Diary Novel examines this use of present-tense narration. 
The present tense was also often used clumsily to increase dramatic effect. In John 
Henry Newman’s Callista, for example, there are many awkward shifts in tense where 
Newman seems merely to be attempting to heighten dramatic effect. Chapter 35 opens 
with the sentence: “We have already had occasion to mention that there were many 
secret well-wishers, or at least protectors of Christians, as in the world at large, so also 
in Sicca” (343). The next paragraph begins: “The burning sun of Africa is at the height of 
its power” (344). But the next is back to standard past-tense narration: “She too thought 
it was the unwelcome philosopher come again . . .” (344).
 3. Janice Carlisle similarly notes that unconventional present-tense narration 
became commonplace in the late Victorian period especially among second-rate or 
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inexperienced writers (84).
 4. Janice Carlisle and Randolph Quirk are two Dickens scholars who have noted 
Dickens’s use of present tense. Carlisle sees its use in Dombey and Son as a means of 
achieving immediacy by drawing the reader more forcefully into the narrative (77, 85).
 5. Early studies that concentrate on the relationships between providence and nar-
rative include Leopold Damrosch Jr.’s God’s Plots and Man’s Stories, Thomas Vargish’s 
The Providential Aesthetic in Victorian Fiction, and John R. Reed’s Victorian Will. These 
scholars examine how writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Great 
Britain and elsewhere could assume on their readers’ part a belief in a covert and some-
times apparent teleology in human affairs under the superintendence of a benign or 
baleful God. In many instances, novelists likened their own plots to the implicit ten-
dency of Providence.
 6. Sue Lonoff notes this peculiar reader response in Wilkie Collins and His Victorian 
Readers (144).
 7. This technique may serve two purposes: Rosemary Jann writes that “although 
authors using third-person narrators can accomplish this by limiting their omniscience, 
there is always a certain amount of conscious concealment of important information 
on the author’s part that may try the reader’s patience” (23), and Tzvetan Todorov 
points out, with respect to his formulation of point of view, that “the tenor of each piece 
of information is determined by the person who transmits it, no observation exists 
without an observer” (46). Thus Collins’s use of several first-person narrators also serves 
to disguise any objective truth that an omniscient narrator would have to provide; the 
eyewitnesses who speak for themselves may distort a clue that is the key to the mystery. 
However, should this happen within Collins’s structure of the narrative, neither the 
“editor” nor the author would be held to blame for this misinterpretation.
 8. Martens deals with this particular point in her excellent examination of diary 
writing (5), but, oddly enough, though she mentions Miss Clack’s diary in The Moon-
stone, she entirely overlooks the more dramatic instance of Marian Halcombe’s in The 
Woman in White.
 9. It is also possible for the diarist to record recollections and memories of more 
distant pasts. And, as an aside, I should also note that diarists record not only their own 
stories, but the lives (past and present) of those around them.
 10. But what does it mean to end well? Where is the end that is well? Frank Kermode 
emphasizes in The Genesis of Secrecy that human life is played out with a sense that we 
are in the middle of events. He addresses this issue on the cosmic level, but it applies 
as well to individual lives. The person who writes an autobiography at the age of thirty 
comes to the end of things in her narrative and might even conclude that the story of 
her life has ended well. But the next few years might change that story considerably.
 11. Although it is only tangential to my interests here, it is a note of some importance 
that Marian never speaks for herself outside of the medium of the diary. Hereafter, any-
thing which she contributes is filtered through Hartright’s narrative.
 12. Dickens used present-tense narration elsewhere—in Dombey and Son and David 
Copperfield, for example—but his use of present tense in the three novels discussed here 
is systematic and extensive.
 13. Carlyle made frequent use of present-tense narration in The French Revolution, 
thereby creating greater drama and what he himself regarded as a novelistic effect. Of 
course, Dickens claimed to have read The French Revolution many times and declared it 
a source for his own A Tale of Two Cities.
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 14. An extreme example of this penetration in cinema is Last Year at Marienbad, 
written by Alain Robbe-Grillet and directed by Alain Resnais.
 15. What I am describing here using Benveniste’s terms, Suzanne Fleishman explores 
in narratological terms, explaining that present-tense narrations are unstable because 
they erase the distinction between the two temporal planes of the past tense of narrated 
events and the time of narration.
 16. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan accepts the idea of external and internal focalization (74ff).
 17. See Genette’s response to Bal in Narrative Discourse Revisited, chapter 12. Sey-
mour Chatman offers different terms to clarify the process others lump together as 
focalization. “I propose slant to name the narrator’s attitudes and other mental nuances 
appropriate to the report function of discourse, and filter to name the much wider range 
of mental activity experienced by characters in the story world—perceptions, cogni-
tions, attitudes, emotions, memories, fantasies, and the like” (143). Manfred Jahn offers 
a means to adjust this difference within the concept of focalization by employing the 
concept of field of vision and presenting the idea of narrators at the windows of James’s 
House of Fiction.
 18. Another notorious instance is in chapter 32, when the narrator associates Krook’s 
spontaneous combustion with the injustice of the British courts.
 19. Of the 23 chapters, those already mentioned as well as those numbered 9, 10, 
11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22 are in the past tense. The novel opens and closes 
(though we can never know if the later action would have been Dickens’s intent) with a 
present-tense narration.
 20. It would be interesting to consider the situation of the “implied” audience. This 
chapter deals only with the fact that Dickens has set up a narrative that is being told in 
the present tense by an unknown narrator. But to whom is this narrator speaking, for 
this is speech and not written text? Does not the present-tense narrator imply an imme-
diate present-tense auditor? The device that this most immediately resembles is the 
aside spoken by a living actor to a living audience in the theater, and there is no question 
but that Dickens’s use of present-tense narration in Drood heightens the drama. Several 
authors have dealt with problems of audience reception of present-tense narration from 
Genette on, but one of the most compelling is James Phelan’s study of J. M. Coetzee’s 
Waiting for the Barbarians, where the instability created by simultaneous narration acts 
as a means of involving the reader in a double sense of complicity, first in the events of 
the story and then in the way that we are obliged to process them.
 21. Robin W. Winks makes a similar comparison in Modus Operandi, when he states 
that “In football  .  .  .  the variables at any given moment are enormous. To the spec-
tator, suspense arises as much from not knowing what must happen next  .  .  .—the 
huddle allows one’s doubts, like private detectives, to search out weaknesses in the game 
plan . . . the beauty in sport . . . arises from the persistence of doubt, and its mounting 
repetitious nature . . . living with ambiguity is not easy. Most people like their History 
[sic] clear and plain” (8). In the Victorian era the variables themselves were not even 
fully known and history was being eroded by a new revolution—one which questioned 
not just the structures, but the very foundations upon which people laid their lives.
 22. Morson unwittingly supports this picture of the serial reader when he says, “spec-
tators have to be simultaneous with the events they watch” (176). The Mystery of Edwin 
Drood dramatically confirms the open-endedness of serial publication because Dick-
ens’s death before the narrative was completed has turned the novel into a continuing 
memorial of such open-endedness.
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Chapter 3
 1. S. D. Powell calls attention to the well-established tradition of interest in Dickens’s 
naming of characters in a long footnote, listing Elizabeth Hope Gordon as among the 
first to attempt to categorize those names (63).
 2. Miller observes that this allusion to Halevy’s aria compounds a pattern of other 
references to Jewishness, anti-Semitism, and so forth pervasive in Proust’s narrative. 
 3. Harry Stone examines the intricacies of Dickens’s practice of naming and calls 
it a “carefully calculated and artfully articulated system that gives up its secrets only 
to the initiate” (“What’s in a Name?” 193). It is possible that naming had greater reso-
nance in the nineteenth century than it does today, since naming was recognized as 
part of formal church practice. Michael Cotsell remarks in reference to a passage in Our 
Mutual Friend that the second question in the Catechism of the Church of England is 
“Who gave you this Name?”, for which the answer is: “My Godfathers and Godmothers 
in my Baptism; wherein I was made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an 
inheritor of the kingdom of heaven” (173). The narrator makes direct reference to this 
situation in chapter 40 of Bleak House, when he notes that on the occasion of Wool-
wich’s last birthday, “Mr. Bagnet certainly did, after observing on his growth and general 
advancement, proceed, in a moment of profound reflection on the changes wrought 
by time, to examine him in the catechism; accomplishing with extreme accuracy the 
questions number one and two, What is your name? And Who gave you that name? But 
there failing in the exact precision of his memory, and substituting for number three, 
the question And how do you like that name?” (666).
 4. Harry Stone examines the significance of Headstone’s name in some detail 
(“What’s in a Name” 198ff). Joel Brattin offers a close look at Headstone’s name and 
more by way of a reading of Dickens’s manuscript (147ff).
 5. Viewing naming as an assertion of power is my suggestion, not Stewart’s.
 6. Michael Cotsell reminds us that Jenny Wren is a character out of nursery lore, 
notably as the partner of Robin Redbreast or Cock Robin. He reproduces a poem in 
which Jenny Wren falls sick and gets well, but is hostile to Robin Redbreast (140).
 7. David Copperfield has attracted the most attention about naming among Dick-
ens’s novels. I refer here to two recent articles, one by S. D. Powell and one by Richard 
Lettis, both of which appeared together in Dickens Studies Annual.
 8. Richard Lettis says that Brooks is a conventional British alias (75).
 9. S. D. Powell has this to say about Dora’s nickname for David:
His willing acceptance of this name, however, and the narrator’s refusal to 
criticize himself for it, should be an immediate tip-off that his attraction to 
Dora is wrongheaded, that the narrator recognizes as we do that “Doady” 
represents a step back from the mature freedom of “Trotwood” and the 
family that bestowed that name. (56–57)
 10. Richard Lettis comments that nobody knows Littimer’s Christian name (71).
 11. Harry Stone shows how Dickens fits Murdstone into a similar larger pattern.
“The notes, therefore, not only show Dickens carefully fashioning the name 
‘Murdstone,’ but shaping the name and controlling the attendant imagery 
(and the motifs that the name and the imagery embody) so that each 
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enriches and illuminates the other.” (“What’s in a Name?” 196)
 12. I find J. Hillis Miller’s reading of Bleak House compatible with my argument about 
Dickens’s mode of incorporating his names into a larger network of imagery.
Bleak House is properly allegorical, according to a definition of allegory as 
a temporal system of cross references among signs rather than as a spatial 
pattern of correspondence between signs and referents. Most people in the 
novel live without understanding their plight. The novel, on the other hand, 
gives the reader the information necessary to understand why the charac-
ters suffer, and at the same time the power to understand that the novel is 
fiction rather than mimesis. The novel calls attention to its own procedures 
and confesses to its own rhetoric, not only, for example, in the onomastic 
system of metaphorical names already discussed, but also in the insistent 
metaphors of the style throughout. (Introduction 29)
 13. Juliet McMaster observes an interesting pattern of naming in The Old Curiosity 
Shop. Whereas there is detailed naming in Quilp’s side of the narrative, the naming is 
intentionally vague and general in Nell’s, in keeping, she suggests, with the interests of 
a “generalized allegorical fable” (114). She also comments on Quilp’s fascination with 
naming as an “almost fiendish device” (115).
 14. Tom Lloyd examines some of the consequences of names in regard to Pip and 
Magwitch (104ff).
 15. Cotsell notes that Dickens was given to this kind of naming, especially for voting 
constituencies—the most memorable, perhaps, being the town of Eatanswill in Pickwick 
Papers (144).
 16. McMaster, again, notes that place names are particular where associated with 
Quilp, but unspecific when associated with Nell (116). Dickens uses a far different 
approach in Hard Times, beginning with the appropriate Coketown for the name of its 
chief city.
 17. Harry Stone does not highlight the difference between Dickens’s aims in writing 
and those of the realists, but his description of those aims is highly compatible with my 
own.
What then can we conclude from the process I have just been tracing? 
Simply this: that Dickens’s names are quintessential embodiments of what 
one sees everywhere in his art, a fusion of the wild, the portentous, and the 
fantastic with the rational and the everyday. His names, like his whispering 
houses, terrifying streets, primordial storms, and spell-casting witches are 
at once wildly expressionistic and improbable and profoundly real and ordi-
nary. Dickens conveys with the same stroke the surface of things and the 
hidden springs of meaning. His world is discrete, tangible, and familiar, but 
also interconnected, fantastic, and mysterious. (“What’s in a Name” 203)
Chapter 4
 1. Juliet McMasters mentions the leitmotif of handkerchiefs in the novel, including 
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Bill Sikes’s handkerchief that foreshadows his accidental hanging (47ff). John O. Jordan 
indicates that Dickens is true to the facts of his time in his “sociological” treatment of 
handkerchiefs, but also suggests that Dickens goes beyond realism. “As they reappear 
and pass from one context to another, handkerchiefs take on increasing thematic and 
figural significance in the novel” (6). It is just this movement from the real to the figural 
that I am arguing Dickens became conscious of and used more and more purposefully 
through his career.
 2. I offer a different approach to the description of Jacob’s Island in chapter 1 of the 
present study.
 3. Jakobson makes this distinction about literature, but his study of contiguous 
(metonymic) and similar (metaphoric) patterns of thinking and linguistic expression is 
based upon the clinical study of aphasia.
 4. As mentioned in the text, J. Hillis Miller provides an excellent study of “Medita-
tions in Monmouth Street” as a mode of metonymic description and then later indicates 
how this remarkable performance is based upon a convention. “The row of old clothes 
which Boz sees in Monmouth Street gives rise, however, to a wholly conventional nar-
rative, the story of the idle apprentice” (Sketches 35).
 5. Nancy Aycock Metz calls attention to the Analytical’s relationship to the narrator.
 6. Although I admire Kearns’s arguments, I think that they are undermined to a 
large degree by the works that she chooses to treat as realist texts. Although she her-
self suggests that Frankenstein, A Blithedale Romance, Wuthering Heights, and much of 
Dickens do not really represent realism, she goes on to explore these works in detail. 
Moreover, she includes Dracula in the range of realism!
 7. Miller contends against Jakobson’s opposition of metonymy/prose vs metaphor/
poetry, declaring there can be no such diagrammatic opposition (40). But Jakobson is 
not so hard and fast as Miller suggests, indicating that metonymy and metaphor are 
polarities on a continuum.
Chapter 5
 1. Susan Horton captures this aspect of Dickens’s writing:
There comes to be in the reader of Dickens’s novels, then, a powerful per-
ception of meaning at the point at which the reader begins to see gestural, 
phrasal, behavioural predictability in Dickens’s fictive world run directly up 
against Dickens’s world in description, which turns out to be a world in flux, 
and always and ever in the process of transformation. (8)
 2. J. Hillis Miller argues for a kind of utility for prosopopoeia, but as a speech act 
performed by an author/narrator, and an interpretation of that act by a reader, both of 
which result in making something happen. But I am speaking of the personifications 
within the diegesis—that is, the events and circumstances of the narrative.
 3. Richard Lettis puts the tension in these terms.
Faced with a choice between reality and imagination, Dickens usually chose 
the latter, but he distinguished between the imaginative and the ideal; obliged 
to choose between reality and unfounded ideality, he chose the real. (208)
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 4. Peter Brooks, like many other critics, is reluctant to classify Dickens as a realist, 
but finally includes Hard Times as a questionable example of the realist impulse, though 
he is disappointed in its lack of specific social detail. One of his observations about the 
novel fits in nicely with the passages I have cited from Horton and Kucich. He says that 
Dickens employs “the procedure of turning all issues, facts, conditions, into questions of 
style. Hard Times becomes, even more than Dickens’s other novels, a drama of opposed 
styles, presided over by the quicksilver agility of the narrator’s styles” (43–44). I would 
add to this that it is precisely through the mastery of style that Dickens retains control 
of his text in a way that realists cannot.
 5. I discuss Dickens’s nonrealist use of metonymy in chapter 4 of this study.
Chapter 6
 1. Henry James, The Art of Fiction and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1948), 49.
 2. In “The Cup and the Lip and the Riddle of Our Mutual Friend,” ELH 62:4 (1995), 
955–77, Gregg A. Hecimovich discloses a particularly sophisticated riddling technique 
in the novel. My approach resembles his in calling attention to a need for interpreting 
clues, but my focus is far different, concentrating on the way in which Dickens swamps 
his reader with information initially seeming to be redundant in the colloquial sense, 
but ultimately helping to deliver the novel’s meaning more clearly. Both Hecimovich 
and I agree on Dickens’s purpose of wanting to reinforce the significance of his narra-
tive.
 3. George Levine in his seminal The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Fran-
kenstein to Lady Chatterley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) wrote that 
the realist effort was “the struggle to avoid the inevitable conventionality of language 
in pursuit of the unattainable unmediated reality. Realism, as a literary method, can 
in these terms be defined as a self-conscious effort, usually in the name of some moral 
enterprise of truth telling and extending the limits of human sympathy, to make litera-
ture appear to be describing directly not some other language but reality itself (whatever 
that may be taken to be): in this effort, the writer must self-contradictorily dismiss pre-
vious conventions of representation while, in effect, establishing new ones” (8). He also 
wrote that “the continuing literary problem that plagued realism from the start was the 
incompatibility of tight form with plausibility” (11). There is a long history in modern 
literary criticism of the interrogation of Victorian realism, beginning at least with Ken-
neth Graham’s English Criticism of the Novel 1865–1900.
 4. Information theory has found its way into so much of today’s culture that an 
elaborate discussion of it here is unnecessary. It has even penetrated the natural sci-
ences, affecting the discourse of such fields as genetics and microbiology, where there 
is much discussion about the transmission of “information” by chromosomal action. 
Friedrich Kittler demonstrates, in his essay “The World of the Symbolic,” Jacque Lacan’s 
use of information theory for psychoanalytic theory, and Umberto Eco, in The Open 
Work, applies what he prefers to call communication theory to music, making use of 
Leonard B. Meyer’s “Meaning in Music and Information Theory.” My understanding of 
information theory is derived largely from Jeremy Campbell’s Grammatical Man: Infor-
mation, Entropy, Language, and Life. Subsequent references appear in the text. Camp-
bell gives an account of information theory based primarily upon the work of Claude 
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Shannon, but more recent theories provide some different perspectives on that work. 
Kittler quotes the following passage about what has been called “logical depth” at IBM.
The value of a message . . . appears to reside not in its information (its abso-
lutely unpredictable parts), nor in its obvious redundancy (verbatim repeti-
tions, unequal digit frequencies), but rather in what may be called its buried 
redundancy—parts predictable only with difficulty, things the receiver 
could in principle have figured out without being told, but only at consider-
able cost in money, time, or computation. (152)
 5. Charles Dickens, Our Mutual Friend (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 1. 
Subsequent references appear in the text.
 6. John Romano notes that Lightwood, in his first narration, is satirizing a specific 
kind of sentimental romance, but the story he tells nonetheless has real force (37). I 
can’t agree with Romano’s suggestion that Mortimer mirrors Dickens’s own desire to 
discredit representational form, though I do agree that Dickens wishes to get beyond 
many conventions of the fiction of his day.
 7. Redundancy is a notion familiar now in various areas of language and symbol 
study, such as linguistics and composition. A few examples include Jean-Claude Choul’s 
“Redundancy as a Semiotic Principle,” Alice Horning’s “Readable Writing: The Role of 
Cohesion and Redundancy,” and Susan Rubin Suleiman, “Redundancy and the ‘Read-
able’ Text.”
 8. This equation was invented by Ludwig Boltzmann; in it, S stands for entropy, k for 
a universal constant known as Boltzmann’s constant, and W for the number of ways in 
which the system can be arranged (Campbell, 46).
 9. Redundancy has been employed to examine literary techniques. Umberto Eco’s 
The Open Work was an early example of its use in literary theory, and it shows up as 
well in Kittler’s essays. However, the term, when applied to literary analysis, has varying 
meanings. James Phelan offers an illuminating approach, very different from my own, 
in his essay “Redundant Telling, Preserving the Mimetic, and the Functions of Char-
acter Narration,” where he is concerned with the way in which an author must convey 
information to her readership which is redundant in her text. “Redundant telling occurs 
when a narrator gives an unmotivated report of information to a narratee that the nar-
ratee already possesses” (210). His examples are Browning’s “My Last Duchess” and 
Sandra Cisneros’s short story “Barbie-Q.” Meir Sternberg uses the idea of redundancy 
as overwriting in Expositional Modes and Temporal Order in Fiction and The Poetics of 
Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading.
 10. The conference involved scientists associated with MIT’s new Neuroscience 
Research Project and featured Roman Jakobson, who suggested the similarity between 
linguistic and molecular codes.
 11. Tom Lloyd writes of the handkerchief: “It is invested with different meanings, yet 
it means nothing in itself as it passes from person to person; thus, it is emblematic of 
the system of disengaged signs on which society rests in Bleak House. Esther’s gift of the 
handkerchief is a selfless act; around it, the mother builds a shrine with its “little bunch 
of sweet herbs” (BH 162), but for Lady Dedlock it suggests the child she has “discovered 
yet buried” (10).
 12. I have mentioned only a few examples of a pattern of redundancy that is quite 
complex. Just one additional example indicates how the death and burial theme reveals 
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through family history, violence, and supposed revenants, broad social and political 
implications. I refer to the whole assemblage of references to the Ghost’s Walk at 
Chesney Wold.
 13. If anyone should doubt that Dickens knew full well how he was tightly struc-
turing his novel and keeping it under his own control, his notes for chapter 6 make his 
intentions clear. In The Companion to Our Mutual Friend, Michael Cotsell indicates 
that Dickens wrote: “Back to the opening chapter of the book. strongly,” that last word 
underlined three times (255).
 14. J. Hillis Miller sees the river as representing “material otherness” to human beings, 
to which the mysterious depth of the human spirit is analogous, in Charles Dickens: The 
World of His Novels, 318ff. He describes the river as a realm of death and transforma-
tion.
 15. A complicated thematic pattern of captivity, imprisonment, and other forms of 
confinement winds its way through Our Mutual Friend to reinforce the same overall 
message stressed by those of water, dirt, and mud themes.
 16. Michael Cotsell calls attention to a passage in the manuscript of Friend that is 
omitted in the proofs, which indicates that what is not found in the dust mounds is 
“what’s good and true” (Companion, 75).
 17. This scene interestingly brings together the water and earth motifs. Greenwich 
Hospital was the official retirement facility for invalids who had served in the Royal 
Navy. Gruff and Glum had obviously seen serious action, as his two wooden legs sug-
gest, but he also hints at the mudworm Wegg with his one wooden leg. Unlike Wegg, 
the pensioner can be won over and raised up from the mud by the spectacle of love. 
Greenwich Hospital and the pensioner might have been in Dickens’s mind because as he 
was completing Our Mutual Friend, an act of Parliament in 1865 allowed out-pensions 
to the pensioners, who would no longer be required to live on the grounds.
 18. The concept of the death of the author, from Roland Barthes onward, along 
with the active fields of reader response and reception theory, among other critical 
approaches, necessarily plays down the masterfulness of the author. One imagines these 
theoretical approaches would have been anathema to a writer like Dickens, who exerted 
himself to retain as much control as he could over his texts, including his artist’s illustra-
tions for them.
 19. Boffin’s idealization of the lives of famous misers might be read as a playful inver-
sion of Carlyle’s assertion: “The history of the world is but the biography of great men.”
 20. Murray Baumgarten writes in “Fictions of the City,” The Cambridge Companion 
to Charles Dickens: “Like the detectives of the London Metropolitan Police, founded in 
1829, whom he admired and wrote about in Household Words, Dickens teaches us how 
to decode that city world and navigate through its darker streets. His fiction trains us in 
keen and swift observation, careful judgment, and thoughtful commitment” (117).
 21. Eco reminds us that information theory was not designed for analyzing works of 
art, but his endeavor in The Open Work is to demonstrate that a work of art can be ana-
lyzed like any other form of communication and information theory can assist in that 
endeavor (68). Eco also states that the meaning of a message “is a function of the order, 
the conventions, and the redundancy of its structure. The more one respects the laws of 
probability (the preestablished principles that guide the organization of a message and 
are reiterated via the repetition of foreseeable elements), the clearer and less ambiguous 
its meaning will be” (93). My position in this chapter is that Dickens increases the likeli-
hood of his message being conveyed by redundant thematic elements, even as he tests 
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some of the conventions of the novel form. Those who have seen Our Mutual Friend as 
a disordered baggy monster, have, in my view, missed the message.
 22. The importance of underrating and of controlling narratives takes some odd little 
turns in the novel. For example, when Jenny’s father discovers Lizzie’s whereabouts, 
young Blight brings him to Wrayburn at the Veneerings’. He sends in a note to notify 
his master. This is an important turning point in the narrative, for Wrayburn will now 
pursue Lizzie and be pursued by Headstone. But there is a possibility that this line of 
action might be prevented and the narrator hints at it in a self-reflexive manner. “Then 
the Analytical, perusing a scrap of paper lying on the salver, with the air of a literary 
Censor, adjusts it, takes his time about going to the table with it, and presents it to Mr. 
Eugene Wrayburn” (627). Nancy Aycock Metz has suggested in “The Artistic Reclama-
tion of Waste in Our Mutual Friend” that the Analytical Chemist mirrors the narrator 
in various ways. Here he could be considered as a force capable of redirecting the nar-
rative by refusing to deliver the necessary data to generate Wrayburn’s next actions. As 
elsewhere in the novel, he does not interfere with the tale.
 23. Dickens wrote a now-famous letter to Wilkie Collins on 6 October 1859, in which 
he likened the novelist’s role to that of providence. I am not arguing that Dickens had 
a simple perception of ordered existence. I believe he felt it necessary to fight for such 
an order. But this order had less to do with the conventions of realism than with the 
adventures of the imagination. John Romano puts the case rather well when he writes, 
“Dickens’ own epistemology, if it may be called one, seems indeed to have been that 
reality is forever escaping our grasp, forever going deeper than, forever superseding and 
outdistancing, the forms provided by the chasing mind” (46–47).
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